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Advisory · GitHub · Maven · io.netty:netty-codec-http3

GHSA-JGPH-CGQ3-C627

HTTP/1 CONNECT target is mistranslated to malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT and Host-controlled :authority

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Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
7.5
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -1 d de la divulgación
Exposición72 dDesde la divulgación, 9 sept 2026, 7:48 p. m.
Detección70 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Yo la vigilo, tú la programas. ¿Trato?Nivel de sospecha: ceja levantada.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.2.18.Final
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 sept 26
10 sept 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 sept 26
27 sept 26
15 oct 26
3 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.2.18.Final io.netty:netty-codec-http3 · -1 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JGPH-CGQ3-C627 divulgada · CVSS 7.5 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Netty's HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 conversion does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets. Instead, it applies the generic request conversion path:

  • parses `CONNECT trusted.example:443 HTTP/1.1` as a URI with scheme `trusted.example`;
  • emits HTTP/3 `:scheme: trusted.example`;
  • emits HTTP/3 `:path: /`;
  • uses the HTTP/1 `Host` header as HTTP/3 `:authority`.

For example:

CONNECT trusted.example:443 HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:443

is converted to:

:method: CONNECT
:scheme: trusted.example
:path: /
:authority: attacker.example:443

HTTP/3 CONNECT must omit `:scheme` and `:path`, and `:authority` must contain the host and port from the CONNECT authority-form request-target. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, policy that authorizes the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target can disagree with the upstream HTTP/3 proxy, which receives the Host-controlled `:authority`.

Technical Details

`HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(HttpMessage, boolean)` handles all `HttpRequest` methods with the same generic path:

URI requestTargetUri = URI.create(request.uri());
out.path(toHttp3Path(requestTargetUri));
out.method(request.method().asciiName());
setHttp3Scheme(inHeaders, requestTargetUri, out);
String host = inHeaders.getAsString(HttpHeaderNames.HOST);
if (host != null && !host.isEmpty()) setHttp3Authority(host, out);

For CONNECT, `request.uri()` is authority-form (`host:port`), not an absolute URI. Java parses `trusted.example:443` as a URI with scheme `trusted.example`, so Netty emits a bogus `:scheme` and a default `/` path. If `Host` is present, it becomes `:authority`; if Host is absent, the CONNECT target is dropped.

Impact

In a Netty HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy/gateway path, a remote HTTP/1 client can ask to CONNECT to one authority while supplying a different Host header. Netty then builds an HTTP/3 CONNECT request whose tunnel `:authority` is Host-controlled and whose pseudo-header set is malformed.

This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, audit logic, or other security controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3.

This report does not claim code execution or memory corruption. The impact is integrity loss through CONNECT tunnel-target confusion at an HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 conversion boundary.

Suggested Fix

When converting HTTP/1 CONNECT to HTTP/3:

  • set `:method` to `CONNECT`;
  • set `:authority` from the HTTP/1 request-target authority-form;
  • omit `:scheme` and `:path`;
  • reject or ignore conflicting Host instead of allowing it to replace the CONNECT target;
  • add regression tests for direct `toHttp3Headers(...)` and `Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false)`.

The attached patched-control diff demonstrates the minimal behavior change:

`evidence/minimal-connect-patched-control.diff`

Affected Package/Versions

`io.netty:netty-codec-http3`

Confirmed affected:

  • current `4.2` branch at `7bae566a93e69409697fe57fa807910ba5c9720e`
  • `4.2.15.Final` at `a41f7b289ce1d697c50846f3ade3983e22b2ed40`
  • `4.2.2.Final` at `660edeaefad4a4cedbd61584e8f668ad2d89f0b8`

Suggested affected range:

  • `>= 4.2.2.Final, <= 4.2.15.Final`

`codec-http3` was not present in checked `4.2.0.Final` or `4.1.135.Final`.

References

  • Netty security policy: https://github.com/netty/netty/security/policy
  • RFC 9114 CONNECT method: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114#section-4.4
  • RFC 9114 malformed request handling: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114#section-4.1.2
  • RFC 9112 authority-form: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#section-3.2.3
  • RFC 9110 CONNECT method: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9110#section-9.3.6

CWE and CVSS

Suggested CWEs:

  • `CWE-20`: Improper Input Validation
  • `CWE-436`: Interpretation Conflict
  • `CWE-444`: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Suggested severity: High, score 7.5.

Rationale: a network peer can trigger this in a proxy/gateway path without authentication. Integrity impact is high because CONNECT can establish a tunnel to an unintended upstream authority when forwarding policy validated a different request-target.

Duplicate Boundary

Nearby reports are distinct:

  • `GHSA-hfr2-x62w-v49h`: HTTP/1 absolute-form Host mismatch to HTTP/3 `:authority`.
  • `GHSA-w6j8-x45j-w75f`: HTTP/2/HTTP/3 Extended CONNECT inbound downgrade.
  • `GHSA-h235-6gmg-jv93`, `GHSA-qf63-3vvr-7272`, and `GHSA-w2m9-rvg6-gfxg`: HTTP/3-to-HTTP/1 inbound downgrade families.

This report covers outbound HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form conversion to HTTP/3.

Live duplicate evidence is in `evidence/advisory-duplicate-check.tsv`.

Local PoV

PoV file:

`pov/Http3ConnectAuthorityFormHostConfusionPovTest.java`

Run from a Netty checkout after copying the PoV file into `codec-http3/src/test/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http3/`:

./mvnw -q -pl codec-http3 \
  -Dtest=Http3ConnectAuthorityFormHostConfusionPovTest \
  -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false \
  -DskipNativeTests -DskipAutobahnTests -Dmaven.antrun.skip=true test

The PoV is local-only. It proves:

  • conflicting Host controls HTTP/3 `:authority`;
  • Netty emits forbidden `:scheme` and `:path` for CONNECT;
  • even matching Host still emits malformed CONNECT pseudo-headers;
  • absent Host drops the CONNECT authority entirely.

Observed results:

current 4.2 head: focused PoV passed
4.2.15.Final:    focused PoV passed
4.2.2.Final:     focused PoV passed
patched control: focused fixed-control passed

Version sweep details are in `evidence/version-sweep.tsv`.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

RFC 9114 says HTTP/3 CONNECT requests must set only `:method: CONNECT` and `:authority` for the tunnel destination; `:scheme` and `:path` must be omitted. A CONNECT request that does not conform is malformed.

RFC 9112 defines HTTP/1 CONNECT as authority-form, where the request-target contains the tunnel destination. A converter must therefore map the HTTP/1 request-target, not a conflicting Host header, to HTTP/3 `:authority`.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
io.netty:netty-codec-http3≥ 4.2.2.Final ≤ 4.2.17.Final
4.2.2.Final
4.2.17.Final
4.2.20.Final
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
mavenio.netty:netty-codec-http3
Corregida 4.2.18.Final -1 d 4.2.20.Final no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.2.18.Final
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jgph-cgq3-c627

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.