GHSA-JRJH-V4Q7-MRR6
Bulk record and zone deletion did not validate the CSRF token
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-JRJH-V4Q7-MRR6 divulgada · CVSS 8.1 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
Poweradmin validates the CSRF token on its single-item record and zone deletion pages, but the bulk (multi-select) record deletion page did not. A logged-in user who visits an attacker-controlled page can be made to delete DNS records they are allowed to delete.
Details (`page=delete_records`)
File: `lib/Application/Controller/DeleteRecordsController.php`
`run()` dispatches directly to `deleteRecords()` on `$_POST['confirm']`
without ever calling `$this->validateCsrfToken()`:
public function run(): void
{
$raw_ids = $_POST['record_id'] ?? null;
...
if (isset($_POST['confirm'])) {
$this->deleteRecords($record_ids); // no validateCsrfToken() call anywhere in this file
}
$this->showRecords($record_ids);
}For comparison, the single-record equivalent,
`DeleteRecordController::run()`, correctly calls `$this->validateCsrfToken()`
before deleting. `validateCsrfToken()` is not enforced by any global
middleware in this codebase - each controller must call it explicitly - so
this is a real, exploitable gap, not a redundant check.
PoC
An authenticated Poweradmin user who is tricked into visiting an
attacker-controlled page while logged in will have this auto-submitting
form execute in their session:
<form id="f" action="https://TARGET/index.php?page=delete_records" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="record_id[]" value="RECORD_ID">
<input type="hidden" name="confirm" value="1">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit()</script>The record is deleted with no CSRF token required. Impact is bounded by the
victim's own permissions (standard CSRF impact model), but since the actual
deletion is still gated by `RecordManager::deleteRecord()`'s ownership check,
this only lets an attacker delete records the *victim* is authorized to
delete - which, for a victim with broad edit rights, can still be
significant (e.g., MX/NS record removal causing an outage).
Impact
CSRF-triggered deletion of DNS records, bounded by the victim's own permissions. For a victim with broad edit rights this can remove MX or NS records and cause an outage.
Fix
`DeleteRecordsController` now validates the CSRF token before deleting. Bulk zone deletion had the same gap in every release up to 4.4.0 and was fixed in the same releases.
---
Confirmed. The bulk record deletion path never validated the token in any released version up to 4.4.0. The 3.x line is not affected. 4.0.x and 4.1.x are end of life and will not be patched.
The original report also covered bulk zone deletion checking the edit permission instead of the delete permission. That is a separate issue and is now tracked in GHSA-974h-q6f4-mx7g https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-974h-q6f4-mx7g.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistpoweradmin/poweradmin |
Corregida | 4.2.6, 4.3.5, 4.4.1 | — | — |
4.2.64.3.54.4.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/poweradmin/poweradmin/security/advisories/GHSA-jrjh-v4q7-mrr6Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
