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Advisory · GitHub · npm · @angular/platform-server

GHSA-J3R3-MXQP-R2P4

Angular SSR: XSS via Unescaped Processing Instruction (<?...?>) Nodes in Fallback Raw-Content Elements

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versionesPrimer parche a -33 d de la divulgación
Exposición51 dDesde la divulgación, 28 sept 2026, 3:39 p. m.
Detección49 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 20.3.30 +1
Parche 22.1.4
Monitoreo
Detectada
26 ago 26
27 ago 26
28 sept 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
26 ago 26
17 sept 26
8 oct 26
29 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 20.3.30 @angular/platform-server · -33 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 21.2.22 @angular/platform-server · -33 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 22.1.4 @angular/platform-server · -32 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-J3R3-MXQP-R2P4 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

### Summary
An XSS vulnerability exists in `@angular/platform-server` during server-side rendering (SSR) HTML serialization of `ProcessingInstruction` DOM nodes (`<?target data?>`, `nodeType === 7`) when nested inside fallback raw-content elements (`<noscript>`, `<iframe>`, `<noembed>`, `<noframes>`). While processing instruction data escaped `>` to `&gt;`, it did not check for or escape matching closing tags of ancestor fallback elements (e.g., `</noscript>`). When rendered in a browser with scripting enabled, an unescaped closing tag sequence in a processing instruction prematurely closes the fallback raw-content tag and causes subsequent sibling elements to execute as live HTML.

### Technical Description
In HTML5 parsing, fallback raw-content elements (`<noscript>`, `<iframe>`, `<noembed>`, `<noframes>`) place the browser's HTML tokenizer into `RAWTEXT` mode. In `RAWTEXT` mode, processing instruction tokens (`<?...?>`) are treated as literal raw text rather than bogus comments, and the parser ignores `>` or `?>`. The only token sequence that terminates the container is an end tag matching the container tag name (`</noscript`, `</iframe`, etc.).

During server-side HTML serialization, processing instruction nodes previously only replaced `>` with `&gt;` (preventing bogus comment breakouts in normal HTML data states) but left `<` untouched. Crucially, processing instruction serialization never inspected ancestor fallback raw-content tags. As a result, if a `ProcessingInstruction` node inside `<noscript>` contained `</noscript ` in its data payload, it was emitted unescaped as `<?x </noscript ?>`.

### Impact & Reachability
* Reachability: Processing instruction nodes cannot be authored directly through standard Angular template syntax (which parses `<?...>` into comment nodes in DOM position). Reaching this vulnerability requires application or library code calling `inject(DOCUMENT).createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` or `Renderer2` DOM insertion methods with untrusted user input passed to `data` inside a fallback raw-content container.
* Impact: In applications that programmatically construct processing instruction nodes inside fallback elements during server-side rendering, an attacker controlling the processing instruction data can break out of the container and execute arbitrary JavaScript in victims' browsers.

Proof of Concept (Minimal Reproduction)
import { Component, ElementRef, Renderer2, inject, DOCUMENT, AfterViewInit } from '@angular/core';

@Component({
  selector: 'app-root',
  standalone: true,
  template: `<noscript id="host"></noscript>`
})
export class AppComponent implements AfterViewInit {
  private r = inject(Renderer2);
  private el = inject(ElementRef);
  private doc = inject(DOCUMENT);

  ngAfterViewInit() {
    const host = this.el.nativeElement.querySelector('#host');
    
    // Attacker-controlled input passed as Processing Instruction data
    const pi = this.doc.createProcessingInstruction('x', '</noscript ');
    this.r.appendChild(host, pi);
    
    // Sibling markup that should remain inert inside <noscript>
    const img = this.r.createElement('img');
    this.r.setAttribute(img, 'src', 'x');
    this.r.setAttribute(img, 'onerror', 'alert("SSR_PI_XSS")');
    this.r.appendChild(host, img);
  }
}

Vulnerable SSR Output:

<noscript><?x </noscript ?><img src="x" onerror="alert('SSR_PI_XSS')"></noscript>

### Workarounds
* Avoid passing untrusted user input into `document.createProcessingInstruction(target, data)` when the node is inserted into `<noscript>`, `<iframe>`, `<noembed>`, or `<noframes>` during server-side rendering.
* Manually sanitize or replace `<` with `&lt;` in any untrusted data passed to processing instruction nodes on the server.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
@angular/platform-server≤ 19.2.25
@angular/platform-server≥ 20.0.0 < 20.3.30
@angular/platform-server≥ 21.0.0 < 21.2.22
@angular/platform-server≥ 22.0.0 < 22.1.4
19.2.25
20.0.0
20.3.30
21.0.0
21.2.22
22.0.0
22.1.4
22.2.6
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npm@angular/platform-server
Corregida 20.3.30, 21.2.22, 22.1.4 -33 d · -33 d · -32 d 22.2.6 no afectada
Versiones corregidas20.3.3021.2.2222.1.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88058
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-j3r3-mxqp-r2p4
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/issues/70146
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/commit/73d8bbd27cb46495426d4132975a1355b47ad915
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/commit/89b20568dfaee1ec8e0b3bcf1872acdddd2f4fef
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/commit/ba3bc47b20b3d12f5eb141ec9c651373ae4d15e8
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/domino/commit/04f987dc08ff3736b427f50941adf1722458528f
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.30
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.22
Otrahttps://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.4

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