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Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · zebrad

GHSA-JV4H-J224-23CC

Zebra's Block Validator Undercounts Coinbase and P2SH Sigops

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CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -6 d de la divulgación
Exposición196 dDesde la divulgación, 7 may 2026, 3:54 p. m.
Detección193 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.4.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
1 may 26
7 may 26
13 may 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
1 may 26
21 jun 26
11 ago 26
1 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.4.0 zebrad · -6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JV4H-J224-23CC divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Zebra's block validator undercounts transparent signature operations against the 20000-sigop block limit (`MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`), allowing it to accept blocks that `zcashd` rejects with `bad-blk-sigops`. A miner who produces such a block can split the network: Zebra nodes follow the offending chain while `zcashd` nodes do not.

Two distinct undercounts:

A: Coinbase Hidden Legacy Sigops

`zcashd`'s `GetLegacySigOpCount()` includes the coinbase input's `scriptSig`. Zebra's `Sigops` impl skipped the coinbase input entirely, so up to ~98 sigops (the 100-byte coinbase script length cap, less the height prefix) could be hidden inside the coinbase `scriptSig` without being charged against the block limit.

B: Aggregate P2SH Sigops.

`zcashd`'s `GetP2SHSigOpCount()` parses each P2SH input's redeem script with `accurate=true` and sums those sigops into the block-wide total via `ConnectBlock`. The check is per-block, not per-transaction, and the limit applies regardless of who mines the offending block — a miner just needs to include enough P2SH-spending transactions whose redeem scripts together exceed 20000 sigops. Zebra computed P2SH sigops only on the mempool-acceptance path (used for ZIP-317 weighting) and never accumulated them during block validation. A block whose aggregate redeem-script sigops exceed 20000 (e.g. 1334 P2SH spends × 15 sigops = 20010) would be accepted by Zebra and rejected by `zcashd`.

Patches

Fixed in this release: https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.4.0.

Workarounds

None. Operators relying on Zebra for consensus should upgrade.

Resources
  • `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS` constant inherited from Bitcoin via the Zcash protocol spec's §7.6 catch-all "Other rules inherited from Bitcoin", tracked for explicit documentation in zcash/zips#568 https://github.com/zcash/zips/issues/568.
  • `zcashd` `GetLegacySigOpCount`: <https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/v6.11.0/src/main.cpp#L826-L836>
  • `zcashd` `GetP2SHSigOpCount`: <https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/v6.11.0/src/main.cpp#L840-L852>
  • `zcashd` `ConnectBlock` aggregates per-tx sigops and compares against `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS`.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
zebrad< 4.4.0
4.4.0
7.0.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iozebrad
Corregida 4.4.0 -6 d 7.0.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.4.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44498
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-jv4h-j224-23cc
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.4.0

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