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Advisory · GitHub · Go · go.probo.inc/probo

GHSA-JQ76-R8VW-9W36

IsPublicIP SSRF guard missing IPv6 transition address checks allows agent tool SSRF via NAT64/6to4/Teredo

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CVSS 3.1
6.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición95 dDesde la divulgación, 18 ago 2026, 1:30 a. m.
Detección92 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Mi diagnóstico: un ticket y una sonrisa.Tranqui, pero que no se quede en el olvido.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
18 ago 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
18 ago 26
11 sept 26
4 oct 26
28 oct 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JQ76-R8VW-9W36 divulgada · CVSS 6.3 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

IsPublicIP SSRF guard missing IPv6 transition address checks allows agent tool SSRF via NAT64/6to4/Teredo

Summary

The agent tool SSRF guard `IsPublicIP` in Probo uses Go stdlib `net.IP` predicates only (`IsLoopback`, `IsPrivate`, `IsLinkLocalUnicast`, `IsMulticast`, `IsUnspecified`), without extracting the embedded IPv4 from IPv6 transition address forms. An attacker who influences the URL passed to an agent tool (browser, security scanner, whois) can use an IPv6 transition address to bypass the guard and make the agent access internal network services or cloud metadata endpoints.

Affected component / versions

  • Package: `github.com/getprobo/probo`
  • Affected: all versions through current HEAD
  • File: `pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck/netcheck.go`

Details

Root cause (CWE-918)

`pkg/agent/tools/internal/netcheck/netcheck.go` -- `IsPublicIP`:

func IsPublicIP(ip net.IP) bool {
    if ip.IsLoopback() ||
        ip.IsPrivate() ||
        ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
        ip.IsMulticast() ||
        ip.IsUnspecified() {
        return false
    }
    return true
}

Go's stdlib IP predicates do not decode IPv6 transition forms:
- `64:ff9b::10.0.0.1` (NAT64) -- `IsPrivate()` returns false
- `2002:0a00:0001::` (6to4) -- `IsPrivate()` returns false
- `2001:0000:...` (Teredo) -- all checks return false

These addresses wrap private IPv4 destinations in a globally-routable IPv6 envelope.

The guard also does not check CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`), which `IsPrivate()` does not cover.

Reachability / trust boundary

`IsPublicIP` is called by `ValidatePublicURL` and `ValidatePublicDomain`, which guard 7 agent tool endpoints:
- `pkg/agent/tools/browser/browser.go` -- browser navigation tool
- `pkg/agent/tools/browser/url_check.go` -- URL and domain validation
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/csp.go` -- CSP header scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/headers.go` -- security header scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/cors.go` -- CORS policy scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/ssl.go` -- SSL/TLS scanner
- `pkg/agent/tools/security/whois.go` -- WHOIS lookup

The guard prevents the AI agent from scanning internal infrastructure. The bypass allows the agent to be directed (via prompt injection or adversarial input) to scan internal services.

Attack chain
  1. Attacker provides a URL with an IPv6 transition address as input to an agent tool:
  2. NAT64: `http://[64:ff9b::169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/` (cloud metadata)
  3. 6to4: `http://[2002:c0a8:0101::1]/admin` (192.168.1.1 internal router)
  4. Teredo: `http://[2001:0000:4136:e378:8000:63bf:5765:5765]/`
  5. `ValidatePublicURL` resolves the hostname and calls `IsPublicIP`:
  6. All stdlib predicates return false (the IPv6 address IS global unicast, NOT private)
  7. `IsPublicIP` returns true -- address classified as public
  8. The agent tool makes the HTTP request to the transition address, which routes to the embedded private IPv4 on hosts with transition connectivity.

Impact

SSRF bypassing the agent tool network boundary, allowing:
- Cloud metadata access (AWS/GCP/Azure credential theft via 169.254.169.254)
- Internal network scanning (RFC 1918 services)
- Security tool output (headers, CSP, CORS, SSL info) from internal services leaked to the agent context

Proof of concept

Structural bypass verified by code inspection:

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net"
)

func main() {
    ip := net.ParseIP("64:ff9b::169.254.169.254")
    fmt.Println("IsLoopback:", ip.IsLoopback())           // false
    fmt.Println("IsPrivate:", ip.IsPrivate())               // false
    fmt.Println("IsLinkLocalUnicast:", ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast()) // false
    fmt.Println("IsMulticast:", ip.IsMulticast())           // false
    fmt.Println("IsUnspecified:", ip.IsUnspecified())       // false
    // -> IsPublicIP returns true, URL allowed

    ip2 := net.ParseIP("2002:c0a8:0101::1") // 6to4 wrapping 192.168.1.1
    fmt.Println("IsPrivate:", ip2.IsPrivate()) // false
    // -> allowed
}

Remediation / fix

Add IPv6 transition address extraction before classification:

var (
    nat64WKP   = mustParseCIDR("64:ff9b::/96")
    nat64Local = mustParseCIDR("64:ff9b:1::/48")
    sixToFour  = mustParseCIDR("2002::/16")
    teredo     = mustParseCIDR("2001::/32")
    cgnat      = mustParseCIDR("100.64.0.0/10")
)

func IsPublicIP(ip net.IP) bool {
    ip = extractEmbeddedIPv4(ip) // unwrap transition forms
    if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() ||
        ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsMulticast() ||
        ip.IsUnspecified() || cgnat.Contains(ip) {
        return false
    }
    return true
}

With `extractEmbeddedIPv4` decoding NAT64/6to4/Teredo/IPv4-compatible forms.

Alternatively, block the transition prefixes wholesale since agent tools should never need to reach transition-addressed hosts.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot (tonghuaroot@gmail.com).

Severity reassessment

Reporter severity: High (no CVSS vector provided).

Maintainer assessment: Medium —
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N` (6.3).

Rationale for lowering from High:

  1. Attack Complexity is High, not Low. The report's PoC is a
  2. Defense-in-depth already covered the common HTTP tools. CSP,
  3. Privileges Required is Low. Reaching the tools requires an
  4. Impact remains High if the environmental prerequisites are met

CWE: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:C
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
6.3/ 10Medio
Vector 6.3 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
go.probo.inc/probo< 0.261.1
v0.216.1
0.261.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogo.probo.inc/probo
Sin parche — — v0.216.1 afectada
Versiones corregidas0.261.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-jq76-r8vw-9w36

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.