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Advisory · GitHub · PyPI · mcp-atlassian

GHSA-P6HP-93WP-FH6P

MCP Atlassian: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read in confluence_upload_attachment MCP tool (incomplete fix of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4)

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -74 d de la divulgación
Exposición58 dDesde la divulgación, 22 sept 2026, 3:35 p. m.
Detección55 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 0.22.0
Monitoreo
Detectada
10 jul 26
22 sept 26
1 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
10 jul 26
12 ago 26
14 sept 26
17 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 0.22.0 mcp-atlassian · -74 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-P6HP-93WP-FH6P divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

`mcp-atlassian` exposes an MCP tool `confluence_upload_attachment` whose `file_path` argument is passed directly to `open(file_path, "rb")` without any path validation. An attacker able to invoke the tool can read arbitrary files readable by the server process and exfiltrate them into a multipart upload directed at an attacker-controlled Confluence host. In the default `streamable-http` transport the server binds `0.0.0.0` with no built-in authentication, making this remotely exploitable without credentials.

This is the read-side symmetric twin of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 / CVE-2026-27825 (fixed in v0.17.0). The v0.17.0 patch only covered the download/write path; the upload path that reads local files was left unguarded.

Details

### Vulnerable sink
`src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py:477`

with open(file_path, "rb") as fp:
    files = {"file": (filename, fp, content_type)}
    response = self.confluence.session.post(url, files=files, ...)

`file_path` is attacker-controlled end-to-end.

### Taint source
`src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:1290-1369`, tool definition at `:1307`:

file_path: Annotated[str, Field(description="Absolute path to the file to upload")]

No Pydantic `pattern=`, no validator, no `validate_safe_path()` call.

### Call chain
1. MCP client invokes `confluence_upload_attachment(page_id, file_path, ...)`
2. Server handler forwards to `ConfluenceFetcher.upload_attachment(file_path)`
3. `_upload_attachment_direct(file_path)` calls `open(file_path, "rb")`
4. File bytes are streamed in the multipart body of `POST /wiki/rest/api/content/{page_id}/child/attachment` to the configured Confluence base URL — which the attacker also controls (they provided `CONFLUENCE_URL` via env/config or target a server they already control).

### Asymmetry with the patched download path
- `attachments.py:223` (download) — calls `validate_safe_path(local_path)` before `open(..., "wb")`
- `attachments.py:272` (download) — calls `validate_safe_path(local_path)` before `open(..., "wb")`
- `attachments.py:477` (upload) — no validation

The `check_write_access` decorator does not help: it only gates `READ_ONLY_MODE` (default `false`) and is unrelated to filesystem path safety.

### Default exposure
`src/mcp_atlassian/__init__.py:151` and `:360` — default transport is `streamable-http` binding `HOST=0.0.0.0` with no auth layer. Any network-reachable attacker can call MCP tools directly.

Severity

Primary (default `streamable-http` deployment)
- Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N`
- Score: 9.3 Critical
- Rationale: network-reachable, unauthenticated, scope-changed because files outside the MCP server's intended resource boundary (Confluence attachments) are exfiltrated.

Alternative (stdio-only deployment, conservative)
- Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N`
- Score: 6.6 High
- Rationale: local attacker controlling the MCP client context.

Maintainer should pick the vector that reflects the documented default deployment.

## CWE
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

## Affected
- Product: `sooperset/mcp-atlassian`
- Affected versions: >= 0.17.0, <= HEAD (`d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`)
- Note: v0.17.0 is the fix commit for GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 but only addressed the write-side. This read-side twin has existed since that release and remains unpatched on `main`.
- Patched versions: none at time of disclosure

Proof of Concept

Fully reproduced twice end-to-end against a local stdlib HTTP stub acting as the Confluence API, driven by a real MCP stdio client (`mcp.ClientSession` + `stdio_client`) spawning the unmodified `mcp-atlassian` server at HEAD.

### Permalinks (commit-pinned)
- Sink: https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/blob/d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py#L477
- Source (tool def): https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/blob/d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py#L1307
- Safe download comparison: https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/blob/d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py#L223
- Default transport bind: https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/blob/d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d/src/mcp_atlassian/__init__.py#L151

### Reproduction
1. Start mock Confluence stub: `python mock_confluence.py` (binds `127.0.0.1:8443`, logs all multipart bodies)
2. Launch MCP client against real `mcp-atlassian` server over stdio with `CONFLUENCE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8443`
3. Call tool:

{
  "name": "confluence_upload_attachment",
  "arguments": {
    "page_id": "123456",
    "file_path": "/etc/passwd",
    "comment": "poc"
  }
}

### Run 1 — `/etc/passwd`
- MCP response: `isError=False`, `{"message": "Attachment uploaded successfully"}`
- Stub captured 3339-byte multipart body containing: `root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash` (and full passwd contents)

### Run 2 — `/etc/hostname`
- MCP response: `isError=False`, same success envelope
- Stub captured 380-byte body containing: `ang3l-pc`

Both runs used unmodified server code at commit `d8bc78698a63cb6b321c7ca796d6329d448f7f6d`. PoC artifacts (`mock_confluence.py`, `mcp_client.py`, `poc_run1.sh`, `poc_run2.sh`, `asymmetry.txt`, `ENVIRONMENT.md`) available on request to maintainers via this advisory thread.

## Impact
- Arbitrary file read of anything readable by the server process UID: `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` (if running as root in container), `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `.env` files, kube service-account tokens at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`, application source, database dumps, private keys.
- Exfiltration is covert: file bytes transit to the attacker's configured Confluence host inside a normal-looking multipart upload. No error surface; the tool returns success.
- In the default `streamable-http` 0.0.0.0 deployment, no credentials are required.
- Chains trivially with any AI agent that exposes this MCP server to untrusted prompt input — a prompt-injected assistant can be coerced into calling the tool with a sensitive path.

## Relationship to GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 (CVE-2026-27825)
GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 (CVSS 9.1, fixed in v0.17.0) addressed an arbitrary file write in the same `attachments.py` module: attacker-controlled paths reaching `open(..., "wb")` on the download side. The fix introduced `validate_safe_path()` and applied it at lines 223 and 272.

The upload-side counterpart at line 477 was not updated. Same module, same maintainer, same class of bug (unchecked path → `open()`), opposite direction (read vs write). This advisory reports the incomplete-fix twin.

Remediation

### Required
Call `validate_safe_path(file_path)` at the top of `ConfluenceFetcher.upload_attachment` and `_upload_attachment_direct` in `src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py`, mirroring the download path at lines 223 and 272. Reject absolute paths outside a configurable allow-listed upload directory and reject any path containing `..` after normalization.

### Defense in depth
Tighten the Pydantic tool schema at `src/mcp_atlassian/servers/confluence.py:1307`:

file_path: Annotated[
    str,
    Field(
        description="Relative path within the configured upload directory",
        pattern=r"^(?!/)(?!.*\.\.)[\w\-./]+$",
    ),
]

This blocks absolute paths and `..` at the MCP schema layer before the handler is even entered.

### Additional hardening (out of scope but recommended)
- Default `streamable-http` to `127.0.0.1` instead of `0.0.0.0`, or require an auth token when bound to a non-loopback interface.
- Document that `file_path` must be confined to an operator-chosen directory and expose that directory via config.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
mcp-atlassian< 0.22.0
0.22.0
0.24.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
pypimcp-atlassian
Corregida 0.22.0 -74 d 0.24.4 no afectada
Versiones corregidas0.22.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-p6hp-93wp-fh6p
Otrahttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448
Otrahttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460
Otrahttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian
Otrahttps://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0

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