GHSA-MW3M-PPXQ-MXHC
Default users-group grant permits authenticated account-directory reads
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-MW3M-PPXQ-MXHC divulgada · CVSS 4.3 (GitHub) | |
| Remediación | Parche v0.13.45 | github.com/daptin/daptin · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The built-in `user_account` policy automatically associates new accounts with the shared `users` group. Before the fix, this relationship inherited a permission granting `GroupRead`, allowing another authenticated member of that group to read account email, display name, and confirmation status through the account collection and individual-record APIs.
This is a default sharing-policy issue: resource authorization honors the persisted relationship grant. Owner read permission is a separate grant and does not exclude group-based reads. Configurations that have already revoked the relevant sharing grants do not exhibit this access.
Preconditions and onboarding
The first user must complete `become_an_administrator` onboarding and the requested server restart. That transition closes public signup. An unauthenticated caller cannot self-register afterward unless an administrator explicitly reopens signup. The issue was reproduced using ordinary accounts provisioned by an administrator after completed onboarding and restart; administrator-provided credentials were not used for the cross-account reads.
Root cause
`server/resource/columns.go` declared the account table with `DefaultGroups("users")` and no per-binding permission override. `server/resource/resource_create.go` created the account-to-group relationship using the relation resource's default permission. `PermissionInstance.CanRead` correctly honors a matching persisted group relationship carrying `GroupRead`.
The account-to-group relationship supplies both group membership and a sharing grant. The built-in account policy unintentionally coupled membership in the common `users` group with permission to read the associated account. Removing `GroupRead` only from the account row does not revoke the independent relationship grant.
This behavior predates recent schema permission work: the shared account group binding was added in 2018, and the global default explicitly gained `GroupRead` in 2019. The May 2026 schema change retained the binding and introduced support for an explicit per-binding permission.
Impact
An authenticated ordinary member of the shared `users` group can enumerate accounts carrying that group read grant and read their email, name, and confirmation status. This report concerns authenticated account-data disclosure. It does not demonstrate public signup after normal onboarding, a general permission bypass, credential disclosure, or cross-account update permission.
Fix
Commit 36d9a1df https://github.com/daptin/daptin/commit/36d9a1df explicitly assigns permission `None` to the built-in account-to-`users` default binding. New accounts retain group membership without an automatic account-read grant. Owner access, administrator access, and explicitly configured sharing continue through the existing resource authorization path. The shared permission engine and global resource defaults are unchanged.
The fix is released in v0.13.45 https://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.13.45. Upgrade to v0.13.45 or later and review existing relationship permissions as described below.
Existing installations and mitigation
The code change affects new default account relationships. It does not rewrite existing persisted relationship permissions or deliberate sharing policies.
Administrators of existing installations must revoke `GroupRead` from existing `user_account` to shared `users` relationship records through the normal Daptin JSON:API resource update path. Clear that bit on each applicable relationship's current permission while preserving any other intentional bits and the membership relationship itself. Removing `GroupRead` from the account row alone is insufficient. Review other explicitly configured group grants separately if account privacy is required.
The built-in guest account has a separately persisted bootstrap sharing grant; the new-account policy change does not migrate that grant. See Account Visibility https://github.com/daptin/daptin/blob/master/wiki/Permissions.md#account-visibility.
Validation
A real local HTTP E2E test completes administrator onboarding, restarts against the same database, and verifies:
- Public signup is denied with HTTP 403.
- Account owners and administrators can read the relevant account records.
- Alice and Bob cannot read each other's records (HTTP 403), and their collections do not expose the other account or the administrator account.
- An ordinary user cannot update the other account.
- An explicit group read grant enables access, and revoking it immediately denies access.
The regression test is `TestUserDirectoryPrivateAfterOnboardingRealE2E` in `cmd/daptin/user_directory_default_permission_real_e2e_test.go`. Resource, permission, and table-info unit tests, resource `go vet`, and `git diff --check` also passed.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/daptin/daptin |
Corregida | v0.13.45 | 0 d | v0.13.57 no afectada |
0.13.45v0.13.45Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-mw3m-ppxq-mxhcLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
