llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · redaxo/source

GHSA-MRRJ-4F5X-J958

CSRF token check bypass in the user administration allows privilege escalation

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 4.0
8.6
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición111 dDesde la divulgación, 31 jul 2026, 10:44 a. m.
Detección111 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
31 jul 26
20 nov 26
31 jul 26
28 ago 26
25 sept 26
23 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-MRRJ-4F5X-J958 divulgada · CVSS 8.6 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

The backend user administration (`page=users/users`) ran its CSRF check behind a condition that the write path itself did not share. A request could therefore reach the update path without a valid token.

The attack works as a plain GET request, so it was enough for a backend user with the `users[]` permission to open an attacker-controlled page while logged in. Depending on the parameters, this modified arbitrary user accounts — granting administrator rights, deactivating accounts, or locking the only administrator out of the backend.

Root cause

Saving a user in the backend covers three write paths: create, update and delete. The CSRF check for the create and update paths was bound to an additional condition — it only ran when the `save` parameter was truthy and one of the function actions was requested:

if ($save && ($fUNCADD || $fUNCUPDATE || $fUNCAPPLY)) {
    if (!rex_csrf_token::factory('user_edit')->isValid()) {
        $warnings[] = rex_i18n::msg('csrf_token_invalid');
    }
    // …
}

The update itself, however, was triggered by `FUNC_UPDATE` or `FUNC_APPLY` alone and did not require `save`:

if ($warnings) {
    // do not save
} elseif ('' != $fUNCUPDATE || '' != $fUNCAPPLY) {
    // writes to the user record
}

Both conditions could be decoupled: a request carrying `FUNC_UPDATE=1` without `save` skipped the token check entirely, produced no warning, and still entered the unprotected update path.

The create path (`FUNC_ADD`) was not affected — it required `save` explicitly (`'' != $fUNCADD && 1 == $save`), so the token check always ran before it. That explicit condition was missing on the update path.

Why a GET request was sufficient

The parameters were read through `rex_request()`, which resolves against `$_REQUEST` and therefore covers both GET and POST. No form and no JavaScript were needed — a link was enough:

https://example.org/redaxo/index.php?page=users/users&user_id=3&FUNC_UPDATE=1&useradmin=1&userstatus=1
GET /redaxo/index.php?page=users/users&user_id=3&FUNC_UPDATE=1&useradmin=1&userstatus=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.org
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session-of-the-logged-in-user>

REDAXO's session cookie defaults to `SameSite=Lax`, which still sends the cookie on a top-level GET navigation. An attacker page performing `window.location = …` was enough to carry out the request in the victim's authenticated session.

Why the existing permission guard did not help

Before reading `FUNC_UPDATE`, the page restricts editing to cases where the logged-in account is an administrator or the target account is not:

if (0 !== $userId && ($currentUser->isAdmin() || !$user->isAdmin())) {

In a CSRF scenario the logged-in account is the victim, so this check was evaluated in the victim's favour and did not prevent the attack.

Impact

Privilege escalation. With `useradmin=1` in the request, the target account received the administrator flag. An attacker holding a low-privileged backend account could escalate that account by getting an administrator to open a prepared link. A set admin flag overrides all role assignments.

Account deactivation. `userstatus` defaults to inactive when the parameter is absent, so a request without it disabled the target account and prevented the user from logging in. This variant required no administrator victim — any logged-in user with the `users[]` permission was sufficient, as long as the target was not an administrator.

Administrator lockout. Pointing the request at the victim's own account kept the admin flag (a separate guard prevents administrators from removing it from themselves) but did not cover the status, so the account was set to inactive. On installations with a single administrator this locked the backend, recoverable only through direct server access — resetting the status in the database or creating a new administrator via `redaxo/bin/console user:create`.

Collateral damage. Parameters missing from the request were written with their defaults, so role assignments, name and email of the target account were cleared as a side effect.

Passwords could not be set through this path: `userpsw` is read via `rex_post()` and is therefore not reachable with a GET request.

Patch

Fixed in 5.21.3. The token check no longer depends on `save` for the update path:

if ($fUNCUPDATE || $fUNCAPPLY || ($fUNCADD && $save)) {

`FUNC_UPDATE` and `FUNC_APPLY` are only ever sent by the submit buttons of the edit form, so requiring a valid token for them unconditionally is safe. `FUNC_ADD` keeps its `save` condition because it is also used to open the empty create form, which legitimately arrives without a token.

Credits

Reported by @V-C-Williams https://github.com/V-C-Williams.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:N
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:A
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
redaxo/source≤ 5.21.2
5.21.2
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistredaxo/source
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/redaxo/core/security/advisories/GHSA-mrrj-4f5x-j958

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.