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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · nilsteampassnet/teampass

GHSA-P84Q-3H9H-QVH6

Password change and password recovery do not end the sessions opened before them

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 3.1
6.8
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión3.2.4.1
Exposición17 dDesde la divulgación, 4 nov 2026, 12:47 a. m.
Detección15 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir de cerca
Monitorear y programar la remediación
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico total. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
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Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
4 nov 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
4 nov 26
8 nov 26
13 nov 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-P84Q-3H9H-QVH6 divulgada · CVSS 6.8 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

A password change or a password recovery does not end the web session it is meant to evict. TeamPass accepts a web request while `users.key_tempo` equals the session's key and `users.session_end` is still in the future. The self-service password change and the e-mail recovery touch neither value, nor the session id. A session opened before the change, for instance a stolen session cookie, therefore keeps working after the change. The same holds when an administrator generates new keys and a new password for a user. API sessions (JWT) issued before the change are not revoked either.

Details

Paths under `app/sources/`, line numbers as of 3.2.4.0.

`PerformChecks::checkSession()` (`app/vendor/teampassclasses/performchecks/src/PerformChecks.php:86-102`) accepts a request when `key_tempo` equals the session key and `session_end` has not passed. Logout (`app/core/logout.php`) and the administrator disconnect (`users.queries.php:1294-1306`) clear both columns. The paths below clear neither:

  • Password change dialog: `change_user_auth_password` → `changeUserAuthenticationPassword()` (`main.queries.php:3671-3787`).
  • What it changes: the password hash and the re-encrypted private key.
  • What it keeps: the session id, `key_tempo`, `session_end` and the API sessions.
  • The key pair does not change, and the session keeps the private key in clear, so a session holder keeps decrypting every item.
  • E-mail recovery: `reset-password.php:159-189` → `handleUserKeys()`.
  • What it changes: a new password and key pair. Personal access tokens and device credentials are deleted.
  • What it keeps: `key_tempo`, `session_end` and the API sessions.
  • The owner's next sign-in, which would replace `key_tempo`, is refused until the background re-key finishes.
  • Administrator key generation for another user: `user_new_keys_generation` with a `user_id` (`main.queries.php:869-911`). Same as the recovery.
  • Profile path `change_pw`: `changePassword()` (`main.queries.php:1314-1461`).
  • It has the same gap, and it never verifies the current password.
  • On a standard schema it fails before writing anything, because it updates `users.fonction_id`, a column dropped in 3.1.5. That is why it only ran in the lab after the column was added back.

Lifetime: the session is not bounded by the 60-minute post-login window. `increase_session_time` (`main.queries.php:453-456`, `4078-4100`) added a client-supplied duration with no upper limit, so an active session holder could extend the session at will.

Who can still hold a session: every sign-in writes its new key to `key_tempo`, which evicts the account's other sessions. So after a change made by the user, the only remaining holder is whoever shares the user's own session id, typically through a copied cookie.

Not covered here: GHSA-2vf9-2qw7-8hmr. There, any session holder can replace the account password through the key generation endpoint without the current password.

Proof of concept

As reported:

  1. Hold a session of user U (a copy of U's session cookie).
  2. U changes their password in the dialog, or recovers it by e-mail.
  3. Requests made with the copied cookie still pass. After the dialog change, they still decrypt U's items.
Impact

The attacker must already hold a live session of the user; the issue grants no initial access. Given that session, the attacker:

  • keeps it after the user changes or recovers the password, which is the standard reaction to a suspected compromise;
  • could extend it beyond the configured maximum session duration.
Patches

Fixed in 3.2.4.1:

  • A password change made by the user regenerates the session id, destroys the old one, and revokes the user's API sessions.
  • A recovery, or an administrator key generation for another user, ends the account's web and API sessions, as an administrator disconnect does.
  • `change_pw` verifies the current password before any write.
  • `increase_session_time` can no longer extend a session beyond the maximum session duration counted from now.
Workarounds

After changing the password, sign out and sign in again: signing out clears the session key and ends the copied session. After a recovery, an administrator can disconnect the account (Users > Disconnect).

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
5.9/ 10Medio
Vector 5.9 (moderada) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
nilsteampassnet/teampass≥ 3.0.0.0 < 3.2.4.1
3.0.0.0
3.2.4.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistnilsteampassnet/teampass
Corregida 3.2.4.1 — —
Versiones corregidas3.2.4.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/security/advisories/GHSA-p84q-3h9h-qvh6

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.