GHSA-J7QX-P75M-WP7G
PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 4.6.59 | praisonai · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-J7QX-P75M-WP7G divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
Summary
PraisonAI's Dynamic Context Discovery feature exposes artifact helper tools
through `ctx.get_tools()`:
ctx = setup_dynamic_context()
agent = Agent(
instructions="You are a data analyst.",
tools=ctx.get_tools(),
hooks=[ctx.get_middleware()],
)The official documentation describes these helpers as a way for the agent to
explore large tool-output artifacts that were queued by the middleware:
- large tool outputs are saved as artifacts;
- the agent receives compact artifact references; and
- the agent uses `artifact_tail` and `artifact_grep` to explore that data.
The implemented artifact tools do not enforce that the supplied
`artifact_path` is an artifact created by the configured store or that it lives
under the configured artifact base directory. Instead, `artifact_head`,
`artifact_tail`, `artifact_grep`, and `artifact_chunk` wrap the caller-supplied
path directly into an `ArtifactRef` and then read it from the host filesystem.
As a result, any prompt/user/tool-caller that can influence those tool
arguments can read files readable by the PraisonAI process, such as project
`.env` files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, source files, or other local data.
Affected Product
- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`
- Ecosystem: `pip`
- Package: `praisonai`
- Component: Dynamic Context Discovery artifact tools
- Current source path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/queue.py`
- Artifact store path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/artifact_store.py`
- Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`
- Current `origin/main` validated:
- Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`
Suggested affected range:
pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58Representative local sweep:
- `3.8.1`: vulnerable
- `4.0.0`: vulnerable
- `4.5.113`: vulnerable
- `4.6.33`: vulnerable
- `4.6.34`: vulnerable
- `4.6.40`: vulnerable
- `4.6.50`: vulnerable
- `4.6.58`: vulnerable
Root Cause
`create_artifact_tools()` creates an artifact store bound to `base_dir`, but the
read tools do not use `base_dir` for containment.
For example, `artifact_head()` accepts `artifact_path` and immediately creates
an `ArtifactRef` with that path:
def artifact_head(artifact_path: str, lines: int = 50) -> str:
ref = ArtifactRef(path=artifact_path, summary="", size_bytes=0)
try:
return artifact_store.head(ref, lines=lines)
except FileNotFoundError:
return f"Error: Artifact not found: {artifact_path}"`artifact_tail()`, `artifact_grep()`, and `artifact_chunk()` have the same
pattern. They trust the caller-supplied path rather than resolving it through
an artifact identifier, store lookup, manifest, or base-directory containment
check.
The store methods then read that path directly:
def head(self, ref: ArtifactRef, lines: int = 50) -> str:
file_path = Path(ref.path)
if not file_path.exists():
raise FileNotFoundError(f"Artifact not found: {ref.path}")
result_lines = []
with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
...There is no check equivalent to:
resolved = Path(ref.path).resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)There is also no check that the file has a valid `.meta` sidecar or appears in
`artifact_list()`.
Local PoV
Run against the latest PyPI package:
uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
python poc/pov_prai_cand_026_artifact_tools_arbitrary_file_read.py --jsonThe PoV:
- Creates a temporary artifact base directory.
- Creates a separate `outside-secret.txt` file outside that base directory.
- Stores one legitimate artifact through `FileSystemArtifactStore.store()`.
- Calls `artifact_head()` on the legitimate artifact as a positive control.
- Calls `artifact_head()`, `artifact_grep()`, and `artifact_chunk()` on the
- Confirms `artifact_list()` does not list the outside file.
Observed output summary from `evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json`:
{
"package": "praisonai",
"package_version": "4.6.58",
"controls": {
"outside_file_not_listed": true,
"outside_file_outside_base_dir": true,
"valid_artifact_read_works": true
},
"outside_head": "PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET",
"outside_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET\\n second line",
"outside_chunk": "PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET",
"outside_file_listed_by_artifact_list": false,
"vulnerable": true
}The PoV was rerun successfully after a fresh `origin/main` fetch; see
`evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58-rerun.json`.
The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party
target, or use real credentials.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
This report does not claim that every file-reading tool is automatically a
vulnerability. The issue is narrower: tools documented and named as artifact
helpers accept arbitrary host file paths.
The controls show the intended boundary:
- a valid artifact stored under `base_dir` is readable;
- an outside file is not returned by `artifact_list()`;
- the outside file is outside `base_dir`; and
- the read helpers still disclose the outside file when handed its absolute
PraisonAI's own context-security documentation recommends relative paths and
reviewing ignore rules to avoid sensitive-file exposure. Those controls are
bypassed when artifact tools can be pointed directly at any readable host path.
Impact
If a PraisonAI application exposes an agent with `ctx.get_tools()` to
untrusted or lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can request artifact
tools against arbitrary local paths. This can disclose sensitive host files
readable by the PraisonAI process, including:
- project `.env` files;
- cloud or service credentials;
- SSH keys;
- local application configuration;
- source files and private data; and
- terminal/history artifacts from other runs if the path is known or guessed.
The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and
availability are not claimed for this report.
Duplicate Posture
I checked visible PraisonAI advisories and local prior PraisonAI submissions.
This is distinct from nearby file-read/file-write issues:
- `GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj` / `CVE-2026-47394` covers MCP CLI
- `GHSA-hvhp-v2gc-268q` / `CVE-2026-47397` covers `write_file` arbitrary file
- Public recipe registry path traversal advisories cover recipe publish/pull
- Local prior submissions in this harness do not cover `artifact_head`,
Severity
Suggested severity: High.
Suggested CVSS v3.1:
Rationale:
- `AV`: applies when an application exposes a PraisonAI agent over a network
- `AC`: no race, special environment, or complex path manipulation is
- `PR`: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited
- `UI`: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the
- `C`: arbitrary readable host files can contain secrets or private data.
- `I/A`: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.
Remediation
Do not let artifact tools open arbitrary paths. Prefer stable artifact IDs over
raw filesystem paths in tool arguments.
Recommended fixes:
- Change tool schemas to accept `artifact_id` plus optional `run_id` and
- If path arguments must remain for compatibility, resolve the path with
- Require a valid artifact metadata sidecar for read helpers. Files not
- Apply the same containment check to `load()`, `head()`, `tail()`, `grep()`,
- Avoid returning absolute host paths in prompt-visible artifact references
Minimal containment helper:
def _resolve_artifact_path(self, path: str) -> Path:
resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError as exc:
raise PermissionError("Artifact path is outside artifact storage") from exc
return resolvedThis helper should be paired with metadata-sidecar validation so arbitrary
non-artifact files placed under the base directory are not automatically
treated as valid artifacts.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypipraisonai |
Corregida | 4.6.59 | -1 d | 4.7.26 no afectada |
4.6.59Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7ghttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAILas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
