GHSA-JH32-8C9P-RC63
SERVER_NAME fallback poisons emailed username-recovery login link enabling cross-victim phishing
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-JH32-8C9P-RC63 divulgada · CVSS 4.7 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
Poweradmin's username-recovery flow builds the emailed login link from `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` when `interface.application_url` is unset (the default). An unauthenticated attacker submits `POST /username/forgot` with a victim's email and an attacker-controlled `Host` header; the resulting recovery email — delivered to the REAL account owner's inbox — contains an attacker-controlled login URL (`https://evil.tld/login`). This is a distinct sink and impact class from CVE-2026-54588 (out-of-band cross-victim phishing via a legitimate Poweradmin email), and is not among CVE-2026-54588's enumerated sinks. Under Poweradmin's shipped FrankenPHP/official-Docker or Apache-default deployment, `SERVER_NAME` reflects the client `Host` header.
## Root Cause
`UsernameRecoveryService::getLoginUrl()` calls `UrlService::getEmailUrlWithServerFallback('/login')` (v4.4.0) / `getLoginUrl → getAbsoluteUrl → getHost` (v4.3.4/v4.2.5). The `application_url` branch (`UrlService.php:100`) is skipped because `application_url` defaults to `''` (`settings.defaults.php:149`), falling to `:104` `$serverName = $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']` read RAW → returns `https://evil.tld/login`. No `isValidHostname`/allowlist. The link is embedded verbatim in the recovery email and mailed to the account owner.
Notably, the password-RESET path (`getEmailUrl()`, `:77`) correctly returns `null` when `application_url` is unset — proving the maintainer pinned the token-bearing reset path but left the non-token login-link path on `SERVER_NAME`.
## Impact
An attacker causes a legitimate Poweradmin username-recovery email — sent to the genuine account owner — to contain an attacker-controlled login link, enabling out-of-band credential harvesting / account takeover if the attacker mirrors the login page. No dependence on poisoning the victim's own live session. `POST /username/forgot` is pre-auth (`ForgotUsernameController` ctor `parent::__construct($request, false)`); the CSRF token is served on the GET form to anyone and any reCAPTCHA is attacker-self-satisfiable for the attacker's own request.
Proof of Concept
POST /username/forgot HTTP/1.1
Host: evil.tld
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
email=<victim@corp.example>&csrf_token=<token from GET form>
# SERVER_NAME=evil.tld -> getEmailUrlWithServerFallback('/login') returns
# https://evil.tld/login, embedded in the recovery email sent to victim@corp.example.## Attack Chain
1. Entry: `POST /username/forgot` (pre-auth) with `Host: evil.tld` and the victim's email in the body. Guard: CSRF token + optional reCAPTCHA. Bypass proof: CSRF token is served on the GET form to any anonymous visitor; reCAPTCHA is solved by the attacker for their own request — both attacker-satisfiable.
2. Source: FrankenPHP/Apache-default sets `$_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']='evil.tld'` from the client Host. Bypass proof: FrankenPHP `cgi.go` `SplitHostPort(r.Host)`; hostname-less shipped Caddyfile.
3. Guard: `UrlService::getEmailUrlWithServerFallback('/login')` `:100` `application_url` branch. Bypass proof: `application_url` defaults `''` → skipped → `:104` raw `SERVER_NAME` → `https://evil.tld/login`.
4. Sink: link embedded verbatim in the recovery email rendered by `EmailTemplateService` and mailed to the real owner.
5. Impact: legitimate Poweradmin email delivers an attacker-controlled login link to a third-party victim → phishing / credential harvest / ATO.
## Bypass Evidence
- Emailed recovery links are NOT among CVE-2026-54588's enumerated sinks (OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO, logout redirect) → novel sink, not a duplicate.
- Password-reset path `getEmailUrl()` `:77` returns `null` when `application_url` unset (confirmed safe), while the login-link path reads SERVER_NAME raw — demonstrating the specific gap.
- Present on latest release v4.4.0 (via `getEmailUrlWithServerFallback`) and on v4.3.4/v4.2.5 (via `getLoginUrl → getAbsoluteUrl → getHost` SERVER_NAME fallback).
## Affected Versions
`>= 4.2.4` through the latest release v4.4.0. Requires `username_recovery.enabled` (default false — a feature toggle, not a security control; per CVSS guidance this narrows the vulnerable population but does not raise attack complexity).
## Suggested Fix
Apply the same host validation/allowlist (or refuse-when-unset, as the reset path already does) to the login-link builder in `UrlService`.
---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
---
Confirmed. I've widened the range to `>= 4.1.0, <= 4.4.0`, since username recovery shipped in 4.1.0 and its link builder was reachable from the request from the start. 4.0.x and 4.1.x are end of life and will not get a patch.
Worth flagging that on 4.1.0 through 4.3.4 the link is built from the Host header rather than SERVER_NAME, so the deployment precondition you describe does not apply there. Those versions are exploitable behind nginx too, not only FrankenPHP or Apache with UseCanonicalName off. Your SERVER_NAME analysis is right for 4.4.0.
The recovery link now goes through the same refuse-when-unset builder the password reset path uses, so with no application URL configured the email goes out without a login link instead of an attacker-controlled one. I did not add host validation: a syntactically valid attacker hostname is still the attacker's.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin |
Corregida | 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 | — | — |
4.2.64.3.54.4.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-jh32-8c9p-rc63Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
