llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · getgrav/grav

GHSA-MXWR-773Q-23XW

Media uploaders can store script-running SVG and XML files despite the upload sanitizer

Texto original en inglés · Ver en español

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión2.2.18
Exposición21 dDesde la divulgación, 31 oct 2026, 4:06 p. m.
Detección18 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de la severidad declarada por GHSA (media) y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Sin prisa pero sin pausa, como yo en el páramo.Traje la llave inglesa: esto se arregla.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
31 oct 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
31 oct 26
6 nov 26
11 nov 26
16 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-MXWR-773Q-23XW divulgada
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

Grav and its API plugin try to sanitize uploaded SVG files, and block a list of active-content extensions. Three gaps let an account with media upload rights (a publisher, or an account holding only `api.media.write`) store a script-running SVG, XML or XHTML file that is served from the site's own origin. The script runs in the session of anyone who opens the raw file URL, an administrator included. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-66xf-ggf4-6hmc and GHSA-7vhm-8x52-2r5p, which covered the same family.

Affected versions

Grav 2.x from 2.0.0 up to and including 2.2.17. The inner-extension gap dates from Grav 1.7.0-rc.12, the fail-open sanitizer from 1.7.23, and the extension list has always lacked `xml`. Grav 1.7 has the same code, but the upload requires an account, so no 1.7 release is part of this advisory. The API plugin is affected as well.

Details

Inner extension. Core sanitizes an upload as SVG only when the last extension says SVG. The upload checks accept `defaults` as a media type extension because `media.types.defaults` is the fallback block. `drawing.svg.defaults` is therefore stored unsanitized (while `drawing.svg` is stored empty), and Apache skips the unmapped `.defaults` and types the file by the inner `.svg`, so it is served as `image/svg+xml` with its script. The pre-check for XSS is dodged with a namespaced root such as `<s:svg>`. The API plugin's `isSvgUpload()` checks the last extension plus a `<svg` sniff that misses namespaced roots, and it accepts any extension that is not on the dangerous list, so `y.svg.foo` through admin2's normal media upload is stored raw. The reproducer uses a Flex front-end form, but this API route is easier.

Fail-open sanitizer. `Security::sanitizeSVG()` quarantines a file only when the sanitizer returns `false`, but the DOM sanitizer returns a string or throws (a `ValueError` after its doctype pattern consumes the file) or exceeds the time limit. The API and core's upload code move the file into the public folder first and sanitize afterwards, so the raw file stays. A 127-byte payload makes the upload answer 500 and leaves the raw file served with its `onload` attribute.

Extension list. `security.uploads_dangerous_extensions` omits `xml` and `xhtm` (the 66xf fix added `xhtml`, `xht` and `svgz`). The API accepts `report.xml` and `report.xhtm` with 201 and they are served with XML types.

Impact

Script runs on the site origin when an administrator opens the file URL. That needs the administrator to navigate to the raw file, which the normal admin flow does not do, and it depends on how the web server types the file. The original report rated these High. They are rated Medium, as GHSA-66xf and GHSA-7vhm were, for the same reason.

Patches

Fixed in Grav 2.2.18. The `defaults` extension is refused as an upload type. The SVG decision uses a shared helper that checks every extension part, so a name such as `drawing.svg.foo` is sanitized. A sanitizer that throws or fails now quarantines the file, and the stored file is emptied before sanitizing so a fatal error leaves it empty. `xml`, `xhtm`, `xsl`, `xslt`, `atom`, `rss`, `rdf` and `mml` are added to `security.uploads_dangerous_extensions`, so `.xml`, `.xhtm` and the other XML formats a browser renders are blocked by default. That is a behavior change for sites that attach XML files, which can take `xml` out of `uploads_dangerous_extensions` in their security configuration. Update the Form plugin to 9.1.38 as well, which refuses and removes an SVG upload the sanitizer cannot clean instead of keeping it as it was sent, and the API plugin to 1.1.6, which uses the same SVG check with a namespace-aware sniff and sanitizes the file in temporary storage before moving it into the media folder.

Workarounds

Send `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on static files served from `user/` and `images/`. That neutralizes script in SVG, XML and XHTML regardless of the file name.

Credits

Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-QFPA37QT, ANT-2026-5H3YQ3WM, ANT-2026-SHNZNOI3).

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
getgrav/grav≥ 2.0.0 < 2.2.18
2.0.0
2.2.18
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistgetgrav/grav
Corregida 2.2.18 — —
Versiones corregidas2.2.18
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-mxwr-773q-23xw

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.