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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @cdxgen/cdxgen

GHSA-HXX2-G8W7-CQX4

Scanned content can make cdxgen read host files outside the scanned tree into the BOM

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
6.5
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche el mismo día de la divulgación
Exposición8 dDesde la divulgación, 12 nov 2026, 9:51 p. m.
Detección5 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Traje la llave inglesa: esto se arregla.Hoy toca mantenimiento, no heroísmo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 12.9.2
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
13 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
13 nov 26
15 nov 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-HXX2-G8W7-CQX4 divulgada · CVSS 6.5 (GitHub)
Remediación Parche 12.9.2 @cyclonedx/cdxgen · 0 d desde divulgación
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

Several readers open paths that scanned content names, or follow symbolic links in scanned content, without checking that the result stays inside the scanned tree. The author of a repository, pull request, archive, extension folder or container image who can later read the BOM learns the contents, selected fields, or existence of files on the scanning host. Most routes work with `--no-install-deps` and with `CDXGEN_SECURE_MODE=true` when the Node.js permission model is not enabled, and some return data through `cdxgen --server` for paths that `CDXGEN_SERVER_ALLOWED_PATHS` refuses.

Details

Contents or fields of host files

  • *AI and CI readers that follow links.* `communityAiConfigParser.parse()` in `lib/inventory/communityAiConfigParser.js` reads every discovered rule, command and skill markdown file with `readFileSync()` and copies its text, up to the first blank line and with no length limit, into `cdx:agent:description`. A committed link to a private key or to `/proc/self/environ` puts that content into the BOM; only nine token shapes are redacted. This reader runs for `-t ai-skill` and the ai-agent audit category. More than a dozen other readers open files the same way, including the Jenkinsfile reader (untyped scans with `CI=true`) and the Gradle wrapper reader (any `-t java` scan).
  • *pnpm lock file names.* `findPnpmPackagePath()` in `lib/ecosystems/parsers-js.js` joins a locked package name, or `name@version`, onto `node_modules` without checking that the result stays inside, and `pnpmMetadata()` copies description, author, license, homepage, repository URL, bin and script names from the `package.json` found there. No link is needed, so this also works for trees the server clones from a git URL.
  • *npm metadata in deep mode.* With `--deep` (or `--evidence`, or a profile that implies it), `fillMissingMetadataFromLocalNodeModules()` in `lib/ecosystems/jsEvidence.js` (in 12.x, the `LocalNodeModulesPath` lookup in `lib/helpers/utils.js`) reads `package.json` at a location derived from lock file keys. Keys written with backslashes become paths outside the project, or absolute paths, after Arborist normalizes them. Description, author and license of the target are copied.
  • *kosi class path.* `kosiArgs()` in `lib/ecosystems/kosi.js` passes `<scanned dir>/classpath.txt` to kosi after checking only that it exists. Absolute or `../` entries make kosi analyze jars elsewhere on the host, and their class and method names appear in callstack evidence (`-t kotlin --evidence`).
  • *Swift source lists.* `createSemanticsSlices()` in `lib/evinser/swiftsem.js` reads `.swift` files listed in a committed `description.json` wherever they are, and records their paths and the line numbers of import lines for module names the repository chooses (`-t swift --evidence`).
  • *VS Code extension folders.* `collectIdeFolder()` in `lib/helpers/vsixutils.js` follows linked extension entries out of a scanned extensions folder and copies the name, version, description and repository URL from the linked directory's `package.json`, with the SHA-256 of its main file (`-t vscode-extension`).
  • *Windows image paths.* `imageGemDirs()` in `lib/managers/docker.js` drops `GEM_HOME`, `GEM_PATH` and `BUNDLE_PATH` entries containing `..` only when they are split on forward slashes. On Windows, backslash traversal in an image's environment makes cdxgen scan a host directory on the same drive as part of the image.

