GHSA-PCGW-QCV5-H8CH
Unsigned SAML LogoutRequest Acceptance in gosaml2
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-PCGW-QCV5-H8CH divulgada | |
| Remediación | Parche v0.11.0 | github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 · 0 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
The `ValidateEncodedLogoutRequestPOST` function in gosaml2 accepts completely unsigned SAML `LogoutRequest` messages even when `SkipSignatureValidation` is set to `false`. When `validateElementSignature` returns `dsig.ErrMissingSignature`, the code in `decode_logout_request.go:60-62` silently falls through to process the unverified XML element instead of rejecting it. An attacker who can reach the SP's Single Logout endpoint can forge a `LogoutRequest` for any user, terminating their session without possessing the IdP's signing key.
Affected Version
- Library: `github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2`
- Version: All versions up to and including the latest commit on `main` (as of 2026-03-16)
- File: `decode_logout_request.go`, lines 58-69
Vulnerable Code
// decode_logout_request.go:57-69
var requestSignatureValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// Unfortunately we just blew away our Response
el = doc.Root() // <-- BUG: falls through with unsigned element
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout request")
} else {
requestSignatureValidated = true
}
}When `ErrMissingSignature` is returned, the code resets `el` to the raw document root and continues. The `requestSignatureValidated` variable remains `false`, but no error is returned. The unsigned `LogoutRequest` is unmarshalled and passed to `ValidateDecodedLogoutRequest`, which performs attribute/issuer checks but does not verify that a signature was present.
Attack Details
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Attack vector | Network (HTTP POST to SLO endpoint) |
| Authentication required | None |
| Payload size | ~450 bytes (unsigned XML) |
| User interaction | None |
| Complexity | Low -- only requires knowledge of the SP's SLO URL and IdP issuer |
| CVSS estimate | 7.5 (High) -- Network/Low/None/None, Availability impact |
Impact
- Arbitrary session termination: An attacker can force-logout any user by forging a `LogoutRequest` with the victim's `NameID`. This is a targeted denial-of-service.
- Business disruption: Critical users (executives, admins, operators) can be repeatedly logged out, disrupting access to the application during incidents or time-sensitive operations.
- Security control bypass: If session termination triggers downstream effects (e.g., revoking tokens, clearing caches), an attacker can weaponize this to force re-authentication flows and potentially intercept them.
- No cryptographic material needed: The attacker does not need the IdP's private key. The forged request contains zero cryptographic elements.
Suggested Fix
When `ErrMissingSignature` is returned and `SkipSignatureValidation` is `false`, the function should return an error instead of falling through:
// decode_logout_request.go -- fixed version
var requestSignatureValidated bool
if !sp.SkipSignatureValidation {
el, err = sp.validateElementSignature(el)
if err == dsig.ErrMissingSignature {
// FIXED: reject unsigned requests when signature validation is required
return nil, fmt.Errorf("logout request is not signed: %w", dsig.ErrMissingSignature)
} else if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if el == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing transformed logout request")
} else {
requestSignatureValidated = true
}
}This ensures that unsigned `LogoutRequest` messages are rejected when `SkipSignatureValidation` is `false`, matching the behavior that operators expect when they configure signature enforcement.
Attached lab
f1_unsigned_logout.zip https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26038319/f1_unsigned_logout.zip
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 |
Corregida | v0.11.0 | 0 d | v0.12.0 no afectada |
0.11.0v0.11.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2/security/advisories/GHSA-pcgw-qcv5-h8chhttps://github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
