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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

GHSA-JRQ7-XRJX-PCFW

Nginx UI: Auto backup name allows path traversal outside validated storage path

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición35 dDesde la divulgación, 15 oct 2026, 3:10 p. m.
Detección32 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
15 oct 26
19 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
15 oct 26
24 oct 26
2 nov 26
11 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JRQ7-XRJX-PCFW divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Nginx UI validates `backup_path` and `storage_path` against the administrator-defined `backup.GrantedAccessPath` boundary, but the final auto-backup output filename is built from the user-controlled auto-backup `name` without stripping path separators or `..` components.

An authenticated user who can create or modify an auto-backup task can set a name such as `task/../../../escaped`. The configured `storage_path` still passes validation because it is inside `GrantedAccessPath`, but the generated backup path escapes that storage directory when `filepath.Join(storage_path, filename)` resolves the embedded traversal sequence.

This bypasses the documented backup path boundary and allows backup archives, and for encrypted configuration backups the adjacent `.key` file, to be written outside the intended storage directory with the Nginx UI process privileges.

Affected Versions

  • Current `dev` branch commit checked: `4948fba8744e82c3d7003f68ee164e9f49421066`
  • Latest release checked: `v2.3.10`, published 2026-04-28
  • The vulnerable filename construction is present in both current `dev` and `v2.3.10`.

Security Boundary

The project documentation describes `backup.GrantedAccessPath` as the critical security boundary for backup operations. It says the setting:

  • restricts backup operations to explicitly authorized directories,
  • prevents unauthorized access to sensitive system directories,
  • enforces administrator-defined boundaries,
  • normalizes paths to prevent traversal attempts.

That boundary is enforced for the configured `storage_path`, but not for the final path after the backup name is appended.

Root Cause

`model.AutoBackup.GetName()` only trims whitespace and replaces spaces:

func (a *AutoBackup) GetName() string {
    return strings.ReplaceAll(strings.TrimSpace(a.Name), " ", "_")
}

The result is then embedded directly into filenames:

filename := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d.zip", autoBackup.GetName(), time.Now().Unix())
outputPath = filepath.Join(autoBackup.StoragePath, filename)

and for custom directory backups:

filename := fmt.Sprintf("custom_dir_%s_%d.zip", autoBackup.GetName(), time.Now().Unix())
outputPath = filepath.Join(autoBackup.StoragePath, filename)

The API validation rules require `name`, `backup_type`, `storage_type`, `storage_path`, and `cron_expression`, but do not reject `/`, `\`, or `..` in `name`. `ValidateAutoBackupConfig` validates `backup_path` and `storage_path`, but it does not validate the final `outputPath` after appending the generated filename.

Relevant paths:

  • `model/auto_backup.go`
  • `api/backup/auto_backup.go`
  • `internal/backup/auto_backup.go`
  • `internal/backup/utils.go`

Proof of Concept

The following local-only reproducer mirrors the relevant code path without contacting any external system:

name := "task/../../../escaped"
filename := fmt.Sprintf("custom_dir_%s_%d.zip", getName(name), int64(1715555555))
outputPath := filepath.Join(storageDir, filename)

Setup:

  1. Create a temporary `granted` directory.
  2. Set `sourceDir` and `storageDir` under that granted directory.
  3. Treat only `granted` as the allowed path boundary.
  4. Use the auto-backup name `task/../../../escaped`.
  5. Create the custom-directory backup using the same filename pattern and zip creation behavior.

Observed output:

granted_root=/Users/jagadeshachanta/.cache/tmp/nginx-ui-autobackup-poc-1538710430/granted
validated_storage_path=/Users/jagadeshachanta/.cache/tmp/nginx-ui-autobackup-poc-1538710430/granted/storage
auto_backup_name="task/../../../escaped"
constructed_filename="custom_dir_task/../../../escaped_1715555555.zip"
created_file=/Users/jagadeshachanta/.cache/tmp/nginx-ui-autobackup-poc-1538710430/escaped_1715555555.zip
escaped_validated_storage_path=true
created_file_exists=true

The configured storage path is inside the granted directory, but the created backup file is outside both the storage directory and the granted directory.

A repo-local regression test was also prepared at:

internal/backup/auto_backup_path_traversal_poc_test.go

The test cannot currently be executed cleanly in this checkout because unrelated build prerequisites fail before the package test runs:

app/app.go: pattern all:dist: no matching files found
model/cert.go: no required module provides package github.com/go-acme/lego/v5/certificate
internal/helper/key_type.go: no required module provides package github.com/go-acme/lego/v5/certcrypto

The standalone reproducer output above was therefore used as the executable proof for this report.

Impact

An authenticated user with access to the auto-backup API can bypass the administrator-configured backup storage boundary. Depending on filesystem permissions and deployment layout, this can:

  • write backup archives outside the intended `storage_path`,
  • write encrypted configuration backup key files outside the intended `storage_path`,
  • place sensitive backup material in directories that administrators did not authorize for backup storage,
  • create or overwrite timestamp-suffixed files outside the validated backup directory using the Nginx UI process privileges.

This is especially relevant because backup archives may contain Nginx UI configuration, database files, Nginx configuration, and for encrypted config backups the adjacent key file required to decrypt the archive.

Suggested Fix

Recommended defense in depth:

  1. Treat auto-backup `name` as a display label only, not as a filesystem path component.
  2. Sanitize generated filenames with `filepath.Base` or a strict allowlist such as `[A-Za-z0-9._-]`.
  3. Reject path separators, drive separators, NUL bytes, and `..` segments in `name`.
  4. After constructing `outputPath`, clean it and validate that the final path remains inside the already-validated `storage_path`.
  5. Add regression tests for both local and S3 temporary-file paths.

Example invariant:

cleanOutput := filepath.Clean(outputPath)
cleanStorage := filepath.Clean(autoBackup.StoragePath) + string(filepath.Separator)
if !strings.HasPrefix(cleanOutput, cleanStorage) {
    return ErrPathNotInGrantedAccess
}

Disclosure Notes

This was tested only in a local isolated environment against source code and temporary directories. No online demo systems or production systems were tested.

AI assistance was used to inspect the open-source code, prepare the local reproducer, and draft this report. The issue and PoC output were verified locally before submission.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI< 1.9.10-0.20260715121709-f92218e01054
v1.9.9
1.9.10-0.20260715121709-f92218e01054
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Sin parche — — v1.9.9 afectada
Versiones corregidascommit f92218e
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84320
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-jrq7-xrjx-pcfw
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/f92218e01054491fc1e6684dc6f7facaf8ab41eb
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui
Otrahttps://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.4.3

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