GHSA-JQ76-R8VW-9W36
IsPublicIP SSRF guard missing IPv6 transition address checks allows agent tool SSRF via NAT64/6to4/Teredo
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-JQ76-R8VW-9W36 divulgada · CVSS 6.3 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
IsPublicIP SSRF guard missing IPv6 transition address checks allows agent tool SSRF via NAT64/6to4/Teredo
Summary
The agent tool SSRF guard `IsPublicIP` in Probo uses Go stdlib `net.IP` predicates only (`IsLoopback`, `IsPrivate`, `IsLinkLocalUnicast`, `IsMulticast`, `IsUnspecified`), without extracting the embedded IPv4 from IPv6 transition address forms. An attacker who influences the URL passed to an agent tool (browser, security scanner, whois) can use an IPv6 transition address to bypass the guard and make the agent access internal network services or cloud metadata endpoints.
Affected component / versions
- Package: `github.com/getprobo/probo`
- Affected: all versions through current HEAD
- File: `pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck/netcheck.go`
Details
Root cause (CWE-918)
`pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck/netcheck.go` -- `IsPublicIP`:
func IsPublicIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if ip.IsLoopback() ||
ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IsMulticast() ||
ip.IsUnspecified() {
return false
}
return true
}Go's stdlib IP predicates do not decode IPv6 transition forms:
- `64:ff9b::10.0.0.1` (NAT64) -- `IsPrivate()` returns false
- `2002:0a00:0001::` (6to4) -- `IsPrivate()` returns false
- `2001:0000:...` (Teredo) -- all checks return false
These addresses wrap private IPv4 destinations in a globally-routable IPv6 envelope.
The guard also does not check CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`), which `IsPrivate()` does not cover.
Reachability / trust boundary
`IsPublicIP` is called by `ValidatePublicURL` and `ValidatePublicDomain`, which guard 7 agent tool endpoints:
- `pkg/agent/tools/browser/browser.go` -- browser navigation tool
- `pkg/agent/tools/browser/url_check.go` -- URL and domain validation
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/csp.go` -- CSP header scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/headers.go` -- security header scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/cors.go` -- CORS policy scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/ssl.go` -- SSL/TLS scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/whois.go` -- WHOIS lookup
The guard prevents the AI agent from scanning internal infrastructure. The bypass allows the agent to be directed (via prompt injection or adversarial input) to scan internal services.
Attack chain
- Attacker provides a URL with an IPv6 transition address as input to an agent tool:
- NAT64: `http://[64:ff9b::169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/` (cloud metadata)
- 6to4: `http://[2002:c0a8:0101::1]/admin` (192.168.1.1 internal router)
- Teredo: `http://[2001:0000:4136:e378:8000:63bf:5765:5765]/`
- `ValidatePublicURL` resolves the hostname and calls `IsPublicIP`:
- All stdlib predicates return false (the IPv6 address IS global unicast, NOT private)
- `IsPublicIP` returns true -- address classified as public
- The agent tool makes the HTTP request to the transition address, which routes to the embedded private IPv4 on hosts with transition connectivity.
Impact
SSRF bypassing the agent tool network boundary, allowing:
- Cloud metadata access (AWS/GCP/Azure credential theft via 169.254.169.254)
- Internal network scanning (RFC 1918 services)
- Security tool output (headers, CSP, CORS, SSL info) from internal services leaked to the agent context
Proof of concept
Structural bypass verified by code inspection:
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net"
)
func main() {
ip := net.ParseIP("64:ff9b::169.254.169.254")
fmt.Println("IsLoopback:", ip.IsLoopback()) // false
fmt.Println("IsPrivate:", ip.IsPrivate()) // false
fmt.Println("IsLinkLocalUnicast:", ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast()) // false
fmt.Println("IsMulticast:", ip.IsMulticast()) // false
fmt.Println("IsUnspecified:", ip.IsUnspecified()) // false
// -> IsPublicIP returns true, URL allowed
ip2 := net.ParseIP("2002:c0a8:0101::1") // 6to4 wrapping 192.168.1.1
fmt.Println("IsPrivate:", ip2.IsPrivate()) // false
// -> allowed
}Remediation / fix
Add IPv6 transition address extraction before classification:
var (
nat64WKP = mustParseCIDR("64:ff9b::/96")
nat64Local = mustParseCIDR("64:ff9b:1::/48")
sixToFour = mustParseCIDR("2002::/16")
teredo = mustParseCIDR("2001::/32")
cgnat = mustParseCIDR("100.64.0.0/10")
)
func IsPublicIP(ip net.IP) bool {
ip = extractEmbeddedIPv4(ip) // unwrap transition forms
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsMulticast() ||
ip.IsUnspecified() || cgnat.Contains(ip) {
return false
}
return true
}With `extractEmbeddedIPv4` decoding NAT64/6to4/Teredo/IPv4-compatible forms.
Alternatively, block the transition prefixes wholesale since agent tools should never need to reach transition-addressed hosts.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot (tonghuaroot@gmail.com).
Severity reassessment
Reporter severity: High (no CVSS vector provided).
Maintainer assessment: Medium —
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N` (6.3).
Rationale for lowering from High:
- Attack Complexity is High, not Low. The report's PoC is a
- Defense-in-depth already covered the common HTTP tools. CSP,
- Privileges Required is Low. Reaching the tools requires an
- Impact remains High if the environmental prerequisites are met
CWE: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery).
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogo.probo.inc/probo |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.216.1 afectada |
0.261.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-jq76-r8vw-9w36Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
