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Advisory · GitHub · Packagist · php-standard-library/dnssec

GHSA-PQP4-HJ5Q-H473

DNSSEC SecureResolver and TrustChainResolver accept forged and unsigned DNS data as validated

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CVSS 3.1
5.9
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versión6.4.0
Exposición24 dDesde la divulgación, 27 oct 2026, 8:46 p. m.
Detección22 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Agenda, parchea y celebra con un mate.Sin drama: ventana de mantenimiento y listo.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Explotación
Remediación
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
28 oct 26
19 nov 26
21 nov 26
28 oct 26
3 nov 26
9 nov 26
15 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PQP4-HJ5Q-H473 divulgada · CVSS 5.9 (GitHub)
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Impact

`Psl\DNSSEC\SecureResolver` and `Psl\DNSSEC\TrustChainResolver` are documented to verify that DNS responses have not been tampered with. They skipped several checks that RFC 4035 requires of a validating resolver, so forged DNS data could pass validation. In the simplest cases the attacker needs no DNSSEC key and no valid signature.

An attacker who can change the responses that reach the resolver wrapped by `SecureResolver` can:

  • Forge any answer for a name in a signed zone. Only RRsets that had an RRSIG were verified, and an RRSIG over an RRset that was not in the response was skipped, so a forged `A` record next to one junk RRSIG was returned as validated, with the upstream AD flag left set.
  • Sign names of another zone with the keys of their own zone. The RRSIG signer was not tied to the zone of the signed name or to the owner of the DNSKEY. Records for `www.victim.example` signed by any DNSSEC-signed zone the attacker controls were accepted, and an RRSIG that named any unsigned zone as its signer made the whole response skip validation.
  • Replace the keys of a zone, including the root. A DNSKEY RRset was accepted when any key in it had signed it, not only a key matched by the parent DS record or the root trust anchor, so a key added by the attacker could sign the set that contains it. DS RRsets and DS denial proofs were accepted without a valid signature whenever an unrelated RRSIG was present, the parent zone was taken from the first RRSIG, and DS owners were not compared with the queried zone. A forged chain cached by `CachedTrustChainResolver` is reused by later queries.
  • Downgrade a signed zone to insecure, where answers are returned without validation and with AD cleared. Any proof that a DS record is absent marked a zone insecure, including proofs for hosts and empty non-terminals inside a signed zone and proofs signed by a zone other than the closest validated parent, and a single covering NSEC3 Opt-Out record was accepted without the closest encloser proof.
  • Forge NXDOMAIN and NODATA answers. NSEC, NSEC3 and SOA records in the authority section could borrow unrelated signatures, only the signer of the first RRSIG was resolved, a proof from a parent zone could deny names below a secure child zone, and an NXDOMAIN that followed a signed CNAME or DNAME needed no denial proof for the final target.
  • Replay a signed wildcard RRset for names that exist. A valid wildcard signature was accepted without the NSEC or NSEC3 proof that the queried name does not exist.

Applications are affected when they use `SecureResolver` (with `TrustChainResolver`, `CachedTrustChainResolver` or `StaticTrustChainResolver`) to authenticate DNS data, for example TLSA records for DANE, SSHFP records, or the addresses they connect to. A `CachedResolver` placed on top stores the forged answers. The resolvers of `php-standard-library/dns` do not validate DNSSEC on their own and are not covered by this advisory.

The attack is remote and needs no authentication or user interaction, but the attacker must be able to supply DNS responses to the application: a position on the network path between the application and its recursive resolver, control of that resolver or of a forwarder, a poisoned cache in a non-validating upstream resolver, or a won spoofing race against the UDP resolver. These are the attackers that DNSSEC validation exists to stop.

Patches

Fixed in 6.4.0 https://github.com/php-standard-library/php-standard-library/releases/tag/6.4.0.

  • A DNSKEY RRset must be signed by a key that matches a validated DS record or root trust anchor. Every DS and denial proof RRset used to build the chain needs its own valid RRSIG from the closest validated zone, and DS owners must equal the queried zone.
  • The RRSIG signer must equal the DNSKEY owner, and signed owners must lie at or below the zone of the signer. An insecure signer skips validation only for names that its zone contains.
  • Every RRset of the query name and of each CNAME and DNAME link is validated with the keys of its own zone. Unrelated answer RRsets are stripped, and alias loops and unbounded DNAME expansion are rejected.
  • Every NSEC, NSEC3 and SOA RRset in the authority section must carry its own valid signature from the zone of the query name.
  • A delegation is insecure only when the denial proves an unsigned zone cut. NSEC3 Opt-Out needs the closest provable encloser and an Opt-Out record that covers the next closer name.
  • NXDOMAIN after a CNAME or DNAME chain needs a signed denial for the final target, and is rejected when that target is in the answer. Wildcard answers need signed NSEC or NSEC3 proof that expansion applies, and AD is cleared for NSEC3 Opt-Out.
  • The DNS decoder rejects records of classes other than IN (except OPT), and adds `DNAMERecord` and `RecordType::DNAME` so that DNAME substitutions can be verified. `php-standard-library/dnssec` 6.4.0 requires `php-standard-library/dns` `^6.4`, so Composer upgrades `dns` with it.
  • DNSKEY records passed to `StaticTrustChainResolver` must now be owned by the zone name they are configured for.

The release adds regression tests built from signed Ed25519 fixtures. Run against the 6.3.0 validator, 59 of them fail, most because a forged response is accepted.

Workarounds

None in the validator. Exposure to network attackers can be reduced by sending queries only to a trusted validating resolver over an authenticated channel (`TCPResolver` with a TLS connector, or `HTTPSResolver`), but that trusts the upstream resolver instead of validating locally. `SecureResolver` should not be relied on to authenticate DNS data before 6.4.0.

References

  • RFC 4033, RFC 4034 and RFC 4035 (DNSSEC), in particular RFC 4035 sections 5.2, 5.3.1, 5.3.4 and 5.4
  • RFC 5155 sections 8.3, 8.6, 8.8, 8.9 and 9.2 (NSEC3 proofs and Opt-Out)
  • RFC 6672 (DNAME redirection)
  • RFC 6840 sections 4.1 and 4.4 (DNSSEC clarifications)
  • https://github.com/php-standard-library/php-standard-library/releases/tag/6.4.0
Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:N
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:H
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida
php-standard-library/dnssec · php-standard-library/php-standard-library≥ 6.2.0 < 6.4.0
6.2.0
6.4.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
Packagistphp-standard-library/dnssec
Corregida 6.4.0 — —
Packagistphp-standard-library/php-standard-library
Corregida 6.4.0 — —
Versiones corregidas6.4.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/php-standard-library/php-standard-library/security/advisories/GHSA-pqp4-hj5q-h473

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