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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · poweradmin/poweradmin

GHSA-JH32-8C9P-RC63

SERVER_NAME fallback poisons emailed username-recovery login link enabling cross-victim phishing

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CVSS 3.1
4.7
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche3 versiones4.2.6 · 4.3.5 · 4.4.1
Exposición78 dDesde la divulgación, 3 sept 2026, 11:39 p. m.
Detección76 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Se arregla en el próximo ciclo. Sin estrés.Sin prisa pero sin pausa, como yo en el páramo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 sept 26
22 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 sept 26
23 sept 26
13 oct 26
1 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JH32-8C9P-RC63 divulgada · CVSS 4.7 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
Poweradmin's username-recovery flow builds the emailed login link from `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` when `interface.application_url` is unset (the default). An unauthenticated attacker submits `POST /username/forgot` with a victim's email and an attacker-controlled `Host` header; the resulting recovery email — delivered to the REAL account owner's inbox — contains an attacker-controlled login URL (`https://evil.tld/login`). This is a distinct sink and impact class from CVE-2026-54588 (out-of-band cross-victim phishing via a legitimate Poweradmin email), and is not among CVE-2026-54588's enumerated sinks. Under Poweradmin's shipped FrankenPHP/official-Docker or Apache-default deployment, `SERVER_NAME` reflects the client `Host` header.

## Root Cause
`UsernameRecoveryService::getLoginUrl()` calls `UrlService::getEmailUrlWithServerFallback('/login')` (v4.4.0) / `getLoginUrl → getAbsoluteUrl → getHost` (v4.3.4/v4.2.5). The `application_url` branch (`UrlService.php:100`) is skipped because `application_url` defaults to `''` (`settings.defaults.php:149`), falling to `:104` `$serverName = $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` read RAW → returns `https://evil.tld/login`. No `isValidHostname`/allowlist. The link is embedded verbatim in the recovery email and mailed to the account owner.

Notably, the password-RESET path (`getEmailUrl()`, `:77`) correctly returns `null` when `application_url` is unset — proving the maintainer pinned the token-bearing reset path but left the non-token login-link path on `SERVER_NAME`.

## Impact
An attacker causes a legitimate Poweradmin username-recovery email — sent to the genuine account owner — to contain an attacker-controlled login link, enabling out-of-band credential harvesting / account takeover if the attacker mirrors the login page. No dependence on poisoning the victim's own live session. `POST /username/forgot` is pre-auth (`ForgotUsernameController` ctor `parent::__construct($request, false)`); the CSRF token is served on the GET form to anyone and any reCAPTCHA is attacker-self-satisfiable for the attacker's own request.

Proof of Concept

POST /username/forgot HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.tld
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

email=<victim@corp.example>&csrf_token=<token from GET form>
# SERVER_NAME=evil.tld -> getEmailUrlWithServerFallback('/login') returns
# https://evil.tld/login, embedded in the recovery email sent to victim@corp.example.

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: `POST /username/forgot` (pre-auth) with `Host: evil.tld` and the victim's email in the body. Guard: CSRF token + optional reCAPTCHA. Bypass proof: CSRF token is served on the GET form to any anonymous visitor; reCAPTCHA is solved by the attacker for their own request — both attacker-satisfiable.
2. Source: FrankenPHP/Apache-default sets `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']='evil.tld'` from the client Host. Bypass proof: FrankenPHP `cgi.go` `SplitHostPort(r.Host)`; hostname-less shipped Caddyfile.
3. Guard: `UrlService::getEmailUrlWithServerFallback('/login')` `:100` `application_url` branch. Bypass proof: `application_url` defaults `''` → skipped → `:104` raw `SERVER_NAME` → `https://evil.tld/login`.
4. Sink: link embedded verbatim in the recovery email rendered by `EmailTemplateService` and mailed to the real owner.
5. Impact: legitimate Poweradmin email delivers an attacker-controlled login link to a third-party victim → phishing / credential harvest / ATO.

## Bypass Evidence
- Emailed recovery links are NOT among CVE-2026-54588's enumerated sinks (OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO, logout redirect) → novel sink, not a duplicate.
- Password-reset path `getEmailUrl()` `:77` returns `null` when `application_url` unset (confirmed safe), while the login-link path reads SERVER_NAME raw — demonstrating the specific gap.
- Present on latest release v4.4.0 (via `getEmailUrlWithServerFallback`) and on v4.3.4/v4.2.5 (via `getLoginUrl → getAbsoluteUrl → getHost` SERVER_NAME fallback).

## Affected Versions
`>= 4.2.4` through the latest release v4.4.0. Requires `username_recovery.enabled` (default false — a feature toggle, not a security control; per CVSS guidance this narrows the vulnerable population but does not raise attack complexity).

## Suggested Fix
Apply the same host validation/allowlist (or refuse-when-unset, as the reset path already does) to the login-link builder in `UrlService`.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

---

Confirmed. I've widened the range to `>= 4.1.0, <= 4.4.0`, since username recovery shipped in 4.1.0 and its link builder was reachable from the request from the start. 4.0.x and 4.1.x are end of life and will not get a patch.

Worth flagging that on 4.1.0 through 4.3.4 the link is built from the Host header rather than SERVER_NAME, so the deployment precondition you describe does not apply there. Those versions are exploitable behind nginx too, not only FrankenPHP or Apache with UseCanonicalName off. Your SERVER_NAME analysis is right for 4.4.0.

The recovery link now goes through the same refuse-when-unset builder the password reset path uses, so with no application URL configured the email goes out without a login link instead of an attacker-controlled one. I did not add host validation: a syntactically valid attacker hostname is still the attacker's.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:R
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.1.0 < 4.2.6
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.3.0 < 4.3.5
poweradmin/poweradmin≥ 4.4.0 < 4.4.1
4.1.0
4.2.6
4.3.0
4.3.5
4.4.0
4.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin
Corregida 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas4.2.64.3.54.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-jh32-8c9p-rc63

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.