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Advisory · GitHub · Go · goauthentik.io

GHSA-MRX3-GXJX-HJQJ

Authentik vulnerable to PKCE downgrade attack

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versiones2023.8.7 · 2023.10.7
Exposición1.025 dDesde la divulgación, 29 ene 2024, 5:30 p. m.
Detección1.022 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
29 ene 24
10 sept 26
17 nov 26
20 nov 26
29 ene 24
12 oct 24
25 jun 25
9 mar 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-MRX3-GXJX-HJQJ divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

PKCE is a very important countermeasure in OAuth2 , both for public and confidential clients. It protects against CSRF attacks and code injection attacks. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers.

Patches

authentik 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix this issue.

Details

There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the `code_challenge’ parameter to the authorization request and adds the `code_verifier’ parameter to the token request. We recently fixed a downgrade attack (in v2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4) where if the attacker removed the `code_verifier’ parameter in the token request, authentik would allow the request to pass, thus circumventing PKCE’s protection. However, in the latest version of the software, another downgrade scenario is still possible: if the attacker removes the `code_challenge’ parameter from the authorization request, authentik will also not do the PKCE check.

Note that this type of downgrade enables an attacker to perform a code injection attack, even if the OAuth client is using PKCE (which is supposed to protect against code injection attacks). To start the attack, the attacker must initiate the authorization process without that `code_challenge’ parameter in the authorization request. But this is easy to do (just use a phishing site or email to trick the user into clicking on a link that the attacker controls – the authorization link without that `code_challenge’ parameter).

The OAuth BCP (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics) explicitly mentions this particular attack in section 2.1.1: “Authorization servers MUST mitigate PKCE Downgrade Attacks by ensuring that a token request containing a code_verifier parameter is accepted only if a code_challenge parameter was present in the authorization request, see Section 4.8.2 for details.”

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

  • Email us at [security@goauthentik.io](mailto:security@goauthentik.io)
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
goauthentik.io< 2023.8.7
goauthentik.io≥ 2023.10.0 < 2023.10.7
2023.8.7
2023.10.0
2023.10.7
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Gogoauthentik.io
Corregida 2023.8.7, 2023.10.7 — —
Versiones corregidas2023.8.72023.10.7
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23647
Otrahttps://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/security/advisories/GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj
Otrahttps://github.com/goauthentik/authentik/commit/38e04ae12720e5d81b4f7ac77997eb8d1275d31a
Otrahttps://github.com/goauthentik/authentik

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