Existence of host paths

  • `dotnetManifestProjectDir()` in `lib/ecosystems/parsers-dotnet.js` checks `project.restore.projectPath` from a scanned `project.assets.json`, and whether a lock file package appears in the BOM depends on the answer.
  • `getCppModules()` in `lib/ecosystems/cppEvidence.js` and `isFirstPartyHeader()` resolve `#include` paths containing `..`, and the component's group and purl depend on whether the path exists.
  • `identifyCompilers()` and `trustedCompilerPath()` in `lib/ecosystems/cppBuildContext.js` stat and execute-check every driver named in `compile_commands.json`, and a formulation property shows whether a path is an executable file.
Impact

Disclosure of host files to anyone who authors scanned content and can read the resulting BOM, for example as a CI artifact, a Dependency-Track project, a release attachment or a server response. The worst case is private keys and the environment of the cdxgen process. Other routes expose metadata of other projects on the host, class names of host jars, or yes/no answers about chosen paths. Nothing is written or executed. Running under the Node.js permission model with narrow `--allow-fs-read` grants, as the `cdxgen-secure` image does, blocks the reads.

Patches

Fixed in `@cdxgen/cdxgen` 13.8.0. Versions 13.0.0 through 13.7.0 of `@cdxgen/cdxgen` are affected. The 12.x line, published as `@cyclonedx/cdxgen`, is also affected by some of the issues above from 9.7.2 through 12.9.1, and no 12.x release contains the fix. Users of 12.x should move to `@cdxgen/cdxgen` 13.8.0 or apply the workarounds below. File paths in this advisory refer to the 13.x source tree; in 12.x most of the same functions are under `lib/helpers/` or in `lib/cli/index.js`.

cdxgen-plugins-bin 4.4.0 (cdxgen/cdxgen-plugins-bin#193) also hardens the kosi helper, which now confines the classpath entries it discovers to the project, the dependency caches, the JDK and Android SDKs, `GRADLE_USER_HOME` and roots named with `--classpath-root`. cdxgen 13.8.0 is fixed with any plugins-bin release; the plugins-bin change adds a second layer.

First affected release of each issue:

  • AI and CI readers that follow links: 12.3.1
  • pnpm lock file names: 11.5.0
  • npm metadata in deep mode: 10.0.4
  • kosi class path: 13.2.0 (not in 12.x)
  • Swift source lists: 13.3.0 (not in 12.x)
  • VS Code extension folders: 13.6.0 (not in 12.x)
  • Windows image paths: 13.6.0 (not in 12.x)
  • .NET project paths (existence): 13.4.0 (not in 12.x)
  • `#include` paths (existence): 9.7.2
  • compiler paths (existence): 13.4.0 (not in 12.x)
Workarounds
  • Run scans of untrusted content under the Node.js permission model with read access limited to the scanned tree and the tools cdxgen needs, for example with the `cdxgen-secure` image.
  • Scan untrusted content in a container that holds no secrets or other projects.
  • Scan fresh clones made with `git clone` rather than copied or unpacked trees; cdxgen's own clones set `core.symlinks=false`.
  • Avoid `--deep` and `--evidence` for untrusted repositories, and review BOMs before sharing them.
Credit

These issues were found by Anthropic's OSS Scanner (scan cdxgen-20261108-009) and reported as ANT-2026-TBXY3XZ6, ANT-2026-XFMXE0K1, ANT-2026-IXPELN80, ANT-2026-TFHS9ZHO, ANT-2026-1L74B55N, ANT-2026-99G22PG4, ANT-2026-U9YQFH1L, ANT-2026-PS9OCH3C, ANT-2026-UU2MGDK6, ANT-2026-H08SY0XO.

References
  • https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/blob/master/SECURITY.md
  • https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/blob/master/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md
  • Fixed in: https://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/pull/4787
Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@cyclonedx/cdxgen≥ 9.7.2 ≤ 12.9.1
@cdxgen/cdxgen≥ 13.0.0 < 13.8.0
9.7.2
12.9.1
12.9.2
13.0.0
13.8.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@cyclonedx/cdxgen
Corregida 12.9.2 0 d 12.9.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas12.9.213.8.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/cdxgen/cdxgen/security/advisories/GHSA-hxx2-g8w7-cqx4

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.