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Advisory · GitHub · Go · code.vikunja.io/api

GHSA-J5V7-QCWP-5G32

API token scopes collide between v1 and v2, granting a different verb than intended

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CVSS 3.1
5.4
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición28 dDesde la divulgación, 22 oct 2026, 5:08 a. m.
Detección27 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
22 oct 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
22 oct 26
29 oct 26
5 nov 26
12 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-J5V7-QCWP-5G32 divulgada · CVSS 5.4 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

API token permission keys are generated separately for the v1 and v2 route tables. Collisions are resolved by registration order, and v1 and v2 register the background routes in opposite orders. The result is:

  • In v1, `projects.background` means GET.
  • In v2, `projects.background` means DELETE.

`tokenAuthorizesRoute` accepts a key that matches either table, so a token issued only to read a project background can delete it through `/api/v2`. GHSA-v479-vf79-mg83 fixed the same impact on v1.

Buckets collide the same way for a different reason: v1 uses PUT for create and POST for update, v2 uses POST for create and PUT for update. A bucket create-only scope therefore allows updating buckets on the other version.

Reproduced by execution on 2.4.0, 2.7.0 and `main` @ `e7d7f173`. 2.3.0 is not affected (it has no v2 background route).

Details

`pkg/models/api_routes.go`, `CollectRoutesForAPITokenUsage`: `stripAPIVersion` (`:74`) merges v1 and v2 into one permission group, but the routes live in separate maps (`:29/35`). On a key collision, the route registered second gets an `_<method>` suffix (`:316-321`), so the meaning of a non-CRUD key depends on registration order.

  • v1 registers GET, then DELETE (`pkg/routes/routes.go:897-898`): `background` = GET, `background_delete` = DELETE.
  • `pkg/routes/api/v2/backgrounds.go:50-66` registers DELETE, then GET: `background` = DELETE, `background_get` = GET.

`tokenAuthorizesRoute` checks `[apiTokenRoutes[group], apiTokenRoutesV2[group]]` under the same key (`:475`).

The same collision suffix, combined with the bucket PUT/POST swap (v1 `pkg/routes/routes.go:692-694`: PUT = create, POST = update; v2 `pkg/routes/api/v2/buckets.go:58-68`: POST = create, PUT = update), swaps bucket create and update with write-to-write impact only: `projects.views_buckets_put` (v1 create) authorizes the v2 bucket update, and the reverse also holds.

`getRouteDetail`'s verb inversion is not the cause.

Proof of concept

A token with `{"projects":["background"]}` belongs to a user who has write access to a project that has a background.

GET    /api/v1/projects/<id>/background   -> 200   (intended)
DELETE /api/v1/projects/<id>/background   -> 401   (correct)
DELETE /api/v2/projects/<id>/background   -> 200   (background deleted; v1 GET now 404)

Controls:
- A `projects.read_one` token on the v2 DELETE returns 401.
- A `projects.background_delete` token on the v2 DELETE returns 401. This is a functional bug too: the key that is meant to allow the delete doesn't work on v2.

With the patch, `projects.background` gets 401 on the v2 DELETE and `projects.background_delete` gets 200.

Executed on the official release binaries v2.4.0 (sha256 `eefc0e31587e0c9d7b18f38d4d50dd1fa03fd5fc6879eb9894ce9909620072ea`) and v2.7.0 (sha256 `569861fd690f9ffc812e39e20be3943b882d4549a19e556e47066e71e29ca1b9`), and on `main` @ `e7d7f173`. Official v2.3.0 (sha256 `c37f8291698e288cd95198b52b826ffca40c3665d351041b93358e142862994d`) is not affected: the v2 background route does not exist there (404). The patch below applies to v2.7.0 and was verified there.

Impact

A token scoped to read a background can permanently delete project backgrounds, which deletes the file and clears `background_file_id`. This is the same impact as GHSA-v479. The bucket swap lets a token scoped to create buckets rename existing buckets and change their limits.

### Fix
Name non-CRUD permission keys by meaning (read/create/update/delete) instead of by registration order or HTTP method, applying the v1/v2 method swap for buckets, so a key means the same operation on both versions. Add a v1/v2 parity test covering backgrounds and buckets.

The reporter's order-independent patch below fixes backgrounds only:

if existing, has := target[routeParts[0]][subkey]; has {
    if route.Method == http.MethodGet && existing.Method != http.MethodGet {
        target[routeParts[0]][subkey+"_"+strings.ToLower(existing.Method)] = existing
    } else {
        subkey += "_" + strings.ToLower(route.Method)
    }
}

For buckets, v1 uses PUT for create while v2 uses POST, so names derived from the HTTP method can't line up. Naming keys by operation covers both cases.

I would appreciate a CVE being requested for this issue.

### Credits
Please credit as: Dylan McGuinness, Ambit Security (finder, reporter).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:L
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:L
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
code.vikunja.io/api≥ 2.4.0 ≤ 2.7.0
v0.24.6
2.4.0
2.7.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gocode.vikunja.io/api
Sin parche — — v0.24.6 no afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-j5v7-qcwp-5g32

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.