GHSA-HJGC-JC5V-FW7H
Remote attestation is susceptible to relay attacks
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-HJGC-JC5V-FW7H divulgada · CVSS 7.4 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
### Impact
Before v1.16.0, Contrast accepted any attestation report that verified correctly and matched the expected firmware patch levels and software measurements, regardless of which CVM-enabled machine produced it. In the absence of additional access controls, Contrast would therefore accept a Coordinator or workload running on any CVM-enabled machine. An attacker could exploit this to impersonate a Coordinator or workload. This required intercepting network traffic between the CLI and the Coordinator, or between the Coordinator and a workload. In addition, the attacker had to forge attestation reports or extract secrets from CVMs on such a machine, e.g. through physical attacks on the CVMs or the attestation infrastructure. Our documentation didn't state that such additional access controls were required.
### Patches
The publication of physical attacks on TEEs, such as TEE.fail in 2025, prompted us to support restricting the set of accepted machines natively in Contrast. Contrast v1.16.0 introduces machine ID pinning with two new manifest fields: `AllowedChipIDs` for SEV-SNP and `AllowedPIIDs` for TDX. If set, Contrast only accepts reports from the listed machines, tying machine access control to attestation. The documentation now covers this requirement: https://docs.edgeless.systems/contrast/architecture/components/manifest#snp-allowed-chip-ids
### Recommendations
Populate `AllowedChipIDs` and `AllowedPIIDs` with the IDs of machines you trust, obtained through a trusted channel such as physical access. If these fields are empty, reports from any machine are accepted. This may still be acceptable if external measures restrict the set of accepted machines, or if the attacker described above, e.g. one able to extract keys from CVMs through physical attacks, is outside your threat model.
### Credits
The requirement to restrict the set of accepted machines is known from the academic literature, e.g., Parno's cuckoo attack (2008) and VC3 (2015). We thank Usama Sardar and team for their related analysis and reporting. It prompted us to publish this advisory, to document the requirement more explicitly, and to expedite the release of the patch.
_Updated 2026-11-18: shortened and clarified. Affected versions and fix unchanged._
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Estado del parche por paquete
La fuente no informa paquetes ni versiones corregidas.
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/edgelesssys/contrast/security/advisories/GHSA-hjgc-jc5v-fw7hLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
