GHSA-P296-7PR4-87RR
deny-funcs capability bypass via method-style invocations on the streaming engine (day-one since 2.0.0; 10 deny families verified incl. a file::* write+read chain)
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 3.3.1 | surrealdb · -12 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-P296-7PR4-87RR divulgada · CVSS 7.1 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
`--deny-funcs` (an official CLI flag and environment variable) is SurrealDB's function-level security control: once an operator denies specific function families, no subject may execute them. The check is scattered across four call sites rather than a central dispatcher, and the method-style invocation path of the streaming engine (the default engine in 3.x) has no check at all:
- `surrealdb/core/src/exec/parts/method.rs:46-66` (`MethodPart::evaluate`: after `descriptor.resolve()` it goes straight to `func.invoke` / `invoke_async`)
- `surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/idiom.rs:295` (planning-time `registry.get_method()` resolves the descriptor, also unchecked)
Call sites that DO check (for contrast): legacy compute `expr/function.rs:90`, streaming normal-form calls `exec/physical_expr/function/builtin.rs:46`, legacy method `fnc/mod.rs:671`. SECURITY_GUIDE §11 states verbatim: "Method-style function invocations (e.g., `$array.map(...)`) must be correctly canonicalized for capability checking" — that invariant is not implemented on the streaming method path.
Secondary independent defect (legacy layer, reported alongside): the legacy method path's canonicalization has dead branches and alias mismatches (`fnc/mod.rs:671` uses `kind_of()`, and `val/mod.rs:299-308` returns `"int"/"float"/"decimal"` for Number and `"geometry<point>"` for Geometry while the mapping table keys are `"number"`/`"geometry"` — never matched; aliases like `every/some/includes/index_of/sort_asc/...` and cross-family mappings such as `chain/expect/diff/patch/to_*/is_*` are checked against names that are not the actually registered function names). Net effect: `deny math::*` / `geo::*` / `array::any` / `array::sort::*` etc. are also partially ineffective on the legacy fallback path.
Reproduction (v3.3.0 released image, local docker; full matrix in transcripts)
Server: `docker run -p 8000:8000 surrealdb/surrealdb:v3.3.0 start --user root --pass root --deny-funcs array::map memory` (or set the `SURREAL_DENY_FUNCS` env var). Then via `/sql` (basic auth):
With `--deny-funcs array::map`, the normal form is blocked and the method form passes:
T1a | RETURN array::map([1,2], |x| x*2) -> ERR "Function 'array::map' is not allowed to be executed"
T1b | RETURN [1,2].map(|x| x*2) -> OK [2,4] <- bypass10 deny families verified one by one (normal form correctly blocked in all; method form bypasses in all): `array::map`, `math::abs`, `record::exists` (`u:1.exists()` -> true), `value::chain`, `string::len`, `array::any` (`.some()`), `array::sort::asc` (`.sort_asc()`), `type::string` (`.to_string()`), `file::get`, `file::*` (family wildcard).
**file::* chain (self-sufficient write + read under `deny file::*`; 3.3.x only — the `files` experimental feature is a 3.3-era addition, ≤3.1.6 has no such flag)**: on deployments with experimental Files enabled, after `deny file::*` the `.put()` method still writes into a bucket, `.get()` reads it back (S5c/S5d: after writing `"top-secret-bytes"`, `$f.get()` returns `[116,111,112,...]`), and `.exists()` returns true. The demo round-trips an object we wrote ourselves; the demonstrated capability is the policy bypass itself — `.get()`/`.put()` operate on any key the bucket's own PERMISSIONS allow (default FULL), so pre-existing objects in such buckets are equally reachable, but reading a specific pre-existing object was not separately demonstrated.
Engine contrast and history arc (`--planner-strategy compute-only` = legacy):
- 2.x (day-one gap): method syntax and deny-funcs coexist since 2.0.0; method form was never covered by the capability check (v1.5.6 control: no method syntax, deny works).
- 3.x legacy path partially fixed: method forms of `array::map`/`record::exists`/`string::len`/`file::get` are blocked under compute-only — but `math::abs`/`value::chain`/`array::any`/`array::sort::asc`/`type::string` still bypass (A2 dead-branch / alias / cross-family mapping layer).
- 3.x streaming path (the default engine) has zero checks: all 10 families bypass in method form — the old engine was partially fixed while the new engine never implemented it. v3.2.4's `.map()` bypasses the same way.
Impact
- Any deployment using `--deny-funcs` as hardening (disabling file::* / http families, internal functions) has that deny fully voided by method-form calls (streaming) or partially voided (legacy aliases/dead branches).
- Most impactful verified scenario: bucket data read + write under `deny file::*` (C:H/I:L~H).
- Reachability: any subject that can submit a query (RPC/HTTP/WS/DEFINE FUNCTION bodies/custom APIs); no other prerequisites. Out-of-the-box deployments that configure no deny rules are not affected.
Suggested fix
Call `check_allowed_function` on the fully resolved function name in `MethodPart::evaluate` (and at the planner resolution point), aligning with the other three call sites; on the legacy side, fix the `kind_of()` mapping and alias canonicalization (checked name = registered function name). Longer term, centralize function capability checking in a single dispatcher (the `fnc::run` entry point) to eliminate the "checklist of call sites" structure.
Evidence
`findings/20260926-surrealdb-deny-funcs-method-bypass/`: repro scripts ×4 (repro.sh–repro4.sh) plus transcripts ×4 (10-family matrix, file::* exfil chain, compute-only contrast, v3.2.4 origin pinning).
transcript.txt https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683238/transcript.txt
transcript2.txt https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683240/transcript2.txt
transcript3.txt https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683241/transcript3.txt
transcript4.txt https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683242/transcript4.txt
transcript5.txt https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683243/transcript5.txt
repro.sh https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683247/repro.sh
repro2.sh https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683249/repro2.sh
repro3.sh https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683250/repro3.sh
repro4.sh https://github.com/user-attachments/files/32683251/repro4.sh
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.iosurrealdb |
Corregida | 3.3.1 | -12 d | 4.0.1 no afectada |
3.3.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-p296-7pr4-87rrLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
