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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8

GHSA-J8FR-73JX-33W9

Docker images still trust the compromised eMudhra CA roots

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.4
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -16 d de la divulgación
Exposición10 dDesde la divulgación, 11 nov 2026, 2:18 a. m.
Detección7 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Más vale un parche a tiempo que un incidente de madrugada.Huele a "ya lo veré". No la dejes así.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v8.39.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
26 oct 26
11 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
26 oct 26
1 nov 26
8 nov 26
15 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v8.39.0 github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 · -16 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-J8FR-73JX-33W9 divulgada · CVSS 7.4 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`gotenberg/gotenberg` 8.38.1 (the newest, also `latest`) and 8.37.0 still trust `emSign ECC Root CA - G3` and `AAA Certificate Services`. Those roots sit above 8 eMudhra intermediate CAs whose private keys anyone can recover from the public certificates (Mozilla bug 2083449, 17 Oct 2026). Someone who can intercept a Gotenberg container's outbound traffic can impersonate any HTTPS server to:

  • the Go server, for `downloadFrom` and webhook calls. It verifies against the OS bundle (`ca-certificates` 20250419, which has both roots) and checks no revocation.
  • Chromium, from each start until it downloads Chrome's CRLSet. That takes 20 to 90 seconds. Gotenberg gives Chromium a fresh profile on every start, so each restart (for example with `--chromium-restart-after`) opens the window again. Where Chromium cannot reach Google's update servers, the CRLSet never arrives.

A new release with current Debian packages fixes the OS bundle. It does not fix Java `cacerts` while Debian ships OpenJDK 21.0.12.1, and it does not change Chromium's built-in root store until Debian ships a Chromium with Chrome Root Store v43.

Details

The six TLS intermediates are issued by `emSign Root TLS CA - G3`, which `emSign ECC Root CA - G3` cross-signs. `AAA Certificate Services` also cross-signs all 8 intermediates. Links are to v8.38.1, timings were measured on 8.37.0.

1. Go server. `downloadFrom` (context.go#L403 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/pkg/modules/api/context.go#L403) and webhooks (middleware.go#L227 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go#L227) use `NewOutboundHttpClient` https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go#L495, which sets no root CAs. Go verifies against `/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt` and checks no revocation. Both tags ship `ca-certificates` 20250419, which has both roots. Debian's `20250419+deb13u1` removes them, and the next release gets it through `apt-get upgrade` (Dockerfile#L139-L141 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/build/Dockerfile#L139-L141).

2. Chromium. Debian's `chromium` (152.0.7977.82 in 8.37.0, 155.0.8059.39 in 8.38.1) trusts its compiled-in Chrome Root Store (v36, v39), which has `emSign ECC Root CA - G3`, and ignores `/etc/ssl/certs`. The image ships no CRLSet. Component updates are on (browser.go#L171 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go#L171), but every Chromium process gets a new `--user-data-dir` (#L164 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go#L164), so the CRLSet is downloaded again after each start. That took 60 to 90 seconds after the first start and 20 to 70 seconds after a restart. CRLSet 10854 blocks the six TLS intermediates. Until it arrives, Chromium accepts chains to `emSign ECC Root CA - G3`, and where Google's update servers are unreachable it always does. Chrome Root Store v43 removes the root. The newest `chromium` in Debian trixie on 22 Oct, 155.0.8059.79, still has v39.

3. Java `cacerts` (`/opt/java/lib/security/cacerts`, used by PDFtk) has `emsigneccrootcag3 [jdk]` and `comodoaaaca [jdk]`. It comes from Debian's `openjdk-21` through `jlink` https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/blob/v8.38.1/build/Dockerfile#L60-L84. Trixie still ships 21.0.12.1+1-1~deb13u1 (23 Oct), and its `jlink` output keeps both, so a new release alone does not fix this.

