GHSA-JGPH-CGQ3-C627
HTTP/1 CONNECT target is mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT and Host-controlled :authority
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 4.2.18.Final | io.netty:netty-codec-http3 · -1 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-JGPH-CGQ3-C627 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Netty's HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 conversion does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets. Instead, it applies the generic request conversion path:
- parses `CONNECT trusted.example:443 HTTP/1.1` as a URI with scheme `trusted.example`;
- emits HTTP/3 `:scheme: trusted.example`;
- emits HTTP/3 `:path: /`;
- uses the HTTP/1 `Host` header as HTTP/3 `:authority`.
For example:
CONNECT trusted.example:443 HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:443is converted to:
:method: CONNECT
:scheme: trusted.example
:path: /
:authority: attacker.example:443HTTP/3 CONNECT must omit `:scheme` and `:path`, and `:authority` must contain the host and port from the CONNECT authority-form request-target. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, policy that authorizes the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target can disagree with the upstream HTTP/3 proxy, which receives the Host-controlled `:authority`.
Technical Details
`HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(HttpMessage, boolean)` handles all `HttpRequest` methods with the same generic path:
URI requestTargetUri = URI.create(request.uri());
out.path(toHttp3Path(requestTargetUri));
out.method(request.method().asciiName());
setHttp3Scheme(inHeaders, requestTargetUri, out);
String host = inHeaders.getAsString(HttpHeaderNames.HOST);
if (host != null && !host.isEmpty()) setHttp3Authority(host, out);For CONNECT, `request.uri()` is authority-form (`host:port`), not an absolute URI. Java parses `trusted.example:443` as a URI with scheme `trusted.example`, so Netty emits a bogus `:scheme` and a default `/` path. If `Host` is present, it becomes `:authority`; if Host is absent, the CONNECT target is dropped.
Impact
In a Netty HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy/gateway path, a remote HTTP/1 client can ask to CONNECT to one authority while supplying a different Host header. Netty then builds an HTTP/3 CONNECT request whose tunnel `:authority` is Host-controlled and whose pseudo-header set is malformed.
This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, audit logic, or other security controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3.
This report does not claim code execution or memory corruption. The impact is integrity loss through CONNECT tunnel-target confusion at an HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 conversion boundary.
Suggested Fix
When converting HTTP/1 CONNECT to HTTP/3:
- set `:method` to `CONNECT`;
- set `:authority` from the HTTP/1 request-target authority-form;
- omit `:scheme` and `:path`;
- reject or ignore conflicting Host instead of allowing it to replace the CONNECT target;
- add regression tests for direct `toHttp3Headers(...)` and `Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false)`.
The attached patched-control diff demonstrates the minimal behavior change:
`evidence/minimal-connect-patched-control.diff`
Affected Package/Versions
`io.netty:netty-codec-http3`
Confirmed affected:
- current `4.2` branch at `7bae566a93e69409697fe57fa807910ba5c9720e`
- `4.2.15.Final` at `a41f7b289ce1d697c50846f3ade3983e22b2ed40`
- `4.2.2.Final` at `660edeaefad4a4cedbd61584e8f668ad2d89f0b8`
Suggested affected range:
- `>= 4.2.2.Final, <= 4.2.15.Final`
`codec-http3` was not present in checked `4.2.0.Final` or `4.1.135.Final`.
References
- Netty security policy: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/policy
- RFC 9114 CONNECT method: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114#section-4.4
- RFC 9114 malformed request handling: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114#section-4.1.2
- RFC 9112 authority-form: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#section-3.2.3
- RFC 9110 CONNECT method: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9110#section-9.3.6
CWE and CVSS
Suggested CWEs:
- `CWE-20`: Improper Input Validation
- `CWE-436`: Interpretation Conflict
- `CWE-444`: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests
Suggested CVSS v3.1:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NSuggested severity: High, score 7.5.
Rationale: a network peer can trigger this in a proxy/gateway path without authentication. Integrity impact is high because CONNECT can establish a tunnel to an unintended upstream authority when forwarding policy validated a different request-target.
Duplicate Boundary
Nearby reports are distinct:
- `GHSA-hfr2-x62w-v49h`: HTTP/1 absolute-form Host mismatch to HTTP/3 `:authority`.
- `GHSA-w6j8-x45j-w75f`: HTTP/2/HTTP/3 Extended CONNECT inbound downgrade.
- `GHSA-h235-6gmg-jv93`, `GHSA-qf63-3vvr-7272`, and `GHSA-w2m9-rvg6-gfxg`: HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1 inbound downgrade families.
This report covers outbound HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form conversion to HTTP/3.
Live duplicate evidence is in `evidence/advisory-duplicate-check.tsv`.
Local PoV
PoV file:
`pov/Http3ConnectAuthorityFormHostConfusionPovTest.java`
Run from a Netty checkout after copying the PoV file into `codec-http3/src/test/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http3/`:
./mvnw -q -pl codec-http3 \
-Dtest=Http3ConnectAuthorityFormHostConfusionPovTest \
-Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false \
-DskipNativeTests -DskipAutobahnTests -Dmaven.antrun.skip=true testThe PoV is local-only. It proves:
- conflicting Host controls HTTP/3 `:authority`;
- Netty emits forbidden `:scheme` and `:path` for CONNECT;
- even matching Host still emits malformed CONNECT pseudo-headers;
- absent Host drops the CONNECT authority entirely.
Observed results:
current 4.2 head: focused PoV passed
4.2.15.Final: focused PoV passed
4.2.2.Final: focused PoV passed
patched control: focused fixed-control passedVersion sweep details are in `evidence/version-sweep.tsv`.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
RFC 9114 says HTTP/3 CONNECT requests must set only `:method: CONNECT` and `:authority` for the tunnel destination; `:scheme` and `:path` must be omitted. A CONNECT request that does not conform is malformed.
RFC 9112 defines HTTP/1 CONNECT as authority-form, where the request-target contains the tunnel destination. A converter must therefore map the HTTP/1 request-target, not a conflicting Host header, to HTTP/3 `:authority`.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http3 |
Corregida | 4.2.18.Final | -1 d | 4.2.20.Final no afectada |
4.2.18.FinalArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
