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Advisory · GitHub · Go · github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8

GHSA-PR34-75C7-F9H3

Chromium host-resolver rules disable WebSocket private-IP enforcement

Parche disponible
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CVSS 3.1
5.9
Media
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Fuente: GitHub
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -6 d de la divulgación
Exposición10 dDesde la divulgación, 11 nov 2026, 2:18 a. m.
Detección7 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Decisión estimadaSeguir
Remediar en la ventana regular de mantenimiento
Estimación de Llama con el árbol SSVC de CISA a partir de vector CVSS 3.1 y la evidencia de explotación (sin evaluación oficial): sin explotación conocida, no automatizable e impacto técnico parcial. Hay versiones corregidas disponibles.
Rumio tranquila, pero no me olvido de esta.Tu backlog la recibirá con los brazos abiertos.
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche v8.40.0
Monitoreo
Detectada +1
5 nov 26
11 nov 26
14 nov 26
18 nov 26
21 nov 26
5 nov 26
9 nov 26
13 nov 26
17 nov 26
21 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche v8.40.0 github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 · -6 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PR34-75C7-F9H3 divulgada · CVSS 5.9 (GitHub)
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Monitoreo Verificada Última verificación contra las fuentes
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

An API caller can submit HTML that opens a WebSocket to a private network service.
When Gotenberg is configured with `CHROMIUM_DENY_PRIVATE_IPS=true` and any
nonempty `CHROMIUM_HOST_RESOLVER_RULES`, the renderer logs that the target is
non-public but does not block the connection. An isolated exact-image test read a
fake private WebSocket secret and rendered it into the returned PDF, while the
identical request was blocked when the unrelated resolver override was absent.

Details

Affected version and preconditions

  • Repository: `https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg.git`
  • Commit: `e4ee0f29d648f8d5a0a766dd797d108361905deb`
  • Version: 8.38.1 source commit on `main` at the tested commit (same code as the 8.38.0 Docker image)
  • Minimum attacker privilege: API caller able to submit attacker-controlled HTML; this is
  • Victim interaction: none
  • Default configuration: no
  • Other conditions: the deployment enables `CHROMIUM_DENY_PRIVATE_IPS` and also

Root cause

The `--chromium-deny-private-ips` option is documented as rejecting non-public
destinations to mitigate SSRF (`pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:484`). Chromium
normally starts an internal pinning proxy that validates and pins every outbound
destination (`pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:204`). WebSocket handshakes are not
surfaced through the CDP request-pausing API, so the code states that this proxy
is the only enforcement layer that can block them
(`pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:222`).

However, setting any custom host-resolver rule disables the pinning proxy
entirely, even when a deny-private policy is active
(`pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:194` and
`pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:215`). The remaining WebSocket event listener
calls `FilterOutboundURL`, but on rejection it only writes a warning and cannot
abort the handshake (`pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:54` and
`pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:85`). Module validation does not reject or warn
about this incompatible option combination
(`pkg/modules/chromium/chromium.go:693`). The result is a configured private-IP
restriction that logs a warning but does not block WebSockets. The public
outbound-filtering documentation notes that custom host-resolver rules skip DNS
pinning; it does not say this makes WebSocket private-IP denial warning-only.

Remediation

Make outbound-policy enforcement fail closed when custom routing options are
present. Reject startup when an IP policy is combined with a resolver or proxy
override that removes the only WebSocket enforcement layer, or preserve an
enforcement proxy that honors the operator's routing configuration while still
validating every WebSocket destination. A warning emitted after the handshake is
not sufficient. Add integration tests for private WebSockets with host-resolver
rules, custom proxies, environment proxies, redirecting services, and Web Workers.

Proof of concept
  1. From a clean checkout at the tested commit, build the exact source image:

```bash
docker build --progress=plain \
--file build/Dockerfile \
--target gotenberg \
--build-arg GOTENBERG_VERSION=e4ee0f2 \
--label com.codex.review.revision=e4ee0f29d648f8d5a0a766dd797d108361905deb \
--tag codex-gotenberg:e4ee0f2 .
```

  1. Ensure Docker, Docker Compose, Bash, Python 3, and `pdftotext` are available.
  2. From this finding directory, run `./reproduce.sh`. The wrapper starts an
  3. The negative control uses `CHROMIUM_DENY_PRIVATE_IPS=true` without resolver
  4. The treatment uses the same policy and HTML plus the unrelated rule
  5. Confirm the summary contains `websocket_host_resolver_bypass=present` and
  6. Cleanup is automatic on success, failure, or interruption. After all target
Impact

The exact pinned image demonstrated server-side access to a Docker-internal
WebSocket and exfiltration of its harmless secret through an attacker-controlled
PDF. This crosses the private-network boundary that the enabled deny-private
option is intended to enforce. A deployment exposing an internal WebSocket that
returns credentials, administrative state, or privileged responses could disclose
that data to an API caller.

The finding is classified `medium`: exploitation needs a non-default combination
of a deny-private policy and custom resolver rules, plus a useful reachable
WebSocket service. The test did not demonstrate arbitrary HTTP SSRF, code
execution, real cloud-metadata access, or access to a real sensitive service. A
separate attempt to read a mounted local file was blocked by the file-URL filter,
and Chromium's DevTools endpoint used a random local port and browser identifier,
so no Critical chain was reproduced.

Provisional CVSS v3.1: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` (5.9). This scores the demonstrated read of a private WebSocket response; the non-default resolver configuration and useful private target are prerequisites.

Patches

Fixed on `main` for 8.40.0 by 9243257 https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/9243257cb442929f19602247699d47d8a37b0e4b, and on `next` for 9.0.0 by c462a2e https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/c462a2ebf5542005740337a6a232ab3f10ef801d. Host-resolver rules no longer turn the pinning proxy off. Gotenberg parses the rules with Chromium's `MAP` and `EXCLUDE` semantics and applies them in the outbound checks and in the proxy, so a WebSocket to a private address is refused with `CHROMIUM_DENY_PRIVATE_IPS` set, from a page and from a Web Worker. An invalid rule stops Gotenberg at startup. `--chromium-proxy-server` still hands WebSockets to the operator's proxy, and Gotenberg now logs a startup warning when it is combined with an outbound policy.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Vector CVSS 3.1

Desglose de métricas

Opción resaltada = valor del vector · izquierda = peor caso · GitHub
Vector de ataqueAV:N
RedAdyacenteLocalFísica
ComplejidadAC:H
BajaAlta
PrivilegiosPR:N
NingunoBajosAltos
InteracciónUI:N
NingunaRequerida
AlcanceS:U
CambiadoSin cambio
ConfidencialidadC:H
AltoBajoNinguno
IntegridadI:N
AltoBajoNinguno
DisponibilidadA:N
AltoBajoNinguno
Score de explotaciónQué tan fácil y probable es que la exploten
7.1/ 10Alto
Vector 7.1 (fácil) · sin evidencia de explotación.
Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8≤ 8.39.0
8.39.0
v8.40.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
gogithub.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
Corregida v8.40.0 -6 d v8.40.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidasv8.40.0
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-pr34-75c7-f9h3

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.