GHSA-P6M2-FV55-V5WP
Open redirect bypass via path normalization: ASCII TAB survives path.Clean and collapses to a protocol-relative URL in browsers
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CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-P6M2-FV55-V5WP divulgada · CVSS 4.7 (GitHub) | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Impact
Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC login, SAML `RelayState`, trust-center visitor OAuth, magic-link sign-in, and connector-complete redirects). This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-49820 / GHSA-x7qq-m748-8p2c https://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-x7qq-m748-8p2c: that fix added `path.Clean` plus rejection of backslash, `%5c`, and protocol-relative (`//`) prefixes, but it never rejected or stripped ASCII control bytes.
`normalizeRelativePath` (`pkg/saferedirect/saferedirect.go`) calls `path.Clean` on the input and then only rejects the result if the second byte is `/` or `\`. An ASCII TAB (`0x09`) is an ordinary byte to `path.Clean`, so `path.Clean("/\t/evil.com")` returns `/\t/evil.com` unchanged; the second byte is `0x09`, which is neither `/` nor `\`, so every guard passes and the value is accepted as a "safe" relative path.
An attacker delivers this as `?continue=/%09/evil.com`. Go's query decoder turns `%09` into a raw tab before `Validate` sees it, so the guard receives `/<TAB>/evil.com` and accepts it. Per the WHATWG URL spec, browsers strip tab (and newline) characters before parsing a URL, so `/<TAB>/evil.com` collapses to `//evil.com` — a protocol-relative URL — and the browser navigates off-origin to `evil.com`.
LF and CR do not work as substitutes: Go's `http.Header` writer replaces `\n` and `\r` in header values with spaces before writing the response, so newline variants are neutralized on the wire. TAB is not replaced and is transmitted as-is in the `Location` header, which is why it is the only live vector.
This is reachable at the same sinks as the parent advisory via a crafted link the victim clicks:
- OIDC callback (`pkg/server/api/connect/v1/oidc_handler.go`)
- SAML `RelayState` (`pkg/server/api/connect/v1/saml_handler.go`)
- Trust-center visitor OAuth callback (`pkg/server/api/complianceportal/v1/oauth_callback_handler.go`)
- Magic-link sign-in (`pkg/server/api/connect/v1/magic_link_handler.go`)
Same attacker model as the parent CVE: a crafted `continue`/`RelayState` link that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects the victim to an attacker-controlled site (phishing, OAuth-state confusion, etc.).
Patches
Fix in progress. `normalizeRelativePath` will reject any input containing a C0 control character (`0x00`-`0x1F`, notably TAB `0x09`, LF `0x0A`, CR `0x0D`) before calling `path.Clean`, rather than denylisting only the backslash family. This advisory will be updated with the patched version once released.
Workarounds
No practical workaround for self-hosted installations short of a reverse-proxy rule stripping/rejecting control characters in query parameters ahead of Probo. Upgrade once the patch is released.
References
- https://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-x7qq-m748-8p2c (parent advisory, CVE-2026-49820)
- https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#url-parsing (tab/newline stripping in the URL parser)
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogo.probo.inc/probo |
Sin parche | — | — | v0.216.1 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getprobo/probo/security/advisories/GHSA-p6m2-fv55-v5wpLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
