llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-J3PH-4847-695H

Managers can grant any role access to any folder, and edit, delete or AD-map any role

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
8.3
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.3.0
Exposición40 dDesde la divulgación, 11 oct 2026, 11:39 p. m.
Detección38 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Revisa si tu versión cae en el rango. Te espero.Mis orejas detectan algo raro por aquí.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
12 oct 26
22 oct 26
1 nov 26
11 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-J3PH-4847-695H divulgada · CVSS 8.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

The Roles page is open to managers and HR managers, who are meant to administer the roles
they hold or created, on the folders they can access. Its server-side handlers did not enforce
that scope. A manager could change the folder rights of any role — including granting their own
role read/write access to every shared folder — and rename, re-flag or delete any role. When the
LDAP AD group to role mapping is enabled, a manager could also map any AD group to any role,
an administrator-only setting.

Details

All handlers live in `roles.queries.php` and only checked the session key (and, for some, a
read-only flag that was compared with the wrong type):

  • `change_access_right_on_folder` only required `roleId > 0`. Neither the role nor the submitted
  • `change_role_definition` (actions `edit_role` / `edit_folder`) updated any role by id: title,
  • `delete_role` deleted any role by id, with its folder rights, its user assignments and its item
  • `get_list_of_groups_in_ldap` and `map_role_with_adgroup` had no administrator check, although
  • `build_matrix` returned the folder rights of any role.

The read-only check compared `user-read_only === 1`, while some sign-in paths store the raw
database value (`'1'`): read-only accounts were not stopped by it.

Proof of concept

Signed in as a manager, on Roles (`index.php?page=roles`), in the browser console — the
session key is the one the page embeds in its own scripts:

$.post('sources/roles.queries.php', {
  type: 'change_access_right_on_folder',
  key: '<session key>',
  data: prepareExchangedData(JSON.stringify({
    roleId: <id of a role the manager holds>,
    selectedFolders: [999999],   // any id that is not a folder
    access: 'W',
    propagate: 1
  }), 'encode', '<session key>')
})

The request succeeds. At the next page load the manager's folder tree contains every
shared folder, and their items open. Replacing `roleId` with another role, `access` with `''`,
or calling `delete_role` with `{"roleId": <any role>}` works the same way.

Impact

Any account with the Manager or HR manager privilege can:

  • read — and, with `W`, modify and delete — every item of every shared folder, by granting its
  • remove the access of any role to its folders, or delete any role;
  • change another role's complexity requirement or its "can edit any visible item" flag;
  • with LDAP and the AD group mapping enabled, give any role to every member of an AD group.

Administrators are not concerned (they already hold these rights), nor are standard users: the
Roles page and its handlers are closed to them. Items in personal folders stay protected: their
keys are only shared with their owner.

Patches

Fixed in 3.2.3.0. The role handlers now only act on the roles the caller holds or created
(every role for an administrator), and on the folders the caller can access, personal and denied
folders excluded. A request naming a folder outside that scope is refused as a whole, and
propagation never leaves it. The AD group mapping is restricted to administrators, and read-only
accounts are refused consistently. The role list of the Roles page shows the same scope.

Workarounds

Until the upgrade:

  • only give the Manager and HR manager privileges to accounts trusted with the whole vault;
  • review the permission matrix of each role and the AD group mappings (**Roles → LDAP

```sql
SELECT v.role_id, v.folder_id, v.type
FROM teampass_roles_values AS v
LEFT JOIN teampass_nested_tree AS t ON t.id = v.folder_id
WHERE t.id IS NULL OR t.personal_folder = 1;
```

  • if roles are not derived from AD groups, keep AD user roles mapped with their AD groups
References
  • Release notes: https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/releases/tag/3.2.3.0
  • Documentation: https://documentation.teampass.net/#/features/roles

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.0.0.0 < 3.2.3.0
3.0.0.0
3.2.3.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.3.0 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.3.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-j3ph-4847-695h

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.