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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · gix-url

GHSA-JRCM-326H-GPP8

gix-url authority is not terminated by '?'/'#', causing the gix-transport redirect identity guard to fail open and leak HTTP Basic credentials

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -284 d de la divulgación
Exposición110 dDesde la divulgación, 3 ago 2026, 1:28 p. m.
Detección107 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (alta) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Como dice el refrán: más vale prevenir que restaurar backups.No corre prisa, pero no la pierdas de vista.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.49.1
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
23 oct 25
3 ago 26
12 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
23 oct 25
30 ene 26
8 may 26
15 ago 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.49.1 gix-transport · -284 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JRCM-326H-GPP8 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`gix-url`'s hand-rolled URL parser does not treat `?` or `#` as terminating the authority.
For `http://a?@b/repo` it reports the host as `b`, where Git, libcurl, browsers and the
`url` crate all report `a`.

This is a correctness regression on its own. Its security consequence is that
`gix-transport`'s HTTP redirect guard — `redirect::can_reuse_identity()`, added in PR #2686
to fix GHSA-9857 — compares the *wrong* host and fails open. A server that can return a
crafted `Location` gets the caller's `Authorization: Basic` credentials on the next request,
sent to an authority the credentials do not belong to.

Details

Root cause (#186) — `gix-url/src/simple_url.rs:72`
let path_start = after_scheme.find('/').unwrap_or(after_scheme.len());
let authority = &after_scheme[..path_start];
...
if let Some((user_info, host_port)) = authority.rsplit_once('@') { ... }

The authority is taken as everything up to the first `/`, so `?` and `#` are absorbed into it,
and `rsplit_once('@')` then hands everything after the last `@` to `parse_host_port()`.
RFC 3986 §3.2 ends the authority at the first `/`, `?` or `#`.

This is a regression from commit `b34d1d270` ("feat: Replace url dependency with minimal custom
implementation", 2025-11-22). Before it, `parse::url()` took `host` from `url::Url::host_str()`,
which is RFC-conformant.

`Url::to_bstring()` percent-encodes `?`/`#` into the userinfo, so a URL that gitoxide parsed
itself stays internally consistent. The divergence only bites where a raw URL string reaches
both gitoxide's parser and the HTTP client — which is exactly the redirect `Location` header.

Impact (#187) — `gix-transport/src/client/blocking_io/http/redirect.rs:51`

`can_reuse_identity(redirect_url, original_url)` calls `gix_url::parse` on the server-supplied
`Location` and compares `.host`. With a `Location` of the form
`<attacker-authority>?@<original-authority><original-tail>`:

  • `redirect::base_url()` accepts it (`scheme_is_safe` passes, the tail matches), so
  • `can_reuse_identity()` reads the host as the original host, returns `true`, and
  • the next `request()` builds the POST URL from the attacker base and

libcurl does the right thing on its own — it strips the custom `Authorization` on the
cross-origin GET redirect. gitoxide then re-attaches it on the POST.

Reachable with default configuration: `http.followRedirects` defaults to
`FollowRedirects::Initial` (`http/mod.rs`, `#[default] Initial`).

Reproduction

Two loopback HTTP servers, no external hosts. Confirmed on `main` @ `5708de434`,
macOS, rustc 1.95.0, system git 2.50.1.

(a) Host divergence, via the `gix` CLI

`http://localhost?@127.0.0.1:8802/repo` — a server listening on 127.0.0.1:8802 logs the request
from `gix clone`, while `git clone` of the same string reports
`Failed to connect to localhost port 80` and the 8802 server sees nothing. The `url` crate
reports `host=Some("localhost")`. Identical result with `#` in place of `?`.

(b) Credential leak

A driver built against `gix-transport` (features `blocking-client, http-client-curl,
http-client-curl-rust-tls, http-client-insecure-credentials`) sets an identity and handshakes
against `http://127.0.0.1:8801/repo`. The 8801 server answers the `info/refs` GET with a 302
whose `Location` uses the `?@` shape above and points at 127.0.0.1:8802. The 8802 server then
logs a POST carrying `Authorization: Basic` with the credentials that were provisioned for
8801, and the transport reports `identity after handshake: Some("victim-user")`.

*Note on the repro:* `http-client-insecure-credentials` is only needed because
`add_basic_auth_if_present()` refuses cleartext HTTP. On `https://` — the real-world case —
there is no such gate and no feature flag is involved; `scheme_is_safe()` permits
`https` → `https`, so the same `Location` works.

Full server scripts and the driver source are held locally and will be provided on request
rather than published.

Impact

An attacker who can control a redirect response from an origin the user authenticates to
(a hostile or compromised forge, or an open redirect on a legitimate one) obtains that origin's
HTTP Basic credentials — commonly a PAT or OAuth token from the user's credential helper.

Independently of the credential leak, any embedder that validates or displays a repository URL's
host with a conformant parser and then hands the same string to `gix` will disagree with where
gitoxide actually connects. That is a host-allowlist bypass / request-forgery primitive for
downstream consumers of `gix-url`.

Suggested direction (maintainer's call)

  1. In `simple_url::parse`, end the authority at the first of `/`, `?`, `#`, and keep the
  2. Independently, `can_reuse_identity()` should fail closed on any URL whose authority contains
  3. Extend `redirected_post_does_not_forward_basic_auth_to_the_new_host` with the `?@` and `#@`

Happy to open the PR once you have decided how you want this handled and disclosed.

---

*Disclosure: this report was prepared with AI assistance (Claude Code) operating through
the `shuvamk` account, per `CONTRIBUTING.md`'s "Prevent agent impersonation" section. Every
result quoted above was executed locally against the commit named; the host-divergence and
redirect code paths were re-verified unchanged on `main` @ `da5fa7359` before sending.*

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
gix-url≤ 0.32.0
gix-transport≤ 0.49.0
0.32.0
0.49.0
0.62.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iogix-transport
Corregida 0.49.1 -284 d 0.62.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.49.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/GitoxideLabs/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-jrcm-326h-gpp8

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