llamaCVEVulnerability Intelligence
/
Advisory · GitHub · crates.io · zebrad

GHSA-PVMV-CWG8-V6C8

Zebra v4.4.0 still accepts V5 SIGHASH_SINGLE without a corresponding output

Parche disponible
Descargar PNG JSON
CVSS
—
critical
Fuente: —
ExplotaciónSin evidenciaNo figura en CISA KEV
Exploits públicos0Ninguno conocido
Parche2 versionesPrimer parche a -4 d de la divulgación
Exposición195 dDesde la divulgación, 8 may 2026, 1:27 p. m.
Detección192 dDesde la divulgación hasta su ingreso al índice
Timeline

Ciclo de vida de la vulnerabilidad

Hoy
Divulgación
Publicada
Modificada
Explotación
Remediación
Parche 4.4.1 +1
Monitoreo
Detectada
4 may 26
8 may 26
3 oct 26
17 nov 26
19 nov 26
4 may 26
23 jun 26
12 ago 26
1 oct 26
19 nov 26
FechaFaseEventoDetalle
Remediación Parche 4.4.1 zebrad · -4 d desde divulgación
Remediación Parche 6.0.1 zebra-script · -4 d desde divulgación
Divulgación Publicada GHSA-PVMV-CWG8-V6C8 divulgada
Divulgación Modificada Última actualización del registro
Monitoreo Detectada Ingresó al índice
Resumen
Descripción del advisory
Texto original · GitHub · en inglés

Consensus Divergence in V5 Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE With No Corresponding Output

Summary

Zebra failed to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule for V5 transparent transactions: when an input is signed with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` and there is no transparent output at the same index as that input, validation must fail. Zebra instead asked the underlying sighash library to compute a digest, and that library produced a digest over an empty output set rather than failing. An attacker could craft a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but `zcashd` rejects, creating a consensus split between Zebra and `zcashd` nodes.

A previous fix (`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp` https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp) addressed a closely related case in the same area of the code, but did not cover this specific one.

Severity

Critical - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.

Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`.

Affected Versions

Zebra 4.4.0.

Description

Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code is called from Zebra through a foreign function interface (FFI), with a Rust callback that computes the sighash for each input being verified.

ZIP-244 §S.2a marks two situations as consensus failure for V5 transparent signatures:

  1. The signed hash type is not one of the six canonical values; and
  2. The hash type is `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (alone or combined with `ANYONECANPAY`) and the input has no transparent output at the same index.

`zcashd` enforces both rules: its `SignatureHash` raises an exception, and `CheckSig` catches it and fails the script. A previous fix (`GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp`) added the first rule to Zebra's V5 sighash callback. The second rule, however, was not added — Zebra's callback forwarded the request to `librustzcash`'s ZIP-244 implementation, which handles an out-of-range `SIGHASH_SINGLE` output index by hashing an empty output set rather than refusing to produce a digest. As a result, Zebra would compute a well-defined sighash for the missing-output case and accept any signature that verified against it.

An attacker could exploit this by:

  • Constructing a V5 transaction with two or more transparent inputs and fewer transparent outputs;
  • Signing an input whose index has no matching `vout` entry with `SIGHASH_SINGLE` (`0x03`) or `SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY` (`0x83`), using the digest Zebra computes;
  • Broadcasting the transaction, or a block containing it, to the network.

Zebra would verify the transaction's transparent script and accept the transaction (and any block containing it), while `zcashd` would reject both, splitting Zebra nodes from the rest of the network.

Impact

Consensus Failure

  • Attack Vector: Network.
  • Effect: Network partition/consensus split.
  • Scope: Any affected Zebra node.

Fixed Versions

This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.4.1.

Mitigation

Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.4.1 or later immediately.

There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.

Credits

Zebra thanks @sangsoo-osec, @zmanian, and @fivelittleducks for finding and reporting the issue.

Incluye detalles técnicos publicados por el investigador. Úselos solo para validar y corregir sus propios sistemas.

Versiones

Rangos afectados

Afectada Corregida Última
zebrad< 4.4.1
zebra-script< 6.0.1
4.4.1
6.0.1
7.0.0
14.0.0
Remediación

Estado del parche por paquete

Paquete / productoEstadoCorregida enDesde divulgaciónÚltima versión
crates.iozebrad
Corregida 4.4.1 -4 d 7.0.0 no afectada
crates.iozebra-script
Corregida 6.0.1 -4 d 14.0.0 no afectada
Versiones corregidas4.4.16.0.1
Explotación

Arsenal público

Sin exploits, módulos ni PoC públicos conocidos a la fecha de verificación.

Referencias
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-pvmv-cwg8-v6c8
Otrahttps://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra

Las referencias externas se muestran para copiar: cve.llama.ec no lo redirige a otros sitios.