GHSA-JQ29-C7V8-RG55
Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-JQ29-C7V8-RG55 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in `MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile()` allows an authenticated user with media management permissions to delete arbitrary files on the server. The method validates only the basename portion of the filename using `Utils::checkFilename()`, while the directory path (which may contain `../` sequences) is preserved and passed unvalidated to `unlink()`. This enables directory escape from the intended media storage path.
Severity
High (8.1) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Details
In `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php`, the `deleteFile()` method (lines 332-365) performs filename validation only on the basename, not the full path:
public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void
{
$settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings);
$filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);
// Line 339-340: Only the BASENAME is validated
$basename = $filesystem->basename($filename); // e.g. "evil.jpg" from "../../evil.jpg"
if (!Utils::checkFilename($basename)) { // passes - no traversal in basename
throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);
}
$path = $settings['destination'] ?? $this->getPath();
// ...
// Line 353: Full pathname (with traversal) is preserved
$pathname = $filesystem->pathname($filename); // "../../"
// Line 356-357: Traversal path reconstructed
[$base, $ext,,] = $this->getFileParts($basename);
$name = "{$pathname}{$base}.{$ext}"; // "../../evil.jpg"
// Line 360: Passed to doRemove()
$this->doRemove($name, $path);
}`doRemove()` (line 521-582) then calls:
// Line 538
unlink("{$folder}/{$filename}");
// e.g. unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../config/system.yaml")`Utils::checkFilename()` (lines 1022-1044) properly checks for `/`, `\`, and `..`, but it is applied to `$filesystem->basename($filename)` (the last path component only), so traversal sequences in the directory portion are never validated.
Data flow from user input
The vulnerability is reachable through the Flex media handling pipeline:
- `FlexMediaTrait::setUpdatedMedia()` (line 386) iterates form flash data where `$filename` is the array key - user-controlled
- For file deletions (`$file` is null, line 396), NO upload validation is performed (the `checkUploadedFile()` call at line 401 only executes when `$file` is truthy)
- The raw filename is stored in `$this->_uploads` at line 414
- `saveUpdatedMedia()` (line 499) calls `$media->deleteFile($filename, $settings)` with the unsanitized filename
Sibling: renameFile()
The same pattern exists in `renameFile()` (lines 374-405) which has even weaker validation - it performs NO `checkFilename()` call at all. While `renameFile()` currently has no callers in the core codebase, it is part of the public `MediaUploadInterface` and should be fixed as defense-in-depth.
Proof of Concept
Environment: Grav CMS 2.0.16 with admin plugin
The attack requires an authenticated admin user with page/media editing permissions (not super-admin).
- Create a target file:
echo "DELETE_ME" > /var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt- Submit a Flex object form (e.g. page edit) with a crafted media deletion where the filename key contains path traversal:
POST /admin/pages/mypage/task:save
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
# The form flash data includes a media deletion entry with key:
# "../../data/target.txt" -> null (deletion marker)- When `saveUpdatedMedia()` processes the deletion queue:
- `$filename` = `../../data/target.txt`
- `deleteFile("../../data/target.txt")` is called
- `$basename` = `target.txt` (passes `checkFilename()`)
- `$pathname` = `../../data/`
- `$name` = `../../data/target.txt`
- `doRemove()` calls `unlink("/var/www/grav/user/pages/mypage/../../data/target.txt")`
- Which resolves to `unlink("/var/www/grav/user/data/target.txt")`
- The file is deleted outside the intended media directory.
Impact
An authenticated user with media management permissions can:
- Delete configuration files (`user/config/system.yaml`, `user/config/security.yaml`)
- Delete other pages' content files
- Delete authentication-related files (user account YAML files)
- Cause denial of service by removing critical application files
- Potentially escalate privileges by removing security configuration
Suggested Fix
Apply `Utils::checkFilename()` to the full `$filename` parameter before decomposing it, or reject any filename containing directory separators or `..` sequences:
public function deleteFile(string $filename, ?array $settings = null): void
{
$settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings);
$filesystem = Filesystem::getInstance(false);
// Validate the FULL filename, not just the basename
if (!Utils::checkFilename($filename)) {
throw new RuntimeException(/* ... */);
}
// ... rest unchanged
}The same fix should be applied to `renameFile()` for both `$from` and `$to` parameters.
References
- Vulnerable file: `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php` lines 332-365, 521-582
- Caller: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/Traits/FlexMediaTrait.php` lines 386-414, 490-499
- Sibling: `system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php` lines 374-405 (renameFile)
- Related GHSA: GHSA-g6j3-8jv9-ch5f (path traversal in PagesController::batchCopy - different file, same bug class)
Disclosure
This vulnerability was discovered using AI-assisted security research tools.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 2.0.16 | — | — |
2.0.16Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72695https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55https://github.com/getgrav/gravhttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-path-traversal-via-mediauploadtrait-deletefileLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
