llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · mareforma

GHSA-HXH5-GP44-RC6P

Mareforma: verify_bundle never checks a per-claim signature

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión0.3.8
Exposición14 hDesde la divulgación, 19 nov 2026, 11:03 a. m.
Detección16 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
11:03 a. m.
12:51 a. m.
11:03 a. m.
02:30 p. m.
05:57 p. m.
09:24 p. m.
12:51 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-HXH5-GP44-RC6P divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

What's wrong

`verify_bundle` documents that it verifies "a bundle's DSSE envelope AND each per-claim signature", lists "per-claim signature failure" among its raised errors, and promises that partial verification never surfaces "an authenticated bundle that contains some invalid claims" as success. The code does not do this. The JSON-LD predicate built by `JSONLDExporter._claim_node` carries no signature material (there is no `signatureBundle` field on the node), so the verify loop has nothing cryptographic to check per claim. It only re-derives each claim's canonical-statement digest from the node fields and compares it to the signed subject list:

chain_input = _signing.canonical_statement({...node fields...}, node.get("evidence") or {})
expected = hashlib.sha256(chain_input).hexdigest()
if subjects[subject_name] != expected:
    raise BundleVerificationError(...)

That digest check is self-referential: the exporter signs both the subject digests and the predicate nodes with the same key. It confirms the bundle is internally consistent as built, not that each claim's purported asserter ever validly signed it. The existing test `test_tampered_claim_text_in_predicate_fails` asserts a "digest mismatch", confirming digest-only verification is the actual contract.

Severity and impact

Medium. All trust in a bundle collapses to the single exporter key. Whoever holds it (or a malicious exporter) can emit a bundle containing claims whose asserter signatures are missing, invalid, or forged, and `verify_bundle` returns success. A relying party reading the docstring believes per-claim authenticity was verified when it was not. Security-sensitive because this is the trust boundary the SCITT-style export exists to provide.

Location

  • `mareforma/export_bundle.py:20` module docstring claims verification checks "every per-claim signature inside predicate"
  • `mareforma/export_bundle.py:183` `verify_bundle` docstring promises per-claim signature verification and a per-claim signature failure error
  • `mareforma/export_bundle.py:254` verify loop only recomputes and compares canonical-statement digests
  • `mareforma/exporters/jsonld.py:178` `_claim_node` emits no signature field, so the predicate carries nothing to verify per claim

Fix direction

Two honest options. Either export each claim's signature bundle in the JSON-LD predicate and have `verify_bundle` cryptographically verify it (including the claim_id and subject binding) against the claim's asserter or validator key, raising on the first failure as documented. Or, if per-claim verification is out of scope for the bundle format, correct the module docstring and the `verify_bundle` docstring to state exactly what is verified: the bundle-level DSSE signature plus internal subject-digest consistency, with per-claim asserter signatures explicitly not checked.

Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on `main`, then make it pass.

Quality bar

SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
mareforma≥ 0.3.0 < 0.3.8
0.3.0
0.3.8
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
PyPImareforma
Corregida 0.3.8 — —
Versiones corregidas0.3.8
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71536
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/security/advisories/GHSA-hxh5-gp44-rc6p
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/pull/58
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/commit/20caa4a5a9557a140a09a5d2c1c4a6a2124c0cc3
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma
Otrahttps://github.com/mareforma/mareforma/releases/tag/v0.3.8

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.