GHSA-MV76-WX4X-68PM
Unauthenticated S3 IAM-cache gRPC service allows credential injection and full S3 admin takeover
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-MV76-WX4X-68PM divulgada · CVSS 9.8 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
## Summary
The SeaweedFS S3 gateway registers `SeaweedS3IamCacheServer` on its internal gRPC port (default `0.0.0.0:18333`) with no per-RPC authentication, no default TLS/mTLS, and no auth interceptor. The `PutIdentity` RPC writes an attacker-chosen access key with `Actions:["Admin"]` directly into the live `accessKeyIdent` map that the S3 HTTP SigV4 path reads. An unauthenticated network attacker can inject an admin credential and then make ordinary SigV4-signed S3 requests (signed with their own secret) that resolve to full S3 administrator, gaining read/write/delete over all buckets/objects and the ability to rewrite policies or lock out legitimate users.
## Root Cause
- `weed/command/s3.go:437-438` — `grpcS := pb.NewGrpcServer(security.LoadServerTLS(util.GetViper(), "grpc.s3"))` then `RegisterSeaweedS3IamCacheServer(grpcS, s3ApiServer)`. The port binds `0.0.0.0:18333` by default (`s3.go:342-346`: `portGrpc = 10000 + port`, `bindIp = "0.0.0.0"`).
- `weed/pb/grpc_client_server.go:183-208` — `NewGrpcServer` installs ONLY `requestIDUnaryInterceptor` (a request-ID stamper); there is no auth interceptor for `grpc.s3`.
- `weed/security/tls.go:79-81` — `LoadServerTLS(cfg, "grpc.s3")` returns `(nil, nil)` when `grpc.s3.cert`/`.key` are unset → plaintext, no client cert (default).
- `weed/s3api/s3api_server_grpc.go:16-27` — `PutIdentity` performs zero authentication (unlike the filer sibling `SeaweedIdentityAccessManagement`, which received `checkAdminAuth` in the CVE-2026-72920 fix).
- `weed/s3api/auth_credentials.go` — `UpsertIdentity` → `MergeS3ApiConfiguration(cfg,false,false)` builds an `Identity` from attacker input, writes `accessKeyIdent[cred.AccessKey] = t` (:1092), atomically swaps the live table (:1216-1224), and `updateAuthenticationState(len>0)` one-way-enables auth enforcement.
- `CanDo` short-circuits `return true` when `isAdmin()` is true; `isAdmin()` = `slices.Contains(Actions, "Admin")`; `ACTION_ADMIN = "Admin"`.
## Impact
Unauthenticated → full S3 administrator: read/write/delete any bucket/object, rewrite authorization policies (`PutPolicy`), and remove legitimate identities (`RemoveIdentity`) to lock out real users. An operator who applied the documented CVE-2026-72920 remediation (filer IAM signing key) still leaves THIS service fully open — it directly edits the table that authenticates live S3 traffic.
## Proof of Concept
1. Reach the S3 internal gRPC port (default `0.0.0.0:18333`).
2. Call `PutIdentity{Identity:{Name:"pwn", Credentials:[{AccessKey:"AKIAPWN", SecretKey:"s3cr3t"}], Actions:["Admin"]}}`.
3. Issue `aws s3 --endpoint http://s3host:8333 ls` (and any mutating op) signed with `AKIAPWN/s3cr3t` — resolves to admin.
## Attack Chain
1. Entry: unauth TCP → `0.0.0.0:18333` → gRPC `PutIdentity{...Actions:["Admin"]}`. Guard: per-RPC auth / interceptor / mTLS. Bypass proof: `s3api_server_grpc.go:16-27` has no auth call; `NewGrpcServer` installs only the request-ID unary interceptor (`grpc_client_server.go:200`); `LoadServerTLS("grpc.s3")` returns `(nil,nil)` with no cert (`tls.go:79-81`). The filer sibling got `checkAdminAuth`; this service got nothing.
2. Guard: read-only mode. Bypass proof: `-s3.iam.readOnly` (default true) only reaches the HTTP embedded IAM API (`s3api_embedded_iam.go`); the gRPC `PutIdentity` handler never references it.
3. Sink: `UpsertIdentity` → `MergeS3ApiConfiguration` writes `accessKeyIdent["AKIAPWN"]=t` (`auth_credentials.go:1092`) with `t.Actions=["Admin"]` and swaps the live table (:1216-1224).
4. Sink 2: SigV4-signed S3 request with `AKIAPWN/s3cr3t`. Guard: SigV4. Bypass proof: `lookupByAccessKey` returns the injected identity; signature verifies against the attacker's OWN secret; `isAdmin()` true → `CanDo` returns true.
5. Impact: full read/write/delete over all buckets/objects; policy rewrite; lockout of legitimate users.
## Bypass Evidence
- No auth call anywhere in `s3api_server_grpc.go` (grep for auth/token/readOnly = none).
- `iamReadOnly` reference exists only on the HTTP embedded IAM path, never the gRPC handler.
- `LoadServerTLS("grpc.s3")` default return = `(nil,nil)` (plaintext).
- `NewGrpcServer` interceptor chain = request-ID only (no auth).
- `isAdmin() = slices.Contains(Actions, "Admin")`; `CanDo` returns true unconditionally when admin.
- No existing SeaweedFS advisory (15 repo + 7 global) covers `SeaweedS3IamCacheServer`; CVE-2026-72920 covered only the FILER `SeaweedIdentityAccessManagement` service (`filer_server_handlers_iam_grpc.go`).
## Affected Versions
`<= 4.45` — present verbatim on latest release tag `4.45` and master HEAD `68a175ef6`; module path `github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs` unchanged; no fix commit exists on the S3 gRPC IAM-cache handler.
## Suggested Fix
Gate the S3 gRPC IAM-cache RPCs the way the filer service was fixed — require a per-RPC Bearer token signed with an admin signing key (mirror `checkAdminAuth`), or verify a per-RPC mTLS identity — instead of accepting unauthenticated `PutIdentity`/`PutPolicy`/`RemoveIdentity`.
---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-mv76-wx4x-68pmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
