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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs

GHSA-JQ8H-9MJH-XV8F

Unauthenticated LifecycleDelete on SeaweedFS S3 internal gRPC port allows cross-bucket object/version deletion

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CVSS 3.1
9.1
Crítica
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición11 dDesde la divulgación, 9 nov 2026, 2:50 p. m.
Detección10 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
Te dejo mi extintor por si acaso.Algún pentester ya está tomando notas de esto.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
9 nov 26
20 nov 26
21 nov 26
9 nov 26
12 nov 26
15 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JQ8H-9MJH-XV8F divulgada · CVSS 9.1 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

## Summary
The SeaweedFS S3 server exposes an internal gRPC listener (default `0.0.0.0:<s3.port + 10000>`, i.e. `18333`) that hosts two services: `SeaweedS3IamCache` and `SeaweedS3LifecycleInternal`. Commit `70a26cb` (shipped in 4.46) added `checkAdminAuth` (Bearer JWT) to `SeaweedS3IamCache`, establishing that this listener is intended to require admin authentication. However, the sibling `SeaweedS3LifecycleInternal.LifecycleDelete` RPC on the *same* listener has zero authentication and its optimistic identity check is default-open. An unauthenticated network peer can invoke `LifecycleDelete` to destroy non-object-locked objects, versions, delete-markers, and in-progress multipart uploads across every bucket.

## Root Cause
1. Missing authentication on a critical RPC (CWE-306). `LifecycleDelete` (`weed/s3api/s3api_internal_lifecycle.go:22`) contains no `checkAdminAuth`/Bearer/Authorization check (grep count = 0), whereas the co-located `SeaweedS3IamCache` handlers contain 11. The `grpcS` server uses only `requestIDUnaryInterceptor` (`weed/util/grpc_client_server.go:200`), and `LoadServerTLS("grpc.s3")` returns `(nil,nil)` when no cert is configured (plaintext) — so the RPC is unauthenticated end-to-end.
2. Default-open identity CAS (CWE-862). `identityMatches(live, want)` returns `true` when `want == nil` (`s3api_internal_lifecycle.go:329-331`). `ExpectedIdentity` is optional proto field 20, so an attacker simply omits it and the compare-and-swap guard passes unconditionally.

## Impact
Unauthenticated destruction (integrity + availability) of all non-object-locked objects, versions, delete-markers, and in-progress multipart uploads across all buckets, reachable from any network position that can connect to the S3 internal gRPC port. Object-lock retention / legal-hold objects remain protected by `enforceObjectLockProtections` (line 47) — a partial guard; the majority of objects in typical deployments are unlocked.

## Proof of Concept
1. Connect (plaintext gRPC) to `<s3-host>:18333`.
2. Call `NewSeaweedS3LifecycleInternalClient(...).LifecycleDelete(&LifecycleDeleteRequest{Bucket:"victim", ObjectPath:"important.dat", ActionKind: EXPIRATION_DAYS /* ExpectedIdentity omitted */})`.
3. The object is deleted with no authentication.

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: unauth TCP → `0.0.0.0:18333` (`weed/command/s3.go:345-349`: `portGrpc = 10000 + s3.port`, `bindIp = "0.0.0.0"`) → `NewSeaweedS3LifecycleInternalClient` → `LifecycleDelete`.
- Guard: per-RPC auth / interceptor / TLS. Bypass proof: `checkAdminAuth|Bearer|Authorization` grep in the lifecycle handler = 0 (vs 11 in the guarded `SeaweedS3IamCache` sibling); `grpcS` uses only `requestIDUnaryInterceptor` (`grpc_client_server.go:200`); `LoadServerTLS("grpc.s3")` returns `(nil,nil)` → plaintext (`tls.go:79-81`).
2. Action: send `LifecycleDelete{Bucket, ObjectPath, ActionKind, ExpectedIdentity: nil}`.
- Guard: identity compare-and-swap. Bypass proof: `identityMatches(live, want)` returns `true` for `want==nil` (`s3api_internal_lifecycle.go:329-331`); `ExpectedIdentity` is optional proto field 20 → omitted.
3. Sink: `lifecycleDispatch` → `createDeleteMarker` / `deleteUnversionedObjectWithClient` / `deleteSpecificObjectVersion` → filer delete.
- Guard: object-lock only (`enforceObjectLockProtections`, line 47). Bypass proof: non-locked objects have no protection; handler returns `DONE`.
4. Impact: unauthenticated deletion of all non-object-locked objects/versions/delete-markers/MPUs across every bucket.

## Bypass Evidence
- `git show 4.46:weed/s3api/s3api_internal_lifecycle.go` → `LifecycleDelete` present, `checkAdminAuth` count = 0, `identityMatches` nil-branch present at line 329.
- `git merge-base --is-ancestor 70a26cb 4.46` → YES: the sibling `SeaweedS3IamCache` IS guarded in the shipped 4.46 release, so the parity asymmetry is real in production, not just on HEAD.
- Fix commit `70a26cb` file list = `s3api_server_grpc.go`, `propagating_store.go`, tests only — the lifecycle file is untouched.
- No existing SeaweedFS advisory mentions the lifecycle service (repo advisory grep = 0).

## Affected Versions
`>= 4.41` (S3 lifecycle internal gRPC service introduced) through `<= 4.46` (latest release; unfixed on HEAD `b3aace2`). Module path `github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs` unchanged.

## Suggested Fix
Add `checkAdminAuth` (the same Bearer-JWT guard introduced by `70a26cb` for `SeaweedS3IamCache`) to every `SeaweedS3LifecycleInternal` handler, and have the lifecycle worker/shell clients attach the admin token. Additionally, make the identity CAS fail-closed when `ExpectedIdentity` is absent.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
10.0/ 10Muy alto
Vector 10.0 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs≥ 4.41 ≤ 4.46
4.41
4.46
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-jq8h-9mjh-xv8f

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