Suggested fix. Existing tags are not rebuilt (#1678), so this is for the next release:

  • Current Debian packages fix 1.
  • A distrust entry for both roots in the image user's NSS database fixes 2 from the first request. Chromium then reports both roots as `DISTRUSTED`, and other roots such as `GTS Root R4` stay `TRUSTED_ANCHOR`. It applies while `HOME` is `/home/gotenberg`. `certutil` comes from `libnss3-tools` and can stay in a build stage.

```sh
certutil -N -d sql:/home/gotenberg/.pki/nssdb --empty-password
certutil -A -d sql:/home/gotenberg/.pki/nssdb -t p,p,p -n emsign-ecc-root-ca-g3 -i emSign_ECC_Root_CA_-_G3.pem
certutil -A -d sql:/home/gotenberg/.pki/nssdb -t p,p,p -n aaa-certificate-services -i AAA_Certificate_Services.pem
chown -R gotenberg:gotenberg /home/gotenberg/.pki
```

  • `keytool -delete` for both aliases after `jlink` fixes 3 until Debian ships a fixed OpenJDK.
Proof of concept

The hosts on https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/, such as `dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com`, serve certificates from the compromised intermediates. Clients should refuse them.

Chromium, right after it starts. The first request starts Chromium:

docker run --rm -d -p 3000:3000 --name gotenberg gotenberg/gotenberg:8.38.1
sleep 5
curl -s -o early.pdf --form url=https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/ \
  http://localhost:3000/forms/chromium/convert/url

Expected: `early.pdf` shows Chromium's "Privacy error" page. If it shows the site, Chromium accepted the certificate. Gotenberg returns HTTP 200 either way. After about two minutes this command finds the CRLSet, and the same request should then return "Privacy error":

docker exec gotenberg sh -c 'find /tmp -path "*CertificateRevocation*/crl-set"'

Go server (OS bundle). `curl` in the image uses the same bundle:

docker exec gotenberg curl -sS -o /dev/null https://dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/ && echo trusted

Expected: a certificate error.

Without the test hosts:

  • Bundle: `openssl verify -no-CApath -no-CAstore -CAfile /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt -untrusted FILE.pem FILE.pem` accepts all 14 chains in the checker's `chains.zip`.
  • Chromium trust: serve the real G3B and cross-certificate from `chains.zip` under a test leaf that names G3B as its issuer, with the same AKI, but is signed by any other key. In a NetLog (`--log-net-log=... --net-log-capture-mode=Everything`), `CERT_VERIFY_PROC_PATH_BUILT` ends at `emSign ECC Root CA - G3` with `last_cert_trust: TRUSTED_ANCHOR`, and `CERT_VERIFY_PROC` shows `crlset_sequence: 0`.
  • CRLSet content: the `crl-set` file starts with a 2-byte little-endian length and a JSON header. Its `BlockedSPKIs` match the `spki_sha256` of the six TLS intermediates in the checker's `impacted-intermediates.json`.
Impact

Improper certificate validation: the images trust CA roots whose intermediates have compromised keys, and parts of them check no revocation (CWE-299).

Anyone running the official images is affected if someone can intercept the container's outbound traffic, for example on a shared network, through a compromised proxy, or through DNS. Such an attacker can:

  • serve their own files to `downloadFrom`, which then get converted, and read or change what Gotenberg sends to webhook URLs, including the generated PDF.
  • replace the page in `/forms/chromium/convert/url`, or the fonts, CSS and images a page loads in `/forms/chromium/convert/html`, during the window after each Chromium start. That changes the content of the PDF. A swapped web font can change the text printed in it, for instance.
  • do the same at any time where Chromium cannot reach Google's update servers, for example with an egress allow-list.

PDFtk makes no TLS calls in normal use, so the Java `cacerts` entries matter less.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8< 8.39.0
8.39.0
v8.40.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
Corregida v8.39.0 -16 d v8.40.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas8.39.0v8.39.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-j8fr-73jx-33w9

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