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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · praisonai

GHSA-J7QX-P75M-WP7G

PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición154 dDesde la divulgación, 18 jun 2026, 8:52 a. m.
Detección151 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.6.59
Monitoreo
Detectada
17 jun 26
18 jun 26
23 jul 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
17 jun 26
26 jul 26
3 sept 26
12 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.6.59 praisonai · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-J7QX-P75M-WP7G divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage

Summary

PraisonAI's Dynamic Context Discovery feature exposes artifact helper tools
through `ctx.get_tools()`:

ctx = setup_dynamic_context()

agent = Agent(
    instructions="You are a data analyst.",
    tools=ctx.get_tools(),
    hooks=[ctx.get_middleware()],
)

The official documentation describes these helpers as a way for the agent to
explore large tool-output artifacts that were queued by the middleware:

  • large tool outputs are saved as artifacts;
  • the agent receives compact artifact references; and
  • the agent uses `artifact_tail` and `artifact_grep` to explore that data.

The implemented artifact tools do not enforce that the supplied
`artifact_path` is an artifact created by the configured store or that it lives
under the configured artifact base directory. Instead, `artifact_head`,
`artifact_tail`, `artifact_grep`, and `artifact_chunk` wrap the caller-supplied
path directly into an `ArtifactRef` and then read it from the host filesystem.

As a result, any prompt/user/tool-caller that can influence those tool
arguments can read files readable by the PraisonAI process, such as project
`.env` files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, source files, or other local data.

Affected Product

  • Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`
  • Ecosystem: `pip`
  • Package: `praisonai`
  • Component: Dynamic Context Discovery artifact tools
  • Current source path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/queue.py`
  • Artifact store path: `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/artifact_store.py`
  • Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`
  • Current `origin/main` validated:
  • Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`

Suggested affected range:

pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58

Representative local sweep:

  • `3.8.1`: vulnerable
  • `4.0.0`: vulnerable
  • `4.5.113`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.33`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.34`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.40`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.50`: vulnerable
  • `4.6.58`: vulnerable

Root Cause

`create_artifact_tools()` creates an artifact store bound to `base_dir`, but the
read tools do not use `base_dir` for containment.

For example, `artifact_head()` accepts `artifact_path` and immediately creates
an `ArtifactRef` with that path:

def artifact_head(artifact_path: str, lines: int = 50) -> str:
    ref = ArtifactRef(path=artifact_path, summary="", size_bytes=0)
    try:
        return artifact_store.head(ref, lines=lines)
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return f"Error: Artifact not found: {artifact_path}"

`artifact_tail()`, `artifact_grep()`, and `artifact_chunk()` have the same
pattern. They trust the caller-supplied path rather than resolving it through
an artifact identifier, store lookup, manifest, or base-directory containment
check.

The store methods then read that path directly:

def head(self, ref: ArtifactRef, lines: int = 50) -> str:
    file_path = Path(ref.path)
    if not file_path.exists():
        raise FileNotFoundError(f"Artifact not found: {ref.path}")

    result_lines = []
    with open(file_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
        ...

There is no check equivalent to:

resolved = Path(ref.path).resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)

There is also no check that the file has a valid `.meta` sidecar or appears in
`artifact_list()`.

Local PoV

Run against the latest PyPI package:

uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
  python poc/pov_prai_cand_026_artifact_tools_arbitrary_file_read.py --json

The PoV:

  1. Creates a temporary artifact base directory.
  2. Creates a separate `outside-secret.txt` file outside that base directory.
  3. Stores one legitimate artifact through `FileSystemArtifactStore.store()`.
  4. Calls `artifact_head()` on the legitimate artifact as a positive control.
  5. Calls `artifact_head()`, `artifact_grep()`, and `artifact_chunk()` on the
  6. Confirms `artifact_list()` does not list the outside file.

Observed output summary from `evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json`:

{
  "package": "praisonai",
  "package_version": "4.6.58",
  "controls": {
    "outside_file_not_listed": true,
    "outside_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "valid_artifact_read_works": true
  },
  "outside_head": "PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET",
  "outside_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET\\n  second line",
  "outside_chunk": "PRAI-CAND-026-OUTSIDE-ARTIFACT-SECRET",
  "outside_file_listed_by_artifact_list": false,
  "vulnerable": true
}

The PoV was rerun successfully after a fresh `origin/main` fetch; see
`evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58-rerun.json`.

The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party
target, or use real credentials.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

This report does not claim that every file-reading tool is automatically a
vulnerability. The issue is narrower: tools documented and named as artifact
helpers accept arbitrary host file paths.

The controls show the intended boundary:

  • a valid artifact stored under `base_dir` is readable;
  • an outside file is not returned by `artifact_list()`;
  • the outside file is outside `base_dir`; and
  • the read helpers still disclose the outside file when handed its absolute

PraisonAI's own context-security documentation recommends relative paths and
reviewing ignore rules to avoid sensitive-file exposure. Those controls are
bypassed when artifact tools can be pointed directly at any readable host path.

Impact

If a PraisonAI application exposes an agent with `ctx.get_tools()` to
untrusted or lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can request artifact
tools against arbitrary local paths. This can disclose sensitive host files
readable by the PraisonAI process, including:

  • project `.env` files;
  • cloud or service credentials;
  • SSH keys;
  • local application configuration;
  • source files and private data; and
  • terminal/history artifacts from other runs if the path is known or guessed.

The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and
availability are not claimed for this report.

Duplicate Posture

I checked visible PraisonAI advisories and local prior PraisonAI submissions.
This is distinct from nearby file-read/file-write issues:

  • `GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj` / `CVE-2026-47394` covers MCP CLI
  • `GHSA-hvhp-v2gc-268q` / `CVE-2026-47397` covers `write_file` arbitrary file
  • Public recipe registry path traversal advisories cover recipe publish/pull
  • Local prior submissions in this harness do not cover `artifact_head`,

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

Rationale:

  • `AV`: applies when an application exposes a PraisonAI agent over a network
  • `AC`: no race, special environment, or complex path manipulation is
  • `PR`: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited
  • `UI`: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the
  • `C`: arbitrary readable host files can contain secrets or private data.
  • `I/A`: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.

Remediation

Do not let artifact tools open arbitrary paths. Prefer stable artifact IDs over
raw filesystem paths in tool arguments.

Recommended fixes:

  1. Change tool schemas to accept `artifact_id` plus optional `run_id` and
  2. If path arguments must remain for compatibility, resolve the path with
  3. Require a valid artifact metadata sidecar for read helpers. Files not
  4. Apply the same containment check to `load()`, `head()`, `tail()`, `grep()`,
  5. Avoid returning absolute host paths in prompt-visible artifact references

Minimal containment helper:

def _resolve_artifact_path(self, path: str) -> Path:
    resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
    base = self.base_dir.resolve()
    try:
        resolved.relative_to(base)
    except ValueError as exc:
        raise PermissionError("Artifact path is outside artifact storage") from exc
    return resolved

This helper should be paired with metadata-sidecar validation so arbitrary
non-artifact files placed under the base directory are not automatically
treated as valid artifacts.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
praisonai≥ 3.8.1 < 4.6.59
3.8.1
4.6.59
4.7.26
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypipraisonai
Corregida 4.6.59 -1 d 4.7.26 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.6.59
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g
Otrahttps://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.