GHSA-PQMP-PRWX-HF35
Cross-user login through a stale authentication challenge
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Fuente: GitHub
Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad
| Fecha | Fase | Evento | Detalle |
|---|---|---|---|
| Divulgación | Publicada | GHSA-PQMP-PRWX-HF35 divulgada · CVSS 7.6 (GitHub) | |
| Divulgación | Modificada | Última actualización del registro | |
| Monitoreo | Detectada | Ingresó al índice | |
| Monitoreo | Verificada | Última verificación contra las fuentes |
TL;DR
This vulnerability affects Kirby sites that enable a code-based login method (a one-time login code or password reset by email) and that might have potential attackers in the group of users who can request such a code.
An attacker who controls a single account and knows a victim's email address could use it to log in as that victim, without any interaction from the victim.
Sites that only use password login are *not* affected; that is the default. Two-factor authentication is *not* affected.
This vulnerability is of high severity for affected sites.
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Affected components
Kirby's `Kirby\Cms\Auth` class implements one-time login codes. They are reached wherever the `auth.methods` option enables the `code` or `password-reset` login method.
Two challenge types ship with Kirby. The email challenge is the default implementation and verifies a submitted code against state held in the session. The TOTP challenge verifies against the target user's own secret and is not affected, which is why two-factor authentication is out of scope.
Impact
In affected releases, a challenge request that failed left the previously issued challenge type and code behind in the session. A submitted code was therefore not guaranteed to belong to the account it was being used to log into.
An attacker holding one account whose email they can read, and knowing the victim's email address, could exploit this to authenticate as that victim. The victim can be any user, so a low-privileged account can be escalated to a full administrator account. No interaction from the victim is required at any point.
Where the `password-reset` method is enabled, the attacker could also set a new password for the victim's account.
Patches
The problem has been patched in Kirby 5.6.0 https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/5.6.0 and Kirby 4.9.6 https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/releases/tag/4.9.6.
In these releases, `Auth::createChallenge()` removes any previously stored challenge type and code from the session before it starts a new challenge.
Note that an account whose password was changed through this before the patch stays accessible to the attacker until that password is changed again.
Workarounds
Until you can update, remove the `code` and `password-reset` methods from the `auth.methods` option, leaving password login only.
Credits
Thanks to Bruno Meilick (@bnomei) for responsibly reporting the identified issue.
Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.
Desglose de métricas
Rangos afectados
Estado del parche por paquete
| Paquete / producto | Estado | Corregida en | Desde divulgación | Última versión |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Packagistgetkirby/cms |
Sin parche | — | — | — |
Arsenal público
Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.
https://github.com/getkirby/kirby/security/advisories/GHSA-pqmp-prwx-hf35Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.
