GHSA-PF96-P4FJ-6566
HTTPX2: Conflicting Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers can be auto-generated
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Remediación | Parche 2.11.0 | httpx2 · -21 d desde divulgación | |
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-PF96-P4FJ-6566 divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice |
Summary
HTTPX2 can automatically add a `Content-Length` header to a request that already contains a caller-supplied `Transfer-Encoding` header. The resulting HTTP/1.1 request contains both framing headers, which can create an ambiguous message boundary and enable request smuggling or connection desynchronization when processed by intermediaries that disagree about which header takes precedence.
Details
When a request body has a known size, HTTPX2's content encoder returns a default `Content-Length`. `Request._prepare()` applies each default header with `setdefault()`, which only checks whether that same header is already present. It does not check whether the mutually exclusive `Transfer-Encoding` header is present.
For example:
import httpx2
request = httpx2.Request(
"POST",
"http://example.com/",
headers={"Transfer-Encoding": "chunked"},
content=b"test 123",
)
print(request.headers)The request contains both:
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Length: 8On an HTTP/1.1 connection, the body is serialized using chunked transfer coding while both headers are sent on the wire. This violates HTTP message-framing requirements. Fixed-size byte, JSON, form, and known-length multipart bodies can reach the affected path.
Streaming bodies with an explicit `Content-Length` are not affected in current HTTPX2 releases because the automatically generated `Transfer-Encoding` is already suppressed in that direction.
Impact
An attacker may be able to use the conflicting framing headers as a request-smuggling or desynchronization primitive. Exploitation requires an application to pass attacker-controlled request framing headers and associated body data to HTTPX2, use HTTP/1.1, and communicate through a proxy or origin that accepts conflicting headers and interprets them differently from another hop.
Depending on the downstream infrastructure, successful exploitation could interfere with requests sharing a persistent connection, bypass front-end routing or authorization decisions, or poison responses or caches. Applications that do not forward attacker-controlled `Transfer-Encoding` headers are not directly exposed.
Mitigation
Upgrade to HTTPX2 `2.11.0` or later. Patched versions treat `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` as mutually exclusive when applying automatically generated request headers.
If upgrading is not immediately possible, remove `Transfer-Encoding` and other hop-by-hop framing headers from untrusted input before constructing outbound requests. Applications acting as proxies should derive outbound framing from the body rather than forwarding inbound `Content-Length` or `Transfer-Encoding` headers.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
pypihttpx2 |
Corregida | 2.11.0 | -21 d | 2.16.2 no afectada |
2.11.0Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84380https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/security/advisories/GHSA-pf96-p4fj-6566https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/pull/1137https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/commit/829b93a2393212996f613e635261f777d9ec6eabhttps://github.com/pydantic/httpx2https://github.com/pydantic/httpx2/releases/tag/v2.11.0Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
