GHSA-P57V-XHV3-MF2W
userPassesAuthorize() has two independent unscoped paths, leaking authorize-gated items to scoped API keys
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-P57V-XHV3-MF2W divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Vulnerability Details
Component: getgrav/grav-plugin-api (bundled with Grav 2.0's admin-next/API stack)
Files: `classes/Api/Controllers/AbstractApiController.php` (`userPassesAuthorize()`), plus 6 call sites: `SidebarController.php`, `FloatingWidgetController.php`, `EditorButtonsController.php`, `MenubarController.php` (each `items()`), and `UsersController.php` (`assembleColumns()`, `assembleRowActions()`, `assembleFilterTabs()`)
CWE: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization
Severity: Low
CVSS: 3.7 — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
### Root Cause
`userPassesAuthorize(UserInterface $user, mixed $authorize, bool $isSuperAdmin)` decides whether a caller may see/use an item gated by an `authorize` requirement (a permission string/array attached to sidebar/menubar/widget items and users-list columns/row-actions/filter-tabs). It had two independent, unscoped paths to a false "yes":
- The `$isSuperAdmin` boolean passed in by every call site was computed as `$this->isSuperAdmin($user)` — reading the account's raw `access.api.super` flag directly, with no reference to the calling request's `api_key_scopes`.
- For string/array `authorize` values, `userPassesAuthorize()` calls `$this->hasPermission($user, $authorize)` — which checks the account's real ACL grant, again with no scope-cap consultation. So even after fixing path 1, a key scoped to e.g. `["api.access", "api.pages.read"]` still passes if the underlying account's ACL happens to include the exact permission named in `authorize` (in our testing, `admin.super`, which the test account genuinely held).
A scoped API key minted on a super-admin account is meant to be capped to exactly its declared scopes — that's the entire purpose of `AbstractApiController::isSuperWithinScope()`/`scopeAllows()`, already used correctly elsewhere in this codebase. `userPassesAuthorize()` predates or bypasses that convention.
Vulnerable Code
protected function userPassesAuthorize(UserInterface $user, mixed $authorize, bool $isSuperAdmin): bool
{
if ($authorize === null) {
return true;
}
if ($isSuperAdmin) { // <-- bare boolean, computed via isSuperAdmin($user) at each call site
return true;
}
if (is_string($authorize)) {
return $this->hasPermission($user, $authorize); // <-- no scope-cap check
}
if (is_array($authorize)) {
foreach ($authorize as $perm) {
if (is_string($perm) && $this->hasPermission($user, $perm)) { // <-- no scope-cap check
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
return false;
}### Attack Scenario
1. Super-admin mints a scoped key intended for a narrow integration: `["api.access", "api.pages.read"]` only.
2. That key calls `GET /sidebar/items` (or floating-widget/editor-buttons/menubar items, or the users-list columns/row-actions/filter-tabs endpoints).
3. Any item gated with `authorize => 'admin.super'` (or any other permission the account's ACL happens to hold) is returned anyway, because `userPassesAuthorize()` never consulted the key's actual scope.
### Impact
- Type: CWE-862 Missing Authorization / information disclosure
- Auth required: Yes — a valid API key scoped away from the relevant permission, minted on an account that holds it
- Consequence: Disclosure of `authorize`-gated UI/metadata (item labels, plugin/action identifiers, users-list column/action/tab definitions) to a credential deliberately restricted from seeing it. All affected call sites are read-only listings — no direct code execution or data mutation from this bug alone.
Recommended Fix
// AbstractApiController — signature change: takes $request instead of a precomputed bool
protected function userPassesAuthorize(UserInterface $user, mixed $authorize, ServerRequestInterface $request): bool
{
if ($authorize === null) {
return true;
}
if ($this->isSuperWithinScope($request)) {
return true;
}
if (is_string($authorize)) {
return $this->hasPermission($user, $authorize) && $this->scopeAllows($request, $authorize);
}
if (is_array($authorize)) {
foreach ($authorize as $perm) {
if (is_string($perm) && $this->hasPermission($user, $perm) && $this->scopeAllows($request, $perm)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
return false;
}Every call site drops its precomputed `$isSuperAdmin = $this->isSuperAdmin($user)` line and passes `$request` directly.
### Verification
Dynamically confirmed on grav 2.0.13 / api plugin 1.0.13 in a local Docker lab, in two rounds:
Round 1 (incomplete fix caught before disclosure): applying only the `isSuperAdmin` → `isSuperWithinScope($request)` swap still leaked the gated item — a debug log confirmed the live request correctly computed `isSuper=false` for the scoped key, proving the leak came from the second, independent `hasPermission()` path.
Round 2 (complete fix): after making `userPassesAuthorize()` itself scope-aware and updating all 6 call sites, the same request with a key scoped to `["api.access", "api.pages.read"]` (minted on a super-admin account) correctly returns `{"data":[]}` (HTTP 200), while an unscoped session for the same account still sees the gated item (regression-checked).
A ready-to-apply fix branch is prepared locally against grav-plugin-api's `1.0.13` tag; happy to push it to a private fork once one is available for this advisory.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav-plugin-api |
Corregida | 1.0.14 | — | — |
1.0.14Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-p57v-xhv3-mf2wLